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(2) is of a character to which the employee may have 
had substantial exposure outside of employment or to 
which the general public is commonly exposed; 
(3) is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not 
itself compensable; or 
(4) when disability or death from any other cause not 
itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, 
or m any way contributed to by an occupational disease. 
1997 
34A-3-111. Compensation not additional to that pro-
vided for accidents . 
The compensation provided under this chapter is not in 
addition to compensation that may be payable under Chapter 
2, and in all cases when injury results by reason of an accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment and compen-
sation is payable for the injury under Chapter 2, compensation 
under this chapter may not be payable. 1997 
34A-3-112. Employee's willful misconduct. 
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this chapter, an 
employee or dependent of any employee is not entitled to 
receive compensation for disability or death from an occupa-
tional disease when the disability or death, wholly or in part, 
was caused by the purposeful self-exposure of the employee. 
(2) Except in cases resulting in death: 
(a) Compensation provided for in this chapter shall be 
reduced 15% when the occupational disease is caused by 
the willful failure of the employee: 
(i) to use safety devices when provided by the 
employer; or 
(ii) to obey any order or reasonable rule adopted by 
the employer for the safety of the employee. 
(b) Except when the employer permitted, encouraged, 
or had actual knowledge of the conduct described in 
Subsections (2XbXi) through (iii), disability compensation 
may not be awarded under this chapter to an employee 
when the major contributing cause of the employee's 
disease is the employee's: 
(i) use of illegal substances; 
(ii) intentional abuse of drugs in excess of pre-
scribed therapeutic amounts; or 
(iii) intoxication from alcohol with a blood or 
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
as shown by a chemical test. 1997 
CHAPTER 4 
HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICE FOR DISABLED 
MINERS 
Section 
34A-4-101. 
34A-4-102. 
Who entitled. 
Application for benefits. 
34A-4-101. Who entit led. 
(1) Certain disabled miners meeting the requirements of 
Section 34A-4-102 shall be entitled to, and shall receive, the 
free hospital and medical service provided for in this chapter. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), in the event occupa-
tional diseases are made compensable under Chapter 2 or 3, 
no employer or insurance carrier shall be permitted to evade 
payment under Chapter 2 or 3 by compelling a disabled miner 
to avail himself of the benefits provided for in this chapter. 
1997 
34A-4-102. Application for benefits. 
To be entitled to the free hospital and medical service 
provided for in Section 34A-4-101, a disabled miner applying 
for benefits shall be required to establish under oath the 
following facts, which shall be conditions precedent to the 
granting of the free service provided for in this chapter: 
(1) that he is and has been a resident of this state for a 
period of two years immediately preceding the filing of his 
application; 
(2) that he has been employed in the mines of this state 
for a period of at least five years and that the disability 
from which he is suffering and for which he is in need of 
hospital and medical treatment is due to such employ-
ment; 
(3) that he is physically incapable of entering remu-
nerative employment and holding a job; 
(4) that his disability is such that hospital and medical 
attention is necessary: and 
(5) that he is financially unable to secure and pp** for 
hospital and medical service 1997 
CHAPTER 5 
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT 
Section 
34A-5-101. Title. 
34A-5-102. Definitions. 
34A-5-103. Repealed. 
34A-5-104. Powers. 
34A-5-105. Antidiscrimination and Labor Advisory Coun-
cil — Membership — Appointment — Term 
— Powers and duties — Chair. 
34A-5-106. Discriminatory or unfair employment prac-
tices — Permitted practices. 
34A-5-107. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim — 
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings 
— Settlement — Reconsideration — Deter-
mination. 
34A-5-108. Judicial enforcement of division findings. 
34A-5-101. Title. 
This chapter shall be known as the "Utah Antidiscrimina-
tion Act." 1997 
34A-5-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Apprenticeship" means a program for the training 
of apprentices including a program providing the training 
of those persons defined as apprentices by Section 35A-6-
102. 
(2) "Bona fide occupational qualification" means a char-
acteristic applying to an employee: 
(a) that is necessary to the operation; or 
(b) is the essence of the employee's employer's 
business. 
(3) "Court" means: 
(a) the district court in the judicial district of the 
state in which the asserted unfair employment prac-
tice occurred; or 
(b) if this court is not in session at that time, a 
judge of the court described in Subsection (3Xa). 
(4) "Director" means the director of the division. 
(5) "Disability" means a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of an individual's 
major life activities. 
(6) "Division" means the Division of Antidiscrimination 
and Labor. 
(7) "Employee" means any person applying with or 
employed by an employer 
(8) (a) "Employer" means-
(1) the state; 
(ii) any political subdivision; 
529 UTAH LABOR CODE 34A-5-104 
(iii) a board, commission, department, institu-
tion, school district, trust, or agent of the state or 
its political subdivisions; or 
(iv) a person employing 15 or more employees 
within the state for each working day IL each of 
20 calendar weeks or more in the current or 
preceding calendar year. 
(b) "Employer" does not include: 
(i) a religious organization or association; 
(ii) a religious corporation sole; or 
(iii) any corporation or association constitut-
ing a wholly owned subsidiary or agency of any 
religious organization or association or religious 
corporation sole. 
(9) "Employment agency" means any person: 
(a) undertaking to procure employees or opportu-
nities to work for any other person; or 
(b) holding itself out to be equipped to take an 
action described in Subsection (9Xa). 
(10) "Joint apprenticeship committee" means any asso-
ciation of representatives of a labor organization and an 
employer providing, coordinating, or controlling an ap-
prentice training program. 
Ul ) "Labor organization" means any organization that 
exists for the purpose in whole or in part of: 
(a) collective bargaining; 
(b) dealing with employers concerning grievances, 
terms or conditions of employment; or 
(c) other mutual aid or protection in connection 
with employment. 
(12) "National origin" means the place of birth, domi-
cile, or residence of an individual or of an individual's 
ancestors. 
(13) "On-the-job-training" means any program de-
signed to instruct a person who, while learning the 
particular job for which the person is receiving instruc-
tion: 
(a) is also employed at that job; or 
(b) may be employed by the employer conducting 
the program during the course of the program, or 
when the program is completed. 
(14) "Person" means one or more individuals, partner-
ships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, 
trusts or trustees, receivers, the state and all political 
subdivisions and agencies of the state. 
(15) "Presiding officer" means the same as that term is 
defined in Section 63-46b-2. 
(16) "Prohibited employment practice" means a prac-
tice specified as discriminatory, and therefore unlawful, in 
Section 34A-5-106. 
(17) "Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action by 
an employer, employment agency, labor organization, ap-
prenticeship program, on-the-job training program, or 
vocational school against one of its employees, applicants, 
or members because the employee, applicant, or member: 
(a) has opposed any employment practice prohib-
ited under this chapter; or 
(b) filed charges, testified, assisted, or participated 
in any way in any proceeding, investigation, or hear-
ing under this chapter. 
(18) "Vocational school" means any school or institution 
conducting a course of instruction, training, or retraining 
to prepare individuals to follow an occupation or trade, or 
to pursue a manual, technical, industrial, business, com-
mercial, office, personal services, or other nonprofessional 
occupations. 199» 
34A-5-103. Repealed. i«w 
34A-5-104. Powers. 
(1) (a) The commission has jurisdiction over the subject of 
employment practices and discrimination made unlawful 
by this chapter. 
(b) The commission may adopt, publish, amend, and 
rescind rules, consistent with, and for the enforcement of 
this chapter. 
(2) The division may: 
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators 
and other employees and agents that it considers neces-
sary for the enforcement of this chapter; 
(b) receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon com-
plaints alleging: 
(i) discrimination in: 
(A) employment; 
(B) apprenticeship programs; 
(C) on-the-job training programs; and 
(D) vocational schools; or 
(ii) the existence of a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice by: 
(A) a person; 
(B) an employer; 
(C) an employment agency; 
(D) a labor organization; 
(E) the employees or members of an employ-
ment agency or labor organization; 
(F) a joint apprenticeship committee; and 
(G) vocational school; 
(c) investigate and study the existence, character, 
causes, and extent of discrimination in employment, ap-
prenticeship programs, on-the-job training programs, and 
vocational schools in this state by: 
(i) employers; 
(ii) employment agencies; 
(iii) labor organizations; 
(iv) joint apprenticeship committees; and 
(v) vocational schools; 
(d) formulate plans for the elimination of discrimina-
tion by educational or other means; 
(e) hold hearings upon complaint made against: 
(i) a person; 
(ii) an employer; 
(iii) an employment agency; 
(iv) a labor organization; 
(v) the employees or members of an employment 
agency or labor organization; 
(vi) a joint apprenticeship committee; or 
(vii) a vocational school; 
(f) issue publications and reports of investigations and 
research that: 
(i) promote good will among the various racial, 
religious, and ethnic groups of the state; and 
(ii) minimize or eliminate discrimination in em-
ployment because of race, color, sex, religion, national 
origin, age, or disability; 
(g) prepare and transmit to the governor, at least once 
each year, reports describing: 
(i) its proceedings, investigations, and hearings; 
(ii) the outcome of those hearings; 
(iii) decisions the division has rendered; and 
(iv) the other work performed by the division; 
(h) recommend policies to the governor, and submit 
recommendation to employers, employment agencies, and 
labor organizations to implement those policies; 
(i) recommend any legislation concerning discrimina-
tion because of race, sex, color, national origin, religion, 
age, or disability to the governor that it considers neces-
sary; and 
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(j) within the limits of any appropriations made for its 
operation, cooperate with other agencies or organizations, 
both public and private, in the planning and conducting of 
educational programs designed to eliminate discrimina-
tory practices prohibited under this chapter. 
(3) The division shall investigate alleged discriminatory 
practices involving officers or employees of state government if 
requested to do so by the Career Service Review Board. 
(4) (a) In any hearing held under this chapter, the division 
may: 
(i) subpoena witnesses and compel their atten-
dance at the hearing; 
(ii) administer oaths and take the testimony of any 
person under oath; and 
(iii) compel any person to produce for examination 
any books, papers, or other information relating to 
the matters raised by the complaint. 
(b) The division director or a hearing examiner ap-
pointed by the division director may conduct hearings. 
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a subpoena 
issued by the division, the division may petition the 
district court to enforce the subpoena. 
(d) In the event a witness asserts a privilege against 
self-incrimination, testimony and evidence from the wit-
ness may be compelled pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 22b, 
Grants of Immunity. 1999 
34A-5-105. Antidiscrimination and Labor Advisory 
Council — Membership — Appointment — 
Term — Powers and duties — Chair. 
(1) There is created an Antidiscrimination and Labor Advi-
sory Council consisting of: 
(a) 17 voting members appointed by the commissioner 
as follows: 
(i) four employer representatives; 
(ii) four employee representatives; 
(iii) two representatives of persons who seek to 
rent or purchase dwellings as denned in Section 
57-21-2; 
(iv) two representatives of persons who: 
(A) sell or rent dwellings; and 
(B) are subject to Title 57, Chapter 21, Utah 
Fair Housing Act; and 
(v) five representatives of the general public; and 
(b) the commissioner or the commissioner's designee as 
a nonvoting member of the council. 
(2) In making the appointments under Subsection (1), the 
commissioner shall consider representation of the following 
protected classes: 
(a) race; 
(b) color; 
(c) national origin; 
(d) gender; 
(e) religion; 
(f) age; 
(g) persons with disabilities; 
(h) familial status as defined in Section 57-21-2; and 
(i) source of income as defined in Section 57-21-2. 
(3) The division shall provide any necessary staff support 
for the council. 
(4) (a) Except as required by Subsection (4Kb), as terms of 
current council members expire, the commissioner shall 
appoint each new member or reappointed member to a 
four-year term. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection 
(4Xa), the commissioner shall, at the time of appointment 
or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure 
that the terms of council members are staggered so that 
approximately half of the council is appointed every two 
years. 
(5) (a) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unex-
pired term. 
(b) The commissioner shall terminate the term of a 
council member who ceases to be representative as desig-
nated by the original appointment. 
(6) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees 
shall receive no compensation or benefits for their 
services, but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official 
duties at the rates established by the Division of 
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service, 
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members 
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from 
their agency for their service may receive per diem 
and expenses incurred in the performance of their 
official duties from the council at the rates estab-
lished by the Division of Finance under Sections 
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) State government officer and employee mem-
bers may decline to receive per diem and expenses for 
their service. 
(7) (a) The advisory council shall offer advice on issues 
requested by the commission, division, and the Legisla-
ture and also make recommendations to the commission 
and division regarding issues: 
(i) of employment discrimination; 
(ii) housing discrimination; and 
(iii) related to the administration by the commis-
sion of: 
(A) the provisions of Title 34, Labor in Gen-
eral, that are administered by the commission; 
(B) Title 34A, Chapter 5, Utah Antidiscrimi-
nation Act; and 
(C) Title 57, Chapter 21, Utah Fair Housing 
Act. 
(b) The council shall confer at least quarterly for the 
purpose of advising the commission, division, and the 
Legislature regarding issues described in Subsection 
(7Xa). 
(8) The commissioner or the commissioner's designee shall 
serve as chair. The chair is charged with the responsibility of 
calling the necessary meetings. 2000 
34A-5-106. Disc r imina to ry or unfair employment prac-
tices — Permitted practices. 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
to take any action described in Subsections UXa) through (f). 
(a) (i) An employer may not refuse to hire, promote, 
discharge, demote, or terminate any person, or to 
retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters 
of compensation or in terms, privileges, and condi-
tions of employment against any person otherwise 
qualified, because of: 
(A) race; 
(B) color; 
(C) sex; 
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions; 
(E) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older; 
(F) religion; 
(G) national origin; or 
(H) disability. 
(ii) An applicant or candidate for any job or posi-
tion may not be considered "otherwise qualified," 
unless the applicant or candidate possesses the edu-
cation, training, ability, moral character, integrity, 
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disposition to work, adherence to reasonable rules 
and regulations, and other job related qualifications 
required by an employer for any particular job, job 
classification, or position to be filled or created, 
(iii) (A) As used in this chapter, "to discriminate in 
matters of compensation" means the payment of 
differing wages or salaries to employees having 
substantially equal experience, responsibilities, 
and skill for the particular job. 
(B) Notwithstanding Subsection (lXaXiiiXA): 
(I) nothing in this chapter prevents in-
creases in pay as a result of longevity with 
the employer, if the salary increases are 
uniformly applied and available to all em-
ployees on a substantially proportional ba-
sis; and 
(II) nothing in this section prohibits an 
employer and employee from agreeing to a 
rate of pay or work schedule designed to 
protect the employee from loss of Social 
Security payment or benefits if the employee 
is eligible for those payments. 
(b) An employment agency may not: 
(i) refuse to list and properly classify for employ-
ment, or refuse to refer an individual for employment, 
in a known available job for which the individual is 
otherwise qualified, because of: 
(A) race; 
(B) color; 
(C) sex; 
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions; 
(E) religion; 
(F) national origin; 
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older; or 
(H) disability; 
(ii) comply with a request from an employer for 
referral of applicants for employment if the request 
indicates either directly or indirectly that the em-
ployer discriminates in employment on account of: 
(A) race; 
(B) color; 
(C) sex; 
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions; 
(E) religion; 
(F) national origin; 
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older, or 
(H) disability. 
(c) A labor organization may not exclude any individual 
otherwise qualified from full membership rights in the 
labor organization, expel the individual from membership 
in the labor organization, or otherwise discriminate 
against or harass any of its members in full employment 
of work opportunity, or representation, because of: 
(i) race; 
(ii) sex; 
(iii) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions; 
(iv) religion; 
(v) national origin; 
(vi) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older; 
or 
(vii) disability 
(d) Unless based upon a bona fide occupational quali-
fication, or required by, and given to, an agency of govern-
ment for security reasons, an employer, employment 
agency, or labor organization may not print, or circulate, 
or cause to be printed or circulated, any statement, 
advertisement, or publication, use any form of application 
for employment or membership, or make any inquiry in 
connection with prospective employment or membership 
that expresses, either directly or indirectly: 
(i) any limitation, specification, or discrimination 
as to: 
(A) race; 
(B) color; 
(C) religion; 
(D) sex; 
(E) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions; 
(F) national origin; 
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older; or 
(H) disability; 
(ii) the intent to make any limitation, specification, 
or discrimination described in Subsection (lXdXi). 
(e) A person, whether or not an employer, an employ-
ment agency, a labor organization, or the employees or 
members thereof, may not: 
(i) aid, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of an act 
defined in this section to be a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice; 
(ii) obstruct or prevent any person from complying 
with this chapter, or any order issued under it; or 
(iii) attempt, either directly or indirectly, to com-
mit any act prohibited in this section. 
(f) An employer, labor organization, joint apprentice-
ship committee, or vocational school, providing, coordinat-
ing, or controlling apprenticeship programs, or providing, 
coordinating, or controlling on-the-job-training programs, 
instruction, training, or retraining programs may not: 
(i) deny to, or withhold from, any qualified person, 
the right to be admitted to, or participate in any 
apprenticeship training program, on-the-job-training 
program, or other occupational instruction, training 
or retraining program because of: 
(A) race; 
(B) color; 
(C) sex; 
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions; 
(E) religion; 
(F) national origin; 
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older; or 
(H) disability; 
(ii) discriminate against or harass any qualified 
person in that person's pursuit of such programs, or 
to discriminate against such a person in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of such programs, because of: 
(A) race; 
(B) color, 
(C) sex; 
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-re-
lated conditions; 
(E) religion; 
(F) national origin; 
(G) age, if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older; or 
(H) disability; or 
(iii) print, publish, or cause to be printed or pub-
lished, any notice or advertisement relating to em-
ployment by the employer, or membership in or any 
classification or referral for employment by a labor 
organization, or relating to any classification or refer-
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ral for employment by an employment agency, indi-
cating any preference, limitation, specification, or 
discrimination based on race, color, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, 
national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of 
age or older, or disability except that a notice or 
advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation, 
specification, or discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-
related conditions, age, national origin, or disability 
when religion, race, color, sex, age, national origin, or 
disability is a bona fide occupational qualification for 
employment 
(2) Nothing contained in Subsections (l)(a) through (1Kf) 
shall be construed to prevent 
(a) the termination of employment of an individual who 
is physically, mentally, or emotionally unable to perform 
the duties required by that individual's employment, 
(b) the variance of insurance premiums, of coverage on 
account of age, or 
(c) a restriction on the activities of individuals licensed 
by the liquor authority with respect to persons under 21 
years of age 
(3) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice 
d) for an employer to hire and employ employees, 
for an employment agency to classify or refer for 
employment any individual, for a labor organization 
to classify its membership or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual or for an employer, labor 
organization, or joint labor-management committee 
controlling apprenticeship or other training or re-
training programs to admit or employ any individual 
in any such program, on the basis of religion, sex, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related condi-
tions, age, national origin, or disability in those 
certain instances where religion, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older, national 
origin, or disability is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication reasonably necessary to the normal operation 
of that particular business or enterprise, 
(n) for a school, college, university, or other educa-
tional institution to hire and employ employees of a 
particular religion if the school, college, university, or 
other educational institution is, in whole or in sub-
stantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or man-
aged by a particular religious corporation, associa-
tion, or society, or if the curriculum of the school, 
college, university, or other educational institution is 
directed toward the propagation of a particular reli-
gion, 
(m) for an employer to give preference in employ 
ment to 
(A) the employer's 
(I) spouse, 
(II) child, or 
(III) son-in-law or daughter in law, 
(B) any person for whom the employer is or 
would be liable to furnish financial support if 
those persons were unemployed, 
(C) any person to whom the employer during 
the preceding six months has furnished more 
than one-half of total financial support regard-
less of whether or not the employer was or is 
legally obligated to furnish support, or 
(D) any person whose education or training 
was substantially financed by the employer for a 
period of two years or more 
(b) Nothing in this chapter applies to any business or 
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect 
to any publicly announced employment practice of the 
business or enterprise under which preferential treat-
ment is given to any individual because that individual is 
a native American Indian living on or near an Indian 
reservation 
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to 
require any employer, employment agency, labor organi-
zation, vocational school, joint labor-management com-
mittee, or apprenticeship program subject to this chapter 
to grant pieferential treatment to any individual or to any 
grour because of the race, color, religion, sex, age, na-
tional origin, or disability of the individual or group on 
-account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to 
the total number or percentage of persons of any race, 
color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or disability 
employed by any employer, referred or classified for 
employment by an employment agency or labor organiza-
tion, admitted to membership or classified by any labor 
organization, or admitted to or employed in, any appren-
ticeship or other training program, in comparison with 
the total number or percentage of persons of that race, 
color, rehgior, sex, age, national origin, or disability in 
any community or county or in the available work force in 
any community or county 
(4) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice with 
respect to age to observe the terms of a bona fide senir-ity 
system or any bona fide employment benefit plan such as a 
retirement, pension, or insurance plan that is not a subterfuge 
to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such 
employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire an 
individual. 
(5) Notwithstanding Subsection (4), or any other statutory 
provision to the contrary, a person may not be subject to 
involuntary termination or retirement from employment on 
the basis of age alone, if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older, except 
(a) under Subsection (6), 
(b) under Section 67-5-8, and 
(c) when age is a bona fide occupational qualification 
(6) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement 
of an employee who has attained at least 65 years of age, and 
who, for the two-year period immediately before retirement, is 
employed in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking 
position, if 
(a) that employee is entitled to an immediate nonfor-
feitable annual retirement benefit from the employee's 
employer's pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred 
compensation plan, or any combination of those plans, 
and 
(b) the benefit described in Subsection (6Xa) equals, in 
the aggregate, at least $44,000 1999 
34A-5-107. Procedure for aggrieved person to file 
claim — Investigations — Adjudicative pro-
ceedings — Settlement — Reconsideration — 
Determination. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discrimi-
natory or prohibited employment practice may, or that 
person's attorney or agent may, make, sign, and file with 
the division a request for agency action 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified 
under oath or affirmation 
(c) A request for agency action made under this section 
shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged discrimi-
natory or prohibited employment practice occurred 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship 
committee, or vocational school who has employees or mem-
bers who refuse or threaten to refuse to comply with this 
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chapter may file with the division a request for agency action 
asking the division for assistance to obtain their compliance 
by conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any 
adjudicative proceeding, the division shall promptly as-
sign an investigator to attempt a settlement between the 
parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall 
make a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations 
made in the request for agency action. 
(cVThe division and its staff, agents, and employees 
shall conduct every investigation in fairness to ai) parties 
and agencies involved, and may not attempt a settlement 
between the parties if it is clear that no discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice has occurred. 
(d) An aggrieved party may withdraw the request for 
agency action prior to the issuance of a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccess-
ful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence 
during the investigation to support the allegations of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out 
in the request for agency action, the investigator shall 
formally report these findings to the director or the 
director's designee. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the direc-
tor or the director's designee may issue a determination 
and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) A party may make a written request to the Division 
of Adjudication for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the director's or the director's designee's determina-
tion and order within 30 days of the date the determina-
tion and order for dismissal is issued. 
(d) If the director or the director's designee receives no 
timely request for a hearing, the determination and order 
issued by the director or the director's designee becomes 
the final order of the commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccess-
ful and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence dur-
ing the investigation to support the allegations of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out 
in the request for agency action, the investigator shall 
formally report these findings to the director or the 
director's designee. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the direc-
tor or the director's designee may issue a determination 
and order based on the investigator's report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the Division of 
Adjudication for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo 
the director's or the director's designee's determination 
and order within 30 days of the date the determination 
and order is issued. 
(d) If the director or the director's designee receives no 
timely request for a hearing, the determination and order 
issued by the director or the director's designee requiring 
the respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved 
party becomes the final order of the commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding to review the director's 
or the director's designee's determination that a prohibited 
employment practice has occurred, the division shall present 
the factual and legal basis of its determination. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the 
party filing the request for agency action may reasonably and 
fairly amend any allegation, and the respondent may amend 
its answer. Those amendments may be made during or after a 
hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding 
officer finds that a respondent has not engaged in a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the 
presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the re-
quest for agency action containing the allegation of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice. 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent 
be reimbursed by the complaining party for the respon-
dent's attorneys' fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding 
officer finds that a respondent has engaged in a discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall 
issue an order requiring the respondent to: 
(a) cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice; and 
(b) provide relief to the complaining party, including 
reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees 
and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and 
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file with the Division of Adjudi-
cation a written request for review before the commis-
sioner or Appeals EJoard of the order issued by the 
presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12 and 
Chapter 1, Part 3, Adjudicative Proceedings. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review, the order 
issued by the presiding officer becomes the final order of 
the commission. 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (HXa) is 
subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16 and 
Chapter 1, Par t 3, Adjudicative Proceedings. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make ruk r 
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(14) The commission and its staff may not divulge or make 
public any information gained from any investigation, settle-
ment negotiation, or proceeding before the commission except 
as provided in Subsections (14Xa) through (d). 
(a) Information used by the director or the director's 
designee in making any determination may be provided to 
all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for 
and participation in proceedings before the commission. 
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed 
provided the identities of the individuals or parties are 
not disclosed. 
(c) Information maty be disclosed for inspection by the 
attorney general or other legal representatives of the 
state or commission. 
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and 
reporting requirements of the federal government. 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclu-
sive remedy under state law for employment discrimination 
based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, 
or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin, 
or disability. 
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for 
relief based upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the 
commencement or continuation of any adjudicative proceeding 
before the commission in connection with the same claims 
under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection is intended to 
alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision 
set forth in Subsection (15). 1999 
34A-5-108. Judicial enforcement of division findings. 
(1) The commission or the attorney general at the request of 
the commission shall commence an action under Section 
63-46b-19 for civil enforcement of a final order of the commis-
sion issued under Subsection 34A-5-107Q2) if: 
(a) the order finds that there is reasonable cause to 
believe that a respondent has engaged or is engaging in 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practices made 
unlawful by this chapter; 
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(b) counsel to the commission or the attorney general 
determines after reasonable inquiry that the order is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law; 
(c) the respondent has not received an order of auto-
matic stay or discharge from the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court; and 
(d) (i) the commission has not accepted a conciliation 
agreement to which the aggrieved party and respon-
dent are parties; or 
(ii) the respondent has not conciliated or complied 
with the final order of the commission within 30 days 
from the date the order is issued. 
(2) If the respondent seeks judicial review of the final order 
under Section 63-46b-16, pursuant to Section 63-46b-18 the 
commission may stay seeking civil enforcement pending the 
completion of the judicial review. 1997 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
34A-6-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Occupational Safety and 
Health Act." 1997 
34A-6-102. Legislative i n t e n t 
The intent of this chapter is: 
(1) to preserve human resources by providing for the 
safety and health of workers; and 
(2) to provide a coordinated state plan to implement, 
establish, and enforce occupational safety and health 
standards as effective as the standards under the Wil-
liams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 651 et seq. 1997 
34A-6-103. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administrator" means the director of the Division 
of Occupational Safety and Health. 
(2) "Amendment" means such modification or change in 
a code, standard, rule, or order intended for universal or 
general application. 
(3) "Commission" means the Labor Commission. 
(4) "Council" means the Utah Occupational Safety and 
Health Advisory Council. 
(5) "Division" means the Division of Occupational 
Safety and Health. 
(6) "Employee" includes any person suffered or permit-
ted to work by an employer. 
(7) "Employer" means: 
(a) the state; 
(b) each county, city, town, and school district in 
the state; and 
(c) every person, firm, and private corporation, 
including public utilities, having one or more workers 
or operatives regularly employed in the same busi-
ness, or in or about the same establishment, under 
any contract of hire. 
(8) "Hearing" means a proceeding conducted by the 
commission. 
(9) "Imminent danger" means a danger exists which 
reasonably could be expected to cause an occupational 
disease, death, or serious physical harm immediately, or 
before the danger could be eliminated through enforce-
ment procedures under this chapter. 
(10) "National consensus standard" means any occupa-
tional safety and health standard or modification: 
(a) adopted by a nationally recognized standards-
producing organization under procedures where it 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 0 5 £39 
ROBERT H. WILDE #3466 
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ROBERT H. WILDE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
935 East South Union Avenue Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 2 55-4 774 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ANGELA BYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
CREATIVE CORNER, INC. AND LYN 
PELTON, 
Defendants. 
oo 
Plaintiff alleges: 
1. The Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
2. Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., is a Utah Corporation 
in good standing doing business in Salt Lake County. 
3. Defendant Lyn Pelton is an officer of Defendant 
Creative Corner, Inc., and the person who made all relevant 
decisions and took all relevant actions alleged herein. 
4. All actions alleged herein took place in Salt Lake 
County and venue and jurisdiction are appropriate in Salt Lake 
C \IN\byers2 1 
/SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By heaths Deputy Clerk 
COMPLAINT 
C lvil No. 
Judge (Atdk^y 
County. 
5. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant Creative 
Corner, Inc. at a rate of $11.00 per hour plus a $200.00 per 
month car allowance. 
6. The Plaintiff was terminated on the 15th day of 
October, 1999. 
7. Defendant Pelton said that Plaintiff was terminated 
because she was pregnant and unable to lift. 
8. Plaintiff specifically discussed lifting with her 
doctor and was able to lift all items she had been required to 
lift during her employment with Creative Corner, Inc. 
9. Plaintiff was terminated because she was pregnant. 
10. At the time Plaintiff was terminated Defendants 
employed fewer than 15 employees. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
11. The Plaintiff's employment was terminated by the 
Defendants because of her sex, i.e., because she was pregnant. 
12. The actions of Defendants in terminating Plaintiff 
constituted wrongful termination in violation of public policy in 
that Plaintiff was terminated because of her sex and that there 
is a strong public policy against taking employment actions 
towards employees because of their sex found in both the statutes 
of the State of Utah and of the United States and violation of 
the that public policy gives rise to a claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy. 
13. That public policy is set forth, among other places, in 
both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. 
14. As a result of the actions of Defendants in wrongfully 
terminating the Plaintiff in violation of public policy 
Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for all damages arising 
therefrom including the Plaintiff's lost wages, consequential 
damages arising therefrom, and for the Plaintiff's emotional 
distress and pain and suffering, punitive damages and attorneys 
fees in such amounts as may be shown by proof at the time of 
trial. 
15. Among the consequential damages suffered by the 
Plaintiff which the Defendants should have reasonably foreseen 
are the attorneys fees incurred by the Plaintiff and the value of 
the time expended by counsel for the Plaintiff on the Plaintiff's 
behalf. 
16. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful termination of 
the Plaintiff Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for her 
attorney's fees incurred herein and that a reasonable amount for 
attorneys fees is $25,000.00 or such greater amount as may be 
shown by proof at the time of trial. 
17. The wrongful termination of Plaintiff by Defendants is 
a tort and accordingly Defendant Pelton is personally liable for 
the damages suffered by Plaintiff. 
Wherefore Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendants as 
follows: 
1. For the Plaintiff's unpaid wages; 
2. For compensatory damages resulting from the loss of 
Plaintiff's employment in an amount to be shown by proof at the 
time of trial; 
3. For general damages in an amount to be shown by proof 
at the time of trial; 
4. For Plaintiff's attorneys fees; 
5. For interest on the foregoing and for such other relief 
as the court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this lQ day of November 1999. 
ROBERT H. WILDE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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E. PAUL WOOD (3537) 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
ANGELA BYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CREATIVE CORNER, INC., and 
LYN PELTON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMPLAINT AND FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Case No. 990911231 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
-ooOoo-
Defendants, Creative Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton, by and through their 
undersigned attorney of record, E. Paul Wood, hereby move this Court pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the Complaint based upon Plaintiff 
having failed to state a claim against the Defendants upon which relief may be granted. 
This Motion is based upon the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the pleadings on 
file herein. 
DATED this _0_ day of December, 1999. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
L iuJ((kanJ( 
E. Paul Wood 
Attorneys for Defendants 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ^ \d\ of December, 1999, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION ' I M I I K U M I ' I \IMI \ NI» M 11>' 
ATTORNEYS FEES, to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert H. Wilde 
Blake A. Nakamura 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
935 East South Union Ave., Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
wll\creative.pld 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
v n r<np Q A T T T A,KE C O U N T V STATE ^ T™ 
-ooOoo-
ANGELA BYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CREATIVE CORNER, INC., 
LYN PELTON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS COMPLAINT 
Case No. 990911231 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
-ooOoo-
Defendants, Creative Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton, siihiml Ihis Menu 
Points and Authorities in support of their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. This 
Memorandum shall show the honorable Coun thai the cause o 
Complaint is preempted by the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act ( "UADA J ^ u h Code Ann. 
Sections 34A-* 101 - 108) (as amended, 1997). 
iM'kODLCHON 
Plaintiff Angela Byers sues her former employer, Creative Corner, Inc , a Utah 
Corporation and its President Lyn Pelton, claiming one cause of action, i.c "winiigful 
termination in violation of public policy". (Complaint, para. 12) However, the Utah 
Legislature has propounded comprehensive legislation under the UADA which preempts a 
common law claim for wrongful termination based upon public policy. 
For purposes of this Motion, this Memorandum shall assume that Plaintiffs 
allegation in the Complaint are true. The pertinent allegations verbatim from the Complaint 
are: 
2. Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., is a Utah Corporation in good standing doing 
business in Salt Lake County. 
3. Defendant Lyn Pelton is an officer of Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., and 
the person who made all relevant decisions and took all relevant actions alleged 
herein. 
6. The Plaintiff was terminated on the 15th day of October, 1999. 
9. Plaintiff was terminated because she was pregnant. 
10. At the time Plaintiff was terminated Defendants employed fewer than 15 
employees. 
11. The Plaintiffs employment was terminated by the Defendants because of her 
sex, i.e., because she was pregnant. 
12. The action of Defendants in terminating Plaintiff constituted wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy in that Plaintiff was terminated because of her 
sex and that there is a strong public policy against taking employment action towards 
employees because of their sex found in both the statutes of the state of Utah and the 
2 
United States and violation of that policy gives rise to a claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy 
LEGAL ..ANALYSIS 
I. 
P L A I N T I F F S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON 1 1ICH RELIEF M A Y 
BE GRANTED A G A I N S T D E F E N D , ^ I ;,. 
Pla in t i f fs complaint fails to state a claim against the Defendants upon which relief 
i i i . n hi f i j a i i k ' d in ili.iiiii ilit; s o l e i Liiin 101 n / l i n is [t in/i i if i i 'Ofl lin, ink 1 I , " \ I I A . 
A. Utah Law on Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). When 
considering a Mot ion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to take 
drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Prows v. State 822 P. 2d 
76 1 (I Jta h 1 991); VV hippie v. American Fork Irrigation Company ' 
1996). The Court shall dismiss a claim only in the event that the Plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of her claim. Colman v. Utah State Land Board 795 P. 2d 622 (Utah 
1 990); ft right v. V ernal IJniv ei sity of Utah, 8 ; - 5 I '" 380 (I !l : h C I - * { >p 199 = I ] 
B. The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. The Utah Legislature enacted the 
I Jtah < \ iiti Discrimination / i ct in 1969 1 1 le pui pose of the let vv as to eliminate 
discrimination in the payment of wages based solely on the basis of sex, where men and 
women are doing the same or similar work under all of the same conditions. Kopp v. Salt 
3 
Lake City. 29 Utah 2d 170, 506 P. 2d 809 (Utah 1973). The UADA creates a statutory 
cause of action against an employer for discrimination based upon protected categories which 
is enforceable by the State of Utah through the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor. 
Section 35A-5-107. 
Section 34A-5-102, the definitional section of the Act defines "Employer" as follows: 
(8)(a) "Employer" means: 
(i) The state; 
(ii) Any political subdivision; 
(iii) A board, commission, department, institution, school district, trust, or 
agent of the state or its political subdivisions; or 
(iv) A person employing 15 of more employees within the state for each 
working day in each of the 20 calendar weeks or more in the current or 
proceeding calendar year. 
A person or entity which does not meet the threshold definitions of "employer" is not 
subject to the UADA. 
Section 34A-5-106, defines a set of "Discriminatory or unfair employment practices", 
which in penitent part states: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice to take any action 
described in subsections (1) (a) through (f). 
a(i). An employer may not refuse to hire, promote, discharge, demote or terminate 
any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of compensation 
or in terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any person otherwise 
qualified, because of: 
(A) Race; 
(B) Color; 
(C) Sex; 
(D) Pregnancy, child birth, pregnancy related conditions; 
4 
Section 34A-5-107 provides the procedure for "an aggrieved person to file 013™" 
which requires that the aggrieved person file with the I Jtah < Viiti Discriminatory Commission 
a i ecp lest for agencj T ** %i h vn within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice, rhereafter, the commission shall investigate the claim and make 
appropriate attempts i :\k i\v i laiui .unl in llie LM ml sddnnnH u unsuu fv lul m 
adjudication of the claim shall occur. 
The exclusive remedy section of U<\DA hectic-: 54 A r-t/i I i) states: 
The procedures contained in mis Secuor: diL me exclusive remedy under state law for 
employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, child 
birth, or pregnancy related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or disability. 
-^" -L iii vii2Ai^ .-j-...Jtii.'-; ¥ IVJV- - ijii^ ^-»-^^>i»^ i'viiiv,j) iv-. wUiniib I \ I S J C Lipvu. a j . ' o t e c t e d 
classification. The identical issue which is now before this Court, i e , uhetln- the UADA 
preempts a common law claim based upon termination of an emplo> ee i esulting in <: n alle g id 
violation of a substantial public policy of the State of Utah has been decided in the 
affirmative by the I Jtah Supreme Court in Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the 
Debrah S. Retherford sued her former employer, AT&T, for wrongful discharge claiming 
policy announced in the Liah Anti-Discrimination Act. (Utah Code Ann §§ 34-35 1 to 
8,)(1988 as amended, 1 ° ° ° x The trial Court granted Al.v : - Motion for Summary 
5 
Judgment under the theory that the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act preempted Retherford's 
common law causes of action, including the claim for violation of public policy; the Plaintiff 
appealed. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial Court's granting Summary Judgment. 
Since the version of the UADA in effect at that time did not specifically include a 
prohibition against retaliation for sexual harassment, the Utah Supreme Court was first 
required to determine, as a matter of statutory construction, whether retaliation for 
complaints of sexual harassment were included in the UADA. Justice Zimmerman stated: 
Our analysis of this questions breaks down into two subsidiary issues. First, does the 
UADA preempt common law causes of action for retaliation against an employee for 
complaints of sexual harassment? Second, if the UADA does have this preemptive 
effect, do the causes of action Retherford alleges fall within the UADA's preemptive 
scope? Retherford at 956. 
Justice Zimmerman initially recited the statutory section of the UADA indicating that 
"the exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination because of race, color, 
sex, age, religion, national origin, or handicap" is the UADA. The Court then held: 
Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, we find that the version of the UADA 
in effect at the time of Retherford's firing was the exclusive remedy for the employer 
retaliation against an employee who complained of sexual harassment. We hold that 
the UADA preempts common law causes of action for discharge in retaliation for 
complaints of employment discrimination, (citations omitted) Retherford at 956. 
The next issue addressed by the Retherford Court was deciding which common law 
causes of action are within the UADA's preemptive effect. The initial issue was to decide 
upon an analytical model to determine when an exclusive statutory cause of action preempts a 
common law claim, based on the same facts. The Utah Supreme Court decided upon the 
6 
"indispensable element" test as an analytical model "for determining when a legislative 
enactments appno. un elusive icmcJy for a certain wrong. "Retherford ai •• i." 
The Court then held that the I IAD.A preempted Retherford's claim for violation of 
public policy stating: 
We begin with Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of public policy. In order 
to prove this tort, Retherford must show that AT&T discharged her in a manner or for 
a reason that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy" of the state of Utah, a 
public policy rooted in I Jtah's Constitution or statute, (citation omitted) The only 
possible source in Utah's statutes or constitution for a clear and substantial public 
policy allegedly violated by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's prohibition of 
retaliation based on good faith complaints of employment discrimination, (citing Utah 
Code Ann. Section 34-35-2(15) of the UADA) Without deciding that the statute at 
issue rises to the level of a clear and substantial public policy, we fmd that in the 
absence of this public policy declaration, Retherford would be unable even to allege an 
action for this tort. Simply put, if there were no UADA policy against retaliation, 
there could be no tort for discharge in violation of this public policy. Applying the 
Mounteer test (the "indispensable element" test) it is plain that the harm the UADA 
addresses is an indispensable element in Retherford's tort cause of action; therefor, 
the UADA must preempt this claim. Retherford at 965-66. 
The Mffth .Siipiniif Coin) upheld Ihr finl unii'l'1, f'jafiliiij.' nf the employer's Motion 
for Summary Judgment holding that the breach of public policy claim based upon the 
,. language of the I h VI) \ is pi eempted arid the excli isi\ e remed> is foi ind \ * itl lin the 
statutory framework of the UADA. 
No Utah case has overruled Retherford. 
D. Byeiv> ua:ii un ;,. L^_.\_i2.i_i>i*i--^ ili-iLL^ i---. preempted by the UADA. 
The Plaintiff Byers sole cause of action \h based uncr .t protected category contained 
ii 1 the "I JAD A I he Coi i lplaint in pertinent pai t states: 
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11. The Plaintiffs employment was terminated by the Defendants because of her sex, 
i.e., because she was pregnant. 
12. The action of the Defendants in terminating Plaintiff constituted wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy in that Plaintiff was terminated because of her 
sex and that there is a strong public policy against taking employment action towards 
employees because of their sex found in both the statutes of the state of Utah and the 
United States and violation of that policy gives rise to a claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of this public policy. 
Section 34A-5-106(1) UADA specifically prohibits discriminatory employment 
practices, including demoting or terminating any person, based upon race, color, sex, 
pregnancy, etc. (emphasis added) In the Complaint, Angela Byers' reference to Utah law in 
support of the public policy claim is the UADA. 
The holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Retherford clearly and squarely applies to 
Angela Byers' claim of breach of substantial public policy based upon discrimination in 
employment: "Without deciding that the statute at issue rises to the level of a clear and 
substantial public policy, we find that in the absence of this public policy declaration, 
Retherford would be unable even to allege an action for this tort. Simply put, if there were 
no UADA policy against retaliation, there would be no tort for discharge and violation of 
this public policy. Applying the Mounteer test, it is plain that the harm the UADA addresses 
is an indispensable element in Retherford's tort cause of action; therefore, the UADA must 
preempt this claim. Retherford at 965-66. 
8 
The plain term of the UAL*A dictate tlvM a claim based upon "pregnancy" 01 "sex" 
must be brought under the UADA. ^rhu.n ••• •»« "exclusive state remedy lor the claim, 
I Iowe\ e t „ a ji irisdictional i eqii lirement c f the I J \DA is that an employer have "15 employees 
for 20 weeks during the preceding calendar year." As admitted by Plaintiff, Creative 
Corner, Inc., does not 
conclude that no claim exists under the UADA against Defendants. 
Plaintiff cannot circumvent the exclusive remedy provision of the I J A D J \ by claiming 
hrvacli ' I i-fil I. p»ili«'\ i L I' J '" , ir.ilt •  ihr fiibli. polii \ upon which the claim is based. 
Plaintiff simply has no claim against the Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs sole cause of action for violation of public policy as a result of wrongful 
termination based u p o n p regnancy or sex is p r e e m p t e d by the Utah An t i -Disc r imina t ion Act. 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act , which is the "exclusive remedy". However , even in the event 
a claim were attempted undei the Utah Anli 1 JJSCIiiiim;iin»n AM ilitu1 is mi IVHIIM I JIIHHIU 
since the Defendants do not qualify as a "employer" under the 
terms of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act The Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the 
Defendants upon ( \ h ich i elief n ia;; 1: e granted . 
9 
DATED this J_ day of December, 1999. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
aJ/iloaJ/ 
EJ Paul Wood 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Blake A. Nakamura 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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iv'N.uN >%:* , ..IVLV. .—, .. . . . . . 
This case is before i^ f*i, appeal from a gia 
summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs comp* 
Debra S. Retherford sued her former employer .* -
Communications, under several theories for harms aris-
ing from alleged sexual harassment by her co-employees. 
Specifically, she alleged that AT&T fired her in retalia-
tion for complaining of being sexually harassed by her 
AT&T co-workers. She argued that such a discharge 
violated Utah public policy barring reprisals for reports 
of sexual harassment. She also contended that the dis-
charge breached a term of her implied contract with 
AT&T, which prohibited reprisal for reports of sexual 
harassment and was entirely separate from the agree-
ment between her union's collective bargaining unit and 
AT&T. Retherford [**2] further asserted that AT&T was 
liable for negligently employing her harassers. Finally, 
Retherford sued former co-workers Cathy Bateson (aka 
Cathy Bateson-Hough), Louise Johnson, and Vickie 
Randall, claiming that their retaliatory conduct consti-
tuted intentional infliction of emotional distress and ma-
licious interference with her contractual relations with 
AT&T. 
Defendants moved to dismiss uu - ip;: .., J^ I ; g, 
inter alia, that workers covered b\ ;a:t >ment con-
tracts that prohibit discharge other than for just cause 
should not be able to maintain a tort action for dis-
charge in violation of public policy; that the Utah Anti-
Discriminatory Act ("UADA") preempted Retherford's 
common law causes of action, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 
34-35-1 to -8 (1988) (amended 1989, 1990 & 1991); 
that federal labor law preempted Retherford fs common 
law causes of action, see 29 U.S.C. /55(a); and that 
Retherford had failed to state tort claims against her for-
mer co-workers or to bring those claims within the pe-
riod fixed, by the relevant statute of limitations. 
The district judge considered affidavits in support of 
and in opposition to the motion to dismiss [**3] and 
granted defendants summary judgment on all claims. 
Retherford appeals. 
To summarize our ruling today, we hold as fol-
lows: first, that both employees covered by employ-
ment contracts that limit the bases for discharge and 
employees who are at-will can maintain a tort action 
for [*954] discharge in violation of Utah public pol-
icy; second, that the UADA provides the exclusive rem-
edy for Retherford'S claim for discharge in violation of 
public policy but does not bar her other causes of ac-
tion; third, that federal labor law preempts Retherford's 
claims for breach of implied contract and malicious in-
terference with contractual relations and partially pre-
empts Retherford's claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; and fourth, that Retherford brought 
her claims for emotional distress and negligent employ-
ment in a timely manner and has stated a cause of action 
84H R2d 949, *954; 1992 Utah LEXIS 120, **3; 
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r intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
;r former co-workers. We therefore reverse the order 
anting summary judgment and remand this case for 
rther proceedings on Retherford's claim of negligent 
nployment and the nonpreempted portion of her claim 
r intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
In [**4] reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
ew the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn there-
3m in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
ruth v. Bachelor, 832 P2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992); 
Mns v. Petersen, 813 R2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991); 
tah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power 
Light Co., 776 R2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). We state 
e facts of the instant case-which we draw primarily 
3m Retherford's affidavit submitted in opposition to 
T&T's motion to dismiss-accordingly. See Sandy City 
Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 215 (Utah 1992). 
In 1976, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Dmpany hired Retherford to work as a telephone opera-
r in Grand Junction, Colorado. In 1983, due to the na-
mwide restructuring of AT&T and its subsidiary com-
mies, Retherford was transferred to AT&T's Wasatch 
fice, located in Salt Lake City, where she continued 
3rking as a telephone operator. 
Retherford alleges that two separate agreements gov-
ned her employment with AT&T. As an AT&T em-
oyee, Retherford was covered by a collective [**5] 
irgaining agreement between AT&T and her union, 
e Communications Workers of America ("CWA"). 
dependent of the collective bargaining agreement, 
T&T also had promulgated a code of conduct that 
itlined employees' rights and responsibilities and was 
ecifically brought to the attention of and acknowledged 
writing by all employees. Retherford argues that the 
>de of conduct created an implied employment contract 
itween AT&T and its employees. 
Both the collective bargaining agreement and the code 
' conduct prohibited sexual harassment and outlined 
ocedures for aggrieved employees to press any com-
aints. The collective bargaining agreement stated, 
Neither the Company nor the Union shall unlawfully 
scriminate against any employee because of such em-
oyee's race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin 
' because he or she is handicapped, a disabled veteran 
• a veteran of the Vietnam era." The collective bar-
dning agreement required resort to arbitration to re-
vive "grievances arising out of or resulting from the 
>plication or interpretation of the provisions of this 
greement" and "grievances arising out of or resulting 
om the dismissal, suspension, or demotion [**6] of a 
gular employee. . . ." 
The code of conduct's provision on sexual harassment 
was more detailed than that in the collective bargaining 
agreement. The code of conduct read in relevant part: 
Any sexually harassing conduct in the workplace, 
whether physical or verbal, committed by any employee 
is also prohibited. This includes: repeated offensive 
sexual flirtations, advances, propositions; continued or 
repeated verbal abuse of a sexual nature; graphic verbal 
commentaries about an individual's body; sexually de-
grading words used to describe an individual; and the 
display in the workplace of sexually suggestive objects, 
pictures or posters. 
Employees who have complaints of sexual harassment 
should report such conduct to their supervisors. If this 
is not appropriate, employees are urged to seek the assis-
tance of their EEO coordinator. Where the investigation 
confirms [*955] the allegations, prompt corrective ac-
tion should be taken. 
Any reprisal against an employee because the em-
ployee, in good faith, reported a violation or suspected 
violation is strictly forbidden. 
Soon after Retherford transferred to Salt Lake City, 
manager Fayonne Johaiineson required Retherford meet 
with [**7] her to discuss the provisions of the conduct 
code and to sign a statement saying that she had read and 
understood them. This procedure was repeated every 
year during Retherford's tenure at the Wasatch office. 
In an affidavit submitted in opposition to defendants' 
motion to dismiss, Retherford termed this annual pro-
cedure "a condition of her continued employment" with 
AT&T. 
Among Retherford's co-workers at the Wasatch office 
were Cathy Bateson-Hough, an AT&T manager, Louise 
Johnson, a supervisor, Vickie Randall, a fellow em-
ployee and union steward, and Jolene Gailey, nl a fellow 
telephone operator. Upon her arrival in Salt Lake City, 
she noticed the sexually uninhibited atmosphere of the 
Wasatch office. In her affidavit, Retherford testified that 
during her first day at work, Bateson-Hough showed her 
an obscene Valentine's Day card. Soon Retherford be-
came aware that obscene jokes and foul language were 
commonplace among her co-workers. 
nl Retherford originally named Gailey as a de-
fendant in this suit, but dismissed her when Gailey 
declared bankruptcy. 
[**8] 
After approximately six months, Retherford switched 
8^+ P.2d 949, *955; 1992 Utah LEXIS 120, **8; 
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to the night shift. At this time, she encountered a more 
sexually suggestive work environment, one she found 
threatening. As before, she noted that sex was a com-
mon topic of discussion. For example, in her affidavit 
she described Johnson's loud accounts of an alleged sex-
ual relationship with another AT&T employee. 
For the first time, however, Retherford found her-
self a target of the sexually suggestive commentary. 
Specifically, she alleges that Jolene Gailey subjected her 
to unwelcome sexual advances. Retherford's affidavit 
describes these advances as follows: 
Retherford complains that Gailey touched her, made 
numerous comments regarding her appearance, and reg-
ularly suggested that Retherford join her "in various ac-
tivities. Gailey's friends, including defendant Johnson, 
also began to congregate around Retherford, convers-
ing frequently and explicitly about subjects of a sex-
ual nature. As time passed, Gailey became more ag-
gressive. When "visibly intoxicated," Gailey sat next 
to Retherford, touched her affectionately on the arm, 
and said, "I'm going to save you from Dave Todd," 
a male AT&T employee with whom Retherford had 
[**9] been sitting at meals. Gailey subsequently asked 
Retherford to pose nude while Gailey painted or sculpted 
her likeness, told Retherford that she was looking for a 
roommate, and informed Retherford that she hated men 
and even the sound of men's voices on the telephone. 
Retherford also believes that Gailey passed a note around 
the office stating that Retherford was having an affair 
with a male AT&T employee. 
After approximately ten months of such treatment, 
Gailey telephoned Retherford at home and asked her if 
she intended to file an EEOC complaint about Gailey's 
conduct. n2 Retherford testified in her affidavit that she 
replied that she would file a complaint if Gailey contin-
ued to bother her. According to Retherford's affidavit, 
Gailey responded, "I'm sorry if I offended you, but I 
feel I shouldn't have to apologize for my sexuality." 
n2 The EEOC, or Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, is a federal agency charged with ad-
ministering complaints under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5QS). 
[**10] 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that after she in-
formed Gailey that she was considering filing a com-
plaint of sexual harassment, Gailey and other AT&T 
employees began to retaliate by staring at her, mak-
ing "threatening facial expressions" at her, walking ex-
tremely close to [*956] her, and following her around 
the office. During March of 1984, Retherford twice 
complained to her supervisor and manager of the re-
taliatory harassment from Gailey and other co-workers. 
Two months later, she wrote manager Bateson-Hough a 
letter complaining that Gailey continued to harass her 
despite her requests that Gailey leave her alone. The 
next day, May 10, 1984, Retherford submitted a written 
complaint to AT&T's Equal Employment Opportunity 
("EEO") coordinator. 
About five days later, Richard Salazar, an AT&T em-
ployee and a CWA union steward, called Retherford 
at home to discuss the complaint she had submitted. 
Retherford testified that Salazar told her, "You're the 
new kid on the block-you're not going to win this. 
We don't know you very well, but we do know Jolene 
[Galley], she is a respectable person in the community 
and an artist." He added, "Somebody could get fired 
over this." Darlene Anderson, [**11] a first-level man-
ager of the Wasatch office, also cautioned Retherford, 
saying, "Just be careful what you say and do; this is a 
strong and big group that you are dealing with." Several 
weeks after Retherford complained to the AT&T EEO 
coordinator, she was attempting to cross the street at 
1:15 a.m. when Gailey sped past her. When Retherford 
reached her own car and drove away, Gailey followed 
her for a few miles. 
During June of 1984, Linda Johnston, an AT&T em-
ployee who Retherford says is a personal friend of 
Bateson-Hough's, investigated Retherford's complaint. 
Retherford said that Johnston's investigation consisted 
solely of personal interviews with and submission of 
written statements by Retherford and Gailey. About 
one month later, Johnston submitted the EEO coordi-
nator's report, which recommended that Retherford and 
Gailey have as little contact with each other as possible. 
Subsequently, Retherford received a telephone call from 
Reta Pehrson, an AT&T supervisor and CWA vice pres-
ident, who told her, "%u have to be satisfied with the 
[EEO coordinator's] decision . . . . If anybody asks 
you about it, don't tell them and don't say anything." 
Pehrson added, "Cathy [Bateson-Hough] [**12] wanted 
me to also tell you that if you would like a transfer, she 
will transfer you to the Sundance Office." 
Retherford stated in her affidavit that the harassment in 
the Wasatch office did not abate following the issuance of 
the EEO coordinator's report and recommendations. At 
one point, Retherford overheard an AT&T employee say 
to a group of co-workers, including defendant Johnson, 
"Debi [Retherford] would make a good stripper-she has 
big boobs." Looking directly at Retherford, Johnson 
replied, "My bra size is 34B." Retherford said that 
Gailey and other co-workers continued to stare at her, 
844 P.2d 949, *956; 1992 Utah LEXIS 120, **12; 
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/alk close to her, follow her, and make faces at her. 
the also said that on at least one occasion, Gailey and 
ohnson accused Retherford of staring at them. 
In late August of 1984, Retherford filed a charge letter 
/ith the EEOC, alleging that some of her co-workers had 
exually harassed her for a year and that AT&T had done 
othing to remedy the situation. Several months later, 
Lifted Aros, an EEOC investigator, called Retherford 
t home to tell her that of the four witnesses he had in-
srviewed while investigating her complaint, three had 
)ld him there was a "lesbian problem" at the Wasatch 
**13] office. He said he intended to issue a warning 
3 AT&T management about this situation. Around the 
ame time, the AT&T EEO coordinator surveyed the 
workers in the Wasatch office about sexual harassment 
nd eventually issued a report concluding that employees 
t the Wasatch office engaged in a great deal of sexually 
riented discussion, including many obscene jokes. This 
sport failed to curb the sexual atmosphere in the Wasatch 
ffice. Indeed, Retherford testified in her affidavit that 
fter its issuance, the obscene jokes and explicit sexual 
onversations increased in frequency and offensiveness. 
In late December of 1984, Retherford again deliv-
red a written complaint to Bateson-Hough. Retherford 
ays that Bateson-Hough summoned her and told her 
lat the AT&T EEO coordinator had is sued a letter 
tiastising both Retherford and Gailey for their contin-
ed quarreling. [*957] She refused to show Retherford 
le letter. Bateson-Hough also informed Retherford that 
etherford was on warning of dismissal and told her that 
T&T would fire her if she continued to complain about 
railey. 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that the abuse by 
er co-workers continued, exacerbated by the percep-
on [**14] that she was an informant. In Retherford's 
resence, Johnson and others made various comments 
imenting the fact that someone was watching them 
ad would report them if they broke company rules, 
bllowing one such comment, Johnson looked at 
etherford and said, "Isn't that right, Debi?" Retherford 
Iso said that Bateson-Hough made no effort to protect 
er from this retaliation. In fact, she said, Bateson-
[ough rearranged the seating in the Wasatch office, 
lacing Retherford next to some of her harassers and 
ssigning her to "slow" work stations, which hampered 
er productivity. 
To cope with the stress of her work place, Retherford 
egan visiting a psychiatrist and a physician in the sum-
ler of 1985. In September of 1985, Retherford says, 
ie took medical disability leave to recover from the 
tress and anxiety caused by the harassment. Following 
er psychiatrist's instructions that she must not work in 
proximity to "the people who started the panic in her," 
she never returned to the Wasatch office. 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that on or about 
March 12, 1986, Douglas Erickson, group manager of 
the Wasatch office, and Vickie Randall, an AT&T em-
ployee and union steward, [**15] called Retherford to 
tell her that because she was medically incapable of re-
turning to the Wasatch office, AT&T was transferring 
her to its office in Ekrise, Idaho. Erickson ordered 
her to report to her new assignment within ten days. 
When Retherford protested that her family obligations 
and medical treatment in Salt Lake City prevented her 
from moving to Boise on such short notice, Randall re-
sponded, "What do you expect us to do, build you a 
new building?" Erickson then advised Retherford that if 
she failed to report to the Boise office within ten days, 
AT&T would fire her. 
Retherford did not report to Boise by the deadline, and 
AT&T fired her on March 26, 1986. She filed a written 
grievance with the CWA, Local 7704, on April 9th. On 
September 29th, the vice president of Local 7704 told 
Retherford that due to an oversight on the part of the 
CWA, the union had not submitted her grievance for ar-
bitration and that the time for processing her grievance, 
as established by the bargaining agreement, had expired. 
On July 21, 1988, two years and four months after 
she was fired, Retherford filed suit in United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, alleging federal 
claims under [**16] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3, and section 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S. C. § 185, 
and pendent state UADA and common law claims. On 
March 21, 1989, the court dismissed the federal claims 
with prejudice as being untimely and dismissed the state 
claims without prejudice for lack of pendent jurisdic-
tion. Retherford v. AT&T, No. C-88-648W, slip op. 
(D. Utah Mar. 16, 1989) (unpublished). 
On April 7, 1989, Retherford filed suit in the Third 
Judicial District Court, alleging the following: first, 
that AT&T fired her in violation of Utah public pol-
icy, which bars reprisals for reporting sexual harass-
ment; second, that AT&T's discharging her in retaliation 
for complaining of sexual harassment violated a term of 
an employment contract implied from AT&T's code of 
conduct; third, that AT&T was liable for negligently 
employing Retherford's sexual harassers; fourth, that 
Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and Randall intentionally in-
flicted emotional distress on Retherford; and fifth, that 
Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and Randall maliciously in-
terfered with Retherford's contractual [**17] relations. 
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing first, that Utah 
rage / 
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does not recognize a common law cause of action for dis-
charge in violation of public policy; second, that even 
if Utah did recognize such a cause of action, federal and 
state anti-discrimination [*958] laws would preempt any 
such claim; third, that as a matter of federal labor law, 
the AT&T-CWA collective bargaining agreement barred 
Retherford's state claims; fourth, that Retherford had 
failed to timely assert her state law claims for negli-
gent employment, breach of implied contract, and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress; and fifth, that 
Retherford had failed to state a claim of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress because the conduct she 
alleged did not "offend against the generally accepted 
standards of indecency and immorality," as required by 
Utah case law. n3 
n3 AT&T also argued that Bateson-Hough could 
not be liable for interference with contractual rela-
tions between Retherford and AT&T because she was 
an agent of one of the contracting parties and that 
Retherford's pleadings failed to state a claim that 
Johnson and Randall had interfered with contractual 
relations. Because of the result we reach in this case, 
we have no cause to address these issues. 
[**18] 
Relying on affidavits in reaching its decision, the trial 
court treated defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion 
for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c), 
56(c). The court entered judgment in favor of AT&T, 
Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and Randall, offering the fol-
lowing explanation for the ruling: 
The Court having found that there are no genuine issues 
of material fact; and the Court having further determined 
that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law . . . [ , ] Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which 
is being treated as a motion for summary judgment, is 
hereby granted. n4 
Retherford appeals. 
n4 Such a blanket statement provides us with no 
guidance as to the trial court's reasoning. It therefore 
does not comply with rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which requires trial judges to issue 
brief written statements of their grounds for granting 
summary judgment when multiple grounds are pre-
sented. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Although fail-
ure to issue a statement of grounds is not reversible 
error absent unusual circumstances, we take this op-
portunity to remind trial judges that the presumption 
of correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings 
"has little operative effect when members of this 
court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning be-
cause of the cryptic nature of its ruling." Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 190 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8, (June 22, 1992). 
[**19] 
Before addressing the merits, we note the applicable 
standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Sandy City, 827P.2dat 217-18; 
Rollins, 813 P2dat 1159; Landes v. Capital City Bank, 
795 P2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). Because a summary 
judgment resolves only questions of law, we give no 
deference to the trial court's determinations. We affirm 
only if the decision before us was correct. Sandy City, 
827P2dat 218; Rollins, 813 P.2dat 1159; Landes, 795 
P.2datll29. 
The present appeal requires that we examine the in-
terplay between statutory causes of action and common 
law tort and contract causes of action for discharge in re-
taliation for complaining of sexual harassment. We first 
address the common law. In the last decade, state courts 
have shown a growing willingness to increase employer 
exposure to suit for claims relating to the discharge of 
employees, [**20] a trend that has taken a number of dif-
ferent forms. James N. Dertouzos & Lynn A. Karoly, 
Labor-Market Responses to Employer Liability viii (The 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1992). In Utah, this 
court has joined the national trend by converting into 
a rebuttable presumption the common law rule that ab-
sent an express agreement, employment was at-will, see 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 R2d 1033, 1044 
(Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. 
at 1051-52 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), 
by recognizing implied employment contracts, see id. 
at 1044-46, 1049 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); 
id. at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the re-
sult), and by adopting the tort of discharge in viola-
tion of public policy, see Peterson v. Browning, 832 
P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992) (Durham, J., joined by 
Stewart, J.); id. at 1285 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring). 
See generally Janet Hugie Smith & Lisa A. Yerkovich, 
Utah Employment Law Since Berube, Utah Bar J., Oct. 
1992, [**21] at 15. 
[*959] In making these changes to Utah's common 
law, we did not address the extent to which the avail-
ability of preexisting statutory and contractual remedies 
for employers' malfeasance against employees would 
affect the availability of these new common law con-
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act and tort causes of action. Retherford puts this 
nestion squarely before us. She asserts only com-
lon law tort and contract claims, apparently because 
le statute of limitations has run on any claims for relief 
le might have had under federal and state antidiscrimi-
ation statutes, see 42 US.C. § 2000e-5(€)\ Utah Code 
iin. § 34-35-7.1; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
Green, 411 US. 792, 798, 36L.Ed.2d668, 93 S.Ct. 
SI 7 (1973), and federal labor law, see DelCostello v. 
iternational Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72, 
6L.Ed.2d476, 103 S.Ct. 2281 (1983). 
Her appeal presents the following novel questions: 
irst, when an employee has a contractual right to be 
red only for just cause and therefore has a breach of 
3ntract claim if he or she can demonstrate discharge on 
>me other ground, such as retaliation for exercising a 
gal right, should we allow a common [**22] law tort 
:tion for discharge in violation of public policy that is 
ased on the same facts that underlie the claim for breach 
f contract? Second, does the Utah Anti-Discriminatory 
.ct's exclusive remedy provision preempt common law 
luses of action based on the same facts necessary to 
rove a cause of action under the statute, including com-
lon law causes of action for discharge in violation of 
ublic policy, breach of implied contract, negligent em-
loyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
r malicious interference with contract? Third, does 
xieral labor law preempt these same claims? Fourth, 
" neither state nor federal statute preempts her claims 
gainst her co-workers, is Retherford's assertion of these 
[aims timely? Fifth, if neither state nor federal statute 
reempts Retherford's claim for intentional infliction of 
motional distress, is the conduct Retherford alleges suf-
ciently severe to satisfy the standard we have set for 
lis tort? We will discuss each issue in turn. 
We begin with defendants' contention that we should 
ot allow an employee with an employment contract 
lat protects him or her from discharge without just 
ause~a contract that would prohibit [**23] discharge 
l violation of public policy-to maintain a common law 
)rt action for discharge in violation of public policy. 
)efendants argue that because the facts Retherford al-
sges constitute a cause of action for breach of her col-
xrtive bargaining agreement's just-cause provision, she 
> precluded from seeking tort damages for the same 
onduct. 
The AT&T-CWA collective bargaining agreement pro-
ides the premise for defendants' argument. It requires 
rbitration for "grievances arising out of or resulting 
rom the dismissal . . . of a regular employee," and 
t states that a dismissal "shall stand unless it is estab-
ished that the dismissal. . . was effected without just 
cause." (Emphasis added.) Defendants contend that the 
concept of "just cause" should exclude all reasons for 
discharge that are inconsistent with public policy. They 
argue that because the contractual provision protecting 
an employee from all but a just-cause dismissal protects 
the same interests as a tort cause of action for discharge 
in violation of public policy, no purpose is served by 
permitting a discharged employee to proceed on the tort 
claim when he or she has a contractual cause of action. 
Defendants [**24] contend that the contractual provi-
sion adequately vindicates the public policy underlying 
the tort claim. 
We disagree. Our recent decision in Peterson, which 
adopted a tort action for discharges in violation of public 
policy and was decided after the briefing and argument 
of the present case, requires rejection of defendants' ar-
gument. As adopted in Peterson, the tort of discharge 
in violation of public policy differs in both scope and 
sanction from any contractual provision that might limit 
an employer's power to discharge an employee for other 
than just cause. See PMerson 832 R 2d at 1282-83, 1285 
(Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. at 1285-86 
(Howe, A.C.J., concurring). Both respect for precedent 
and sound public [*960] policy compel the conclusion 
that the tort of discharge in violation of public policy 
should be available to all employees, regardless of their 
contractual status. 
Our reasoning is as follows: First, the logic of 
Peterson and of the earlier Berube decision indicates 
that the cause of action for discharge in violation of 
public policy limits the power of all employers to dis-
charge [**25] employees, without regard to whether 
the employee is at-will or protected by an express or 
implied employment contract. See id. at 1287 n.2 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by 
Hall, C.J.); Berube, 771 R2datl043 n.10 (Utah 1989) 
(opinion of Durham, I , joined by Stewart, J.); id. at 
1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). A pri-
mary purpose behind giving employees a right to sue 
for discharges in violation of public policy is to protect 
the vital state interests embodied in such policies. We 
cannot fulfill such a purpose if we hinge this cause of 
action on employees' contractual status and thus limit its 
availability to any one class of employees. See Peterson, 
832 R2d at 1287n.2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and 
dissenting); see also Petermann v. International Bhd. 
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Wirehousemen & Helpers of 
Am., Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 
27(Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
Second, not every discharge in violation of a con-
tractual just-cause provision rises to the level of a vi-
olation of public policy. [**26] As Justice Durham 
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pointed out in Peterson, only those public policies that 
are "clear" and "substantial" and arise from statutes or 
constitutions qualify for vindication through the tort of 
discharge in violation of public policy. 832 P.2d at 
1282. Consequently, the overlap of a contractual just-
cause cause of action and a public policy tort cause of 
action is not as great as defendants would have us be-
lieve. 
Finally, the vindication of public policy worked by 
the tort cause of action cannot be accomplished by a 
contractual provision that prohibits discharges for any 
but just cause. Even when a contract prohibits conduct 
that also would violate public policy, the remedies for 
breach of that contract would satisfy only the private in-
terests of the parties to the agreement, i.e., by restoring 
a wrongfully discharged employee to his or her posi-
tion and making him or her whole. There is no reason 
to expect that these remedies would be as draconian as 
those that might be available under the tort cause of ac-
tion, remedies that are designed not only to remedy the 
breach and make the employee whole, but to deter and 
punish violations of vital state interests. [**27] While 
any employer violating a contractual just-cause standard 
of dismissal should be liable for breaking its promise 
to its employee, Peterson dictates that an employer who 
violates clear and substantial public policies should be 
liable for the more expansive penalties of tort, a po-
tentially harsher liability commensurate with the greater 
wrong against society. When an employer's act violates 
both its own contractual just-cause standard and a clear 
and substantial public policy, we see no reason to dilute 
the force of the double sanction. In such an instance, 
the employer is liable for two breaches, one in contract 
and one in tort. It therefore must bear the consequences 
of both. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendants* argu-
ment. We hold that the tort of discharge in violation of 
public policy is a limitation on all discharges, not merely 
an exception to the at-will doctrine. See Peterson, 832 
P.2d at 1287n.2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dis-
senting, joined by Hall, CI ) ; Berube, 771 P2dat 1043 
n.10 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. 
at 1051 (Zimmerman, [**28] J., concurring in the re-
sult); see also Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 III. 
2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283-84, 85 III. Dec. 475 
(III. 1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 909, 88 L.Ed.2d 
243, 106 S.Ct. 278 (1985); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 
Md. 45, 537A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. 1988); Lepore v. 
National Tool & Mfg. Co., 224 N.J. Super. 463, 540 
A.2d 1296, 1301 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), 
aff d, 115 N.J. 226, 557 A.2d 1371 (N.J.), cert, de-
nied, 493 U.S. 954, 107L.Ed.2d 353 , 110 S.Ct. 366 
(1989); cf. Johnson v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 149 
Cal. App. 3d 518, 196 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (Ct. App. 
1983); [*961] K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 
732 P.2d 1364, 1369-70 (Nev. 1987). 
We next turn to the UADA to determine whether it pre-
empts Retherford's common law claims for discharge in 
violation of public policy, breach of implied contract, 
malicious interference with contract, negligent employ-
ment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Retherford argues that the UADA has no preemptive ef-
fect because she hopes to avoid its provisions and pursue 
her common law remedies. 
Our analysis of this question breaks down [**29] 
into two subsidiary issues. First, does the UADA 
preempt common law causes of action for retaliation 
against an employee for complaints of sexual harass-
ment? Second, if the UADA does have this preemptive 
effect, do the causes of action Retherford alleges fall 
within the UADA's preemptive scope? We discuss these 
questions in turn. 
The starting place for a determination of the preemp-
tive effect of the UADA is the statute itself. The legisla-
ture enacted the UADA in 1969 as part of a comprehen-
sive state labor law scheme. See 1969 Utah Laws ch. 
85, §§ 160-67. As passed, the statute neither prohibited 
employer retaliation against employees complaining of 
discrimination nor provided that the UADA supplied the 
exclusive remedy for discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practices. In 1985, the legislature added both 
a provision barring employer retaliation against employ-
ees opposing any employment practices prohibited by the 
chapter, 1985 Utah Laws ch. 189, § 3, and a provision 
making the UADA's remedies exclusive, id. § 4. The 
1985 exclusivity provision read as follows: 
The procedures contained in this section and Section 34-
35-8 are the exclusive remedy under state law [**30] for 
employment discrimination because of race, color, sex, 
age, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(11) (1988) (amended 
1990 & 1991) (current version at § 34-37-7.1 (15)). 
n5 The 1985 exclusivity provision, while listing spe-
cific grounds that had been theretofore prohibited, did 
not mention expressly the newly added prohibited ac-
tion: employer retaliation against employees who op-
posed prohibited employment practices. See 1985 Utah 
Laws ch. 189, § 4. In 1990, the legislature added re-
taliation to the listed grounds covered by the exclusivity 
provision. See 1990 Utah Laws ch. 63, § 2. 
n5 The exclusivity provision now reads, "The 
procedures contained in this section are the exclusive 
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remedy under state law for employment discrimina-
tion based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, preg-
nancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, 
age, relation, national origin, or handicap." Utah 
Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (Supp. 1992). 
In arguing that the UADA is not the exclusive rem-
[y [**3i] for employer retaliation against employees 
ho oppose prohibited discrimination, Retherford seizes 
>on the fact that the exclusivity provision in effect in 
>86, when she was fired, did not expressly mention 
taliation. She claims that this omission excepts her 
>mmon law claims from the UADA's exclusivity pro-
sion. We disagree. We find that taken as a whole, the 
ain text of the statute then in e feet preempts common 
w causes of action for retaliation for complaints of 
nployment discrimination. Furthermore, the circum-
ances surrounding the 1990 amendment of the statute 
)lster this construction. We discuss our construction 
r
 the statute below. 
As Retherford correctly notes, the word "retaliation" 
>es not appear in the exclusivity provision in effect at 
e time she was fired. She also correctly notes that 
here statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
>urt will not look beyond it to divine legislative intent. 
xSchurtzv. BMW of North Am., Inc., 814P.2dll08, 
F72 (Utah 1991); Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 
U, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). However, she 
sglects to mention that we [**32] interpret a statute as 
whole, not piecemeal. See Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112; 
lover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 
hah 1991); Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 
?S, 841 (Utah 1990); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
i5, 252 n.ll (Utah [*962] 1988); Peay v. Board of Ed. 
rProvo City School Dist., 14 Utah 2d 63, 66, 377R2d 
W, 492 (1962). Consequently, we begin by examining 
e statute as a whole. 
Although the exclusivity provision itself specifies only 
liscrimination," the statute as a whole defines retali-
ion as "discrimination," thereby implicitly including 
Oaliation within the exclusivity provision. Section 34-
5-6(l)(a)(i) defines retaliation as a "discriminatory or 
rohibited" employment practice. Utah Code Ann. § 
4-35-6(1 )(a)(i). One could argue that interpreting this 
rovision as defining retaliation as discrimination would 
ight the importance of the words "or prohibited" in 
action 34-35-6(1 )(a)(i). However, this argument fails 
t light of the fact that another section of the statute 
'*33] defines "prohibited" employment practices as 
athing more than those "specified as discriminatory, 
id therefore unlawful, in Section 34-35-6." Id. § 34-
5-2(7). Because sections 34-35-6(1 )(a)(i) and 34-35-
2(7) together define retaliation as nothing more than a 
form of prohibited employment discrimination, retalia-
tion must fall within the section 34-35-7.1(11) direction 
that the UADA's procedures "are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimination." Id. § 
34-35-7.1(11) (1988) (amended 1990 & 1991) (current 
version at § 34-35-7.1(15)). Therefore, as a matter of 
statutory construction, we find that the version of the 
UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's firing was the 
exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against an em-
ployee who complained of sexual harassment. We hold 
that the UADA preempts common law causes of action 
for discharge in retaliation for complaints of employ-
ment discrimination. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 
735 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D. Utah 1990); cf. Vfolk v. Saks 
Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 514, 
194 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (Ct. App. 1983). [**34] 
As a final matter, we recognize that the legislature's 
later amendment of the exclusivity provision to prohibit 
retaliation explicitly might indicate that the earlier ex-
clusivity provision had! not included retaliation within 
its scope. However, Retherford has produced no ev-
idence that the legislature intended this amendment to 
change the substantive law rather than merely to clarify 
it. Our own research into the history of this amendment 
has been similarly unavailing. Absent some evidence to 
the contrary, we conclude that taken as a whole, the ver-
sion of the UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's 
firing defined retaliation as discrimination and provided 
the exclusive remedy for this type of discrimination. In 
reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of our statu-
tory mandate to construe liberally statutes in derogation 
of the common law. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. 
Having determined that the UADA is the exclusive 
remedy for a claim of employer retaliation for complaints 
of employment discrimination, we turn to the question 
of whether Retherford's tort and contract claims come 
within the scope of the UADA's preemptive effect. This 
question presents us with an apparently [**35] novel 
question in Utah: What analytical model should deter-
mine when an exclusive statutory cause of action pre-
empts a common law claim based on the same facts? 
Although the Code provides that courts are to construe 
liberally statutes that are in derogation of the common 
law, see id. § 68-3-2, and although we have consid-
ered that statute when examining the scope of statuto-
rily created causes of action or duties, see, e.g., Asay 
v. mtkins, 751 P.2d 1135, 1136-37 (Utah 1988); AAA 
Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 
289, 290-91 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Niblock v. Salt 
Lake County, 100 Utali 573, 581-82, 777 P.2d 800, 804 
(1941), we have yet to propound a generic test for de-
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termining when a statutory cause of action functions as 
the exclusive remedy for the wrong, thereby foreclosing 
enforcement of either a preexisting common law remedy 
or a common law remedy recognized after the enactment 
of the statute. 
Because we lack an analytical model to answer this 
question, we have looked to law outside our jurisdic-
tion. Our research has revealed a diversity of ap-
proaches. [**36] [*963] Courts have described at least 
three separate tests for determining the preemptive ef-
fect of statutes on the common law. First, in examining 
the very issue that confronts us now, the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah decided that the 
relevant inquiry was whether the common law cause of 
action was "based upon the very conduct which is nec-
essary to prove sexual harassment or sex discrimination 
under the [UADA], namely, conduct expressly prohib-
ited by the Act. . . ." Davis v. Utah Power & Light 
Co:, No. 87-C-0659G, slip op. at 12 (D. Utah Nov. 
23, 1988) (unpublished). 
Second, in similar contexts, other courts have articu-
lated a test grounded on what can be termed "antecedent 
existence." These courts hold that the statutory action is 
the exclusive remedy if the common law cause of action 
did not exist before the statutory cause of action was cre-
ated. See Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 843 E2d 
359, 365 (9th Cir. 1988); Froyd v. Cook, 681 E Supp. 
669, 674 (E.D. CaL 1988); Guevara v. K-Uart Corp., 
629 E Supp. 1189, 1191 (S.D. W \b. 1986); Mahoney 
v. Crocker Nat'I Bank, 571 E Supp. 287, 293 (N.D. 
Cal. 1983); [**37] Register v. Coleman, 130 Ariz. 9, 
633 P. 2d 418, 423 (Ariz. 1981); \hlley Drive-In Theatre 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 79 Ariz. 396, 291 P.2d213, 
215 (Ariz. 1955); cf. Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels 
Corp., 634E Supp. 684, 688 (D. Haw. 1986). 
Finally, in determining the preemptive scope of work-
ers' compensation statutes, courts have established a 
test that inquires whether the statutory scheme supplies 
an indispensable element of the tort claim. See Foley 
v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711, 
716 (Mass. 1980); Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs 
Football Club, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1978). We have adopted this test in determining 
whether the Utah workers' compensation statute sup-
plants common law causes of action for injuries on the 
job. See Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 
P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). 
Because we see no reason why the indispensable ele-
ment test should not apply to the area before us as well as 
to workers' compensation n6 and because the other two 
approaches appear to be cumbersome and indeterminate, 
[**38] we hold that the indispensable element test is the 
correct analytical model for determining whether a statu-
tory cause of action forecloses a common law remedy. 
To explain this choice, we briefly outline our objections 
to the other two models courts have followed in this 
area. 
n6 In fact, we have employed a similar analysis in 
the area of governmental immunities. See Gillman 
v. Department of Fin. Insts., 782 P.2d 506, 511-12 
(Utah 1989). 
We begin with the federal district court's test in Davis, 
under which the UADA would preempt only "those com-
mon law causes of action which are based upon the very 
conduct which is necessary to prove [a claim under the 
act]." Slip op. at 12. We think that this test is simply too 
ambiguous. First, the Davis court itself seems uncertain 
as to precisely how the test should be applied. In con-
sidering whether the UADA preempted several different 
claims, the court articulated the standard in varying and 
not wholly consistent ways. At one point, [**39] the 
court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress 
"because the theoretical basis [sic] for the two claims are 
separate and distinct," id. at 21, while at another, the 
court found that the UADA did not preempt a claim for 
negligent supervision because it "may encompass more 
than acts defined to be 'discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practices' under the Utah Act," id. at 22. 
Second, we are unconvinced that inquiring whether a 
common law cause of action is broader than a statu-
tory cause of action will result in defensible distinctions 
between those causes of action that are preempted and 
those that are not. n7 Consequently, [*964] we decline 
to adopt the Davis test as the standard for determining 
preemption in this state. 
n7 The Davis court's analysis of a claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress caused by 
sexual harassment highlights this uncertainty. The 
court found that the UADA did not preempt the claim 
because it went "beyond the discriminatory conduct 
prohibited by the Utah Act." Davis, slip op. at 17. 
Apparently, the court believed that the extra element 
of outrage made the tort broader than the statutory 
claim. However, it could just as well be argued that 
the extra element makes the tort narrower than the 
statutory claim, i.e., that the UADA covers all sex-
ual harassment, whether or not it is inflicted in a 
particularly egregious manner. Furthermore, recent 
critical commentary suggests that sexual harassment 
on the job always constitutes an intentional inflic-
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tion of emotional distress. W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 12, at 18 
(Supp. 1988). If sexual harassment is per se outra-
geous and intolerable, it is difficult to see how the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can 
survive the Davis test. As this example illustrates, 
the Davis test is not a model of predictability or ex-
actitude. 
**40] 
Similarly flawed is the test of antecedent existence, 
/hich appears most developed in California. This test 
ocuses on timing. The general rule is that if the com-
mon law cause of action did not exist before the statutory 
ause of action was created, the statutory cause of action 
•reempts the common law. See Bernstein, 843 E2d at 
'65; Froyd, 681E Supp. at 674; Guevara, 629 E Supp. 
it 1191; Mahoney, 571 E Supp. at 293; Register, 633 
\2d at 423; \blley Drive-In Theatre Corp., 291 P.2d 
it 215; Strauss, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23; Gay Law 
'tudents Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 
<58, 156 Cal. P^tr. 14595 P.2d 592, 612 (Cal 1979); 
\ilo Alto-Menk Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara 
Zounty Transit Dist., 65 Cal. App. 3d 121, 135 Cal. 
>ptr. 192, 197(1976). 
We reject the test of antecedent existence for two rea-
ons. First, we are unsure of its scope. Despite the 
pparently general statement of the rule, we cannot tell 
whether, in fact, the rule applies [**41] to anything other 
tian a common law claim for discharge in violation of 
»ublic policy, which is the usual context in which the 
ule has been applied. See, e.g., Bernstein, 843 E2d at 
'62-64; Froyd, 681 E Supp. at 673 & n.10; Mahoney, 
'71 E Supp. at 292-93; Strauss, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 
'22. The few cases in which courts have addressed 
»ther common law causes of action, ostensibly under 
he antecedent existence test, are so cryptic as to appear 
onclusory. See, e.g., Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 
\27F. Supp. 434, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Diem v. City 
I County of San Francisco, 686 E Supp. 806, 811-12 
N.D. Cal. 1988). Although it is at least arguable that 
he rule should not apply to such common law claims as 
ireach of contract, which generally predate state antidis-
crimination statutes, we have found no reasoned analysis 
>f this question. 
This uncertainty contributes to our second reason for 
leclining to adopt the test of antecedent existence. At 
ts logical extremes, the theory of antecedent [**42] 
existence could infringe upon constitutional and statu-
ory mandates. The United States Constitution protects 
tgainst state interference with contracts, see U.S. Const, 
ut. I, § 10, cl. 1, and the Utah Constitution's open 
courts provision restricts the extent to which the state 
can limit common law remedies, see Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 11. If the test of antecedent existence applies to ven-
erable common law remedies such as breach of contract 
or malicious interference with contract, it might trench 
upon these constitutional provisions. Conversely, if the 
test of antecedent existence is limited to claims for dis-
charge in violation of public policy, as suggested by a 
case in which the court applied the test to a claim of 
discharge in violation of public policy but failed to con-
sider the test's possible application to the plaintiffs other 
common law claims, see Bernstein, 843 E2d at 364-66, 
we cannot reconcile it with Utah's statutory mandate to 
construe liberally statutes in derogation of the common 
law, see Utah Code /inn. § 68-3-2. In sum, we are 
reluctant to adopt a test of uncertain scope when it may 
pose constitutional questions at one [**43] extreme and 
statutory questions at the other. 
We now turn to what we term the indispensable ele-
ment test, which we adopt as the analytical model for 
determining when a legislative enactment supplies the 
exclusive remedy for a certain wrong. We think that 
the indispensable element model will avoid much of the 
vagueness and uncertainty that plague the Davis test and 
the test of antecedent existence. The indispensable ele-
ment test relies on neither timing nor conduct to deter-
mine preemption. [*965] Instead, under this test, pre-
emption depends on "'the nature of the injury for which 
[the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not the nature of the 
defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been 
responsible for that injury.'M Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716 
(quoting Gambrell, 562 S.W.2dat 168). 
An illustration is in order. InMounteer, 823 P.2d 1055 
(Utah 1991), in which we adopted the indispensable el-
ement test in the context of workers' compensation, we 
applied the test as follows: Initially, we identified the in-
jury that the workers' compensation statute is designed to 
address, i.e., only physical [**44] and mental injuries on 
the job. Id. at 1057. Then we examined the elements of 
the plaintiffs tort claims against his employer to deter-
mine whether physical or mental injury was a necessary 
element of each cause of action. Id. at 1058-59. This 
inquiry led us to the following conclusions. First, we 
determined that the plaintiffs claim for slander did not 
require that the plaintiff prove physical or mental injury; 
it required defamation, or injury to reputation, which 
was not an injury the statute addressed. Consequently, 
we held that the nature of the injury was not among 
those injuries protected by the statute and therefore the 
Workers' Compensation Act did not provide the exclu-
sive remedy for the plaintiffs slander claim. Id. at 
1058. Second, we determined that the plaintiffs claims 
for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
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tress did require that the plaintiff prove mental injury 
because " 'mental harm is the essence' of [those] tort[s]." 
Id. (quoting Foley, 413 N.E.2dat 716); see id. at 1059. 
Because mental injury was among [**45] those injuries 
addressed by the statute and because the plaintiff could 
not prove intentional and negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress without proving mental injury, we held 
that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the ex-
clusive remedy for the plaintiffs mental distress. n8 
n8 Defendants have not argued that workers' com-
pensation is the exclusive remedy for Retherford's 
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and negligent employment. However, we realize that 
the preceding discussion may raise questions about 
the application of the Workers' Compensation Act to 
the present case on remand. Therefore, we take this 
opportunity to clarify some potential areas of confu-
sion. See Utah R. App. P. 30(a); State v. James, 
819 R2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 
813 R2d 111, 119 (Utah 1991); Hiltsley v. Ryder, 
738 R2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring). 
Regarding Retherford's claim against her fellow 
employees for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, we have long held that an employee injured by 
the intentional tort of a fellow employee may sue 
the fellow employee personally. See Bryan v. Utah 
Int'l, 533 R2d 892, 894 (Utah 1975). Therefore, 
the Workers' Compensation Act poses no bar to 
Retherford's suing her fellow employees for inten-
tional torts. 
However, the Act's applicability to Retherford's 
claim against AT&T for negligent employment is 
less clear. We have yet to address directly whether a 
plaintiff who is mentally or physically injured by the 
intentional torts of a fellow employee can sue his or 
her employer for negligent employment or whether 
workers' compensation provides the exclusive rem-
edy for the employer's negligence. Neither the Act 
itself nor judicial interpretations of it in Utah or else-
where supply an explicit exception for the tort of 
negligent employment in such an instance. Our rul-
ing in Mounteer, based as it is on an injury-oriented 
analysis rather than on an analysis centered on the 
legal theory of the claim, would suggest that work-
ers' compensation would be an exclusive remedy. 
However, because the parties have neither raised nor 
briefed this issue, we decline to determine whether 
there is nonetheless some reason to allow the tort 
claim to go forward. In the event that this issue 
develops on remand, we do note that if Mounteer 
does not govern and workers' compensation does not 
supply an exclusive remedy, our previous case law 
may provide some guidance in determining AT&T's 
liability for Bateson-Hough's alleged intentionally 
tortious conduct. We have already determined that a 
managerial employee's tortious intent can be imputed 
to his or her employer under certain circumstances. 
See Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 
157 (Utah 1991). 
[**46] 
Applying this analysis to the case at hand, we begin 
with the task of determining what injuries the UADA is 
designed to address. This purpose is revealed on the 
face of the Act itself, which provides that it is a discrim-
inatory or prohibited employment practice 
for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to 
discharge, demote, terminate any person, or to retaliate 
against, or discriminate in matters of compensation or in 
terms, privileges, and conditions [*966] of employment 
against any person otherwise qualified, because of race, 
color, sex, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(l)(a)(i) (amended 1989). 
From this language, we infer that the legislature in-
tended the UADA to address all manner of employment 
discrimination against any member of the specified pro-
tected groups. As discussed above, the legislature in-
cluded employer retaliation for complaining of employ-
ment discrimination within its definition of discrimina-
tion. Thus, the next step in our analysis requires us 
to determine whether employment discrimination, in-
cluding employer retaliation, supplies an indispensable 
element of any of Retherford's [**47] causes of action. 
We begin with Retherford's claim for discharge in vi-
olation of public policy. In order to prove this tort, 
Retherford must show that AT&T discharged her in a 
manner or for a reason that contravened a "clear and 
substantial public policy" of the State of Utah, a pub-
lic policy rooted in Utah's constitution or statutes. n9 
Peterson, 832 R2d at 1281; see also Berube, 771 R2d 
at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). The 
only possible source in Utah's statutes or constitution for 
a clear and substantial public policy allegedly violated 
by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's prohibition of 
retaliation for good faith complaints of employment dis-
crimination. nlO See Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15). 
Without deciding that the statute at issue rises to the level 
of a clear and substantial public policy, we find that in 
the absence of this public policy declaration, Retherford 
would be unable even to allege an action for this tort. 
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nply put, if there were no UADA policy against retali-
on, there could be no tort for discharge in violation of 
s public policy. Applying the Mounteer test, [**48] 
is plain that the harm the UADA addresses is an in-
jpensable element in Retherford's tort cause of action; 
before, the UADA must preempt this claim. 
n9 In determining whether a public policy is suf-
ficiently "clear and substantial" to support a cause 
of action for discharge in violation of public policy, 
one must examine the strength of the policy as well 
as the extent to .vhich it affects the public as a whole. 
The very words "clear and substantial" require a lack 
of ambiguity on both points. As the majority of this 
court recognized in Peterson, all statements made in 
a statute are not expressions of public policy. Many 
statutes merely regulate conduct between private in-
dividuals or "'impose requirements whose fulfill-
ment does not implicate fundamental public policy 
concerns.'" Id. at 1282 (quoting Foley v. Interactive 
Data Corp., 47 Cal, 3d 654, 765 P,2d 373, 379, 
254 Cal, Rptr. 211 (Cal, 1988)), 
The following questions are relevant to determin-
ing whether a statute embodies a clear and substantial 
public policy. First, one must ask whether the pol-
icy in question is one of overarching importance to 
the public, as opposed to the parties only. Second, 
one must inquire whether the public interest is so 
strong and the policy so clear and weighty that we 
should place the policy beyond the reach of contract, 
thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties 
cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal 
bargaining power. Since these are the consequences 
of qualifying a policy as a basis for the tort action, 
these considerations should inform the evaluation of 
the policy itself. See id. at 1288 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring and dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.); see 
also Foley, 765 R2d at 379-80 & n,12, 
*49] 
nlO The UADA defines retaliatory conduct as fol-
lows: 
"Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action by an 
employer . . . against one of its employees . . . be-
cause he [or she] has opposed any employment prac-
tice prohibited under this chapter or because he [or 
she] has filed charges, testified, assisted, or partic-
ipated in any way in any proceeding, investigation, 
or hearing under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15). 
Moving to Retherford's other common law causes of 
:tion, the Mounteer analytical model leads to the con-
clusion that the UADA does not preempt these other 
causes of action because discrimination is not an in-
dispensable element of these claims. A more detailed 
discussion of the elements of each of these claims is in-
cluded in the analysis of the federal labor law preemption 
issue discussed below; however, for the purposes of de-
termining the state law preemption question, it is enough 
to lay out the indispensable elements of Retherford's re-
maining claims and to note that none of them compre-
hends an injury that is the target of the UADA. 
[*967] The elements of Retherford's claims [**50] are 
as follows: To prevail on a claim of breach of implied 
contract, Retherford must prove the existence of an im-
plied contract, created by mutual assent, and AT&T's 
failure to comply with its terms, ni l See Lowe v. 
Sorenson Research Co,, 779R2d668, 670 (Utah 1989); 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777R2d 
483, 485-86 (Utah 1989); Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044-45; 
Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 
775 R2d 940, 942-43 (Utah Ct. App, 1989), cert, de-
nied, 789 R2d33 (Utali 1990). To prevail on her claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Retherford 
must prove that her co-workers either intentionally or 
recklessly engaged in intolerable and outrageous conduct 
that caused her severe emotional distress. See Samrns 
v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 R2d 344, 346-
47(1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 R2d 1315, 1317 
(Utah Ct, App, 1990), To prevail on her claim of mali-
cious interference with contractual relations, Retherford 
[**51] must prove that her co-workers, whether sep-
arately or in conspiracy, intentionally and improperly 
persuaded AT&T to breach its implied employment con-
tract with Retherford. nl2 See Leigh Furniture & Carpet 
Co, v. Isom, 657 R2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982); Bunnell 
v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 R2d 597, 602 (1962), 
And to prevail on her claim of negligent employment, 
Retherford must prove that AT&T's negligence in hir-
ing, supervising, or retaining its employees proximately 
caused her harm. See Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 
Utah 2d 49, 51-52, 386R2d910, 911-12 (1963). 
ni l As discussed more fully above, the UADA 
does not preempt Retherford's cause of action for 
breach of implied contract because none of the in-
dispensable elements of this claim implicates an in-
jury targeted by the UADA. However, even if there 
were an overlap between the indispensable elements 
of the contract claim and the injury addressed by the 
statute, that overlap would not dispose of the ques-
tion of preemption. When dealing with the realm 
of contracts, we must add another step to our pre-
emption analysis. First, we must examine, as we 
do with all common law causes of action, whether 
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the statute at issue supplies an indispensable element 
of the breach of contract claim. If not, our analysis 
is at an end. If so, we must proceed to the second 
step, applicable only to contract claims. This step is 
premised on the unique nature of contracts. Tort law 
embodies statements of public policy, and therefore 
it is appropriate for a statutory policy to preempt 
a judicially declared policy. Contracts, by contrast, 
involve voluntary private agreements that our society 
endows with the force of law. Before we can inter-
fere with the enforcement of this private agreement, 
we must find that the private agreement offends the 
public policy embodied in the statute, offends it so 
severely that it requires striking the term or clause as 
unenforceable. Consequently, the second step for de-
termining preemption of a contract claim is whether 
public policy forbids parties to contract on such a 
subject, for such a remedy, or in such a manner. 
[**52] 
nl2 Retherford's complaint does not specify 
whether she is alleging interference with her col-
lective bargaining agreement or with her contract 
implied from the code of conduct. Because the fed-
eral Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 785(a), would preempt any claim that defendants 
interfered with Retherford's collective bargaining 
agreement, see Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. 
Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647 
F.2d 372, 377-78 (3d Cir. 1981), we interpret her 
complaint as alleging interference with her implied 
contract of employment. 
Noticeably absent from this list of the indispensable 
elements of the four claims is an injury that is a tar-
get of the UADA: retaliation for complaints of sexual 
harassment. While it is true that all four claims arise 
out of defendants1 retaliatory conduct, preemption de-
pends on the nature of the injury, not on the nature of the 
conduct allegedly responsible for that harm. See Foley, 
413 N.E.2dat 716. The injuries Retherford alleges-the 
broken [**53] promise, the mental anguish, the wrong-
ful interference with her contract, and the unchecked 
misconduct of her fellow employees—are distinct from 
the injury of retaliation. Because Retherford would be 
able to maintain these claims without alleging retaliatory 
harassment, we hold that under the Mounteer test, the 
UADA does not preempt Retherford's claims for breach 
of implied contract, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, tortious interference with contract, and negli-
gent employment. 
Having determined that the UADA preempts only 
Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of pub-
lic policy, we next address whether federal labor law 
[*968] preempts any of Retherford's remaining causes 
of action. We recap the substance of these remaining 
claims. Retherford alleges that, first, AT&T's fail-
ure to prevent retaliation for her complaints of sexual 
harassment breached a contract implied from AT&T's 
code of conduct; second, Gailey, Randall, Johnson, and 
Bateson-Hough maliciously interfered with her contrac-
tual relations, resulting in AT&T's breach of its implied 
contract prohibiting reprisal for good-faith complaints 
of sexual harassment; third, Gailey, Randall, Johnson, 
and Bateson-Hough [**54] intentionally inflicted emo-
tional distress on her through their retaliatory conduct; 
and fourth, AT&T negligently employed Retherford's 
harassers, thereby allowing them to inflict emotional 
distress on her. 
The legislative enactment that determines the fed-
eral preemption question is section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), which reads as 
follows: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and 
a labor organization representing employees in an indus-
try affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between 
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United States having jurisdiction of the 
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or 
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 
301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 755(a) [hereinafter section 301]. 
On its face, it is not apparent that section 301 preempts 
state law. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 
208, 85L.Ed.2d206,105 S.Ct. 1904(1985). However, 
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted section 
301 as not only providing federal jurisdiction over con-
troversies involving [**55] collective bargaining agree-
ments, but also as vesting exclusive power in "federal 
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforce-
ment of these collective bargaining agreements." Textile 
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 
U.S. 448, 451, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, 77 S.Ct. 912 (1957); 
accord Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210; Local 
174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Wzrehousemen & Helpers 
of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04, 7 
LEd.2d 593, 82 S.Ct. 571 (1962); see also Sperber v. 
GaligherAsh Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1987). 
The policy underlying this expansive interpretation of 
section 301 is well-founded. If the terms of collective 
bargaining agreements were subject to differing inter-
pretations by state and federal courts, it could severely 
disrupt both the negotiation and the administration of 
S4H P.2d 949, *968; 1992 Utah LEXIS 120, **55; 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; 8 BNA IER CAS 405 
llective bargaining agreements. Lucas Flour Co., 369 
S. at 103. To avoid this possibility, the Court held that 
i meaning to be given to the terms of collective bar-
ining agreements must be determined exclusively by 
iform federal law. Id. at 103-04; [**56] see Allis-
xalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210. 
An elaboration on this doctrine of federal exclusivity 
the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements 
the Supreme Court's conclusion that section 301 pre-
lpts any common law cause of action where the trial 
urt, in adjudicating that cause of action, must inter-
et the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. See 
ngle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 
9, 405-06, 100L.Ed.2d410, 108S.Ct. 1877(1988). 
essence, the Supreme Court has held that section 301 
eempts any common law claim that is "' substantially 
pendent on analysis of a collective bargaining agree-
snt,'" Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 
5, 96 L.Ed.2d 318, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) (quot-
l International Bhd. of Electric Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
ichler, 481 U.S. 851, 859, 95L.Ed.2d 791, 107S.Ct. 
61 n.3 (1987)), lest the common law provide a vehicle 
r state courts to intrude into the exclusive federal pre-
rve that is the interpretation of collective bargaining 
reements. The justification for this expansive view 
section 301 preemption is the ease with which an ag-
ieved employee otherwise could turn [**57] a suit for 
each of a collective bargaining agreement into a state 
rt or contract claim, thereby obtaining [*969] a state 
w holding that might result in an inconsistent inter-
etation of the collective bargaining agreement. As the 
)urt has explained: 
le interests in interpretive uniformity and predictabil-
r that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved 
r
 reference to federal law also require that the meaning 
ven a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform 
deral interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what 
e parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal 
nsequences were intended to flow from breaches of 
at agreement, must be resolved by reference to uni-
rm federal law, whether such questions arise in the 
mtext of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit al-
ging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate 
rm over substance and allow parties to evade the re-
tirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims 
claims for tortious breach of contract. 
}lis-Chalmers Corp., 471 US. at 211. 
The question before us, then, is whether resolution 
* the state law claim depends upon the interpretation 
*58] of the collective bargaining agreement. If it 
>es, section 301 preempts the state law cause of ac-
tion, tingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06. However, "even 
if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining 
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, 
would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, 
as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without 
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 'indepen-
dent1 of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes." 
Id. at 409-10. Under such circumstances, there is no 
section 301 preemption. 
Defendants argue that the Lingle test bars Retherford's 
claims of breach of implied contract, tortious interfer-
ence with contract, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and negligent employment because evaluation 
of the state claims is "inextricably intertwined with con-
sideration of the terms of the labor contract/ In order 
to determine whether resolution of Retherford's claims 
indeed depends upon the meaning of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, we must examine the discrete ele-
ments of each claim. See Douglas v. American Info. 
Technologies Corp., 877E2d565, 570 (7th Cir. 1989). 
[**59] 
We first address Retherford's claim for breach of im-
plied contract. Defendants argue that section 301 bars 
Retherford's implied contract claim because the state 
court must interpret the collective bargaining agreement 
in order to determine whether the AT&T code of con-
duct upon which the claim is based is separate from or 
subsumed into the collective bargaining agreement. We 
hold that Retherford'S implied contract claim is inac-
tionable, but on somewhat different grounds. See Hill 
v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 
1992). 
Under federal labor law, only duly authorized union 
representatives can bargain for the terms and conditions 
of employment for those within the bargaining unit. See 
29 US.C. § 759(a); cf. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 
397. The Supreme Court has held that although any em-
ployee or group of employees can reach a separate agree-
ment with the employer, that separate contract must be 
consistent with the collective bargaining agreement ne-
gotiated by the union. / . / . Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 
U.S. 332, 339, 88 L.Ed. 762, 64 S.Ct. 576 (1944); 
see also [**60] NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 175, 180, 18L.Ed.2dll23 , 87S.Ct. 2001 reh'g 
denied, 389 U.S. 892, 19 L.Ed.2d 202, 88 S.Ct. 13 
(1967). Thus, inconsistent separate agreements are not 
enforceable. See Eitmann v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 
Inc., 730 E2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 469 
US. 1018, 83 L.Ed.2d 359, 105 S.Ct. 433 (1984). 
In applying this rule, at least two federal circuits 
have found unenforceable separate agreements that were 
more favorable to the individual employees than the col-
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lective bargaining agreement. See Chmiel v. Beverly 
Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 E2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 
1989); Eitmcmn, 730 E2d at 362-63. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that an employee whose collective 
[*970] bargaining agreement defined his tenure as at-will 
could not enforce an implied contract for just-cause dis-
missal because the extra protections would contradict the 
collective bargaining agreement. See Chmiel, 873 E2d 
at 1285. 
We think that the policy underlying these decisions is 
sound. Nothing could undermine the authority of the 
collective [**61] bargaining unit more thoroughly than 
allowing individuals or cohorts of employees to enforce 
separate contracts that were more advantageous to those 
employees than was the collective bargaining agreement 
itself. Although the interests of individual employees 
may be slighted in the process, Congress apparently is 
of the view that such sacrifices are necessary in order 
to match the power of the employer with the aggregate 
power of unionized employees. Cf. Lodge 76, Int'l 
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 
132, 146, 49L.Ed.2d396, 96S.Q. 2548 (1976); Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180; J.I. Case, 321 
U.S. at 338-39. See generally Annotation, Collective 
Bargaining Under Labor Relations Act as Related to 
Freedom of Contract Between Employer and Individual 
Employees, 88 L.Ed. 770 (1944). Accordingly, we de-
cline to upset this balance by allowing individual agree-
ments to undercut the union as the bargaining agent. 
In the instant case, providing any remedy under an 
implied contract when no remedy is available under 
the [**62] collective bargaining agreement-because the 
time for arbitration has passed—obviously would put 
Retherford in a more advantageous position than AT&T 
employees bound by the collective bargaining agree-
ment, thereby undermining the collective bargaining 
unit. Consequently, Retherford's alleged implied con-
tract is unenforceable. 
Our holding that Retherford's implied contract is in-
valid requires us to find that her claim for malicious in-
terference with contract is similarly defective. Although 
some courts have held that the contract at issue in a 
case for malicious interference need not be enforceable, 
courts generally agree that the contract must not be ille-
gal or contrary to public policy. See generally 45 Am. 
Jur. 2d Interference §§ 8-9 (1969 & Supp. 1992). 
Allowing a plaintiff to sue for malicious interference 
with a contract that is invalid would gut the federal policy 
of consolidating bargaining power in union representa-
tives. Consequently, we affirm the summary judgment 
on Retherford fs claim for malicious interference with 
contract, albeit on grounds different from those relied 
upon by the trial court. 
Having determined that the LMRA bars Retherford's 
claims stemming [**63] from her implied contract, we 
next consider her tort claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligent employment. We be-
gin with her claim for emotional distress because AT&T 
can be held liable for negligent employment only if its 
employees Randall, Johnson, Gailey, nl3 and Bateson-
Hough are liable for an independent tort. See Focke 
v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 1325, 1344 (D. Kan. 
1982); Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 
799P.2dl5, 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). See generally 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958). Here, 
Retherford alleges that AT&T's employees committed 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
nl3 Although Retherford stipulated to Gailey's 
dismissal upon Gailey's declaration of bankruptcy, 
Gailey's absence from this suit does not affect 
Retherford's ability to prove Gailey's tortious con-
duct in order to find AT&T liable for negligent em-
ployment. It merely prevents Retherford from seek-
ing damages from Gailey personally. Any finding 
that Gailey engaged in tortious conduct would, of 
course, have no preclusive effect in a subsequent 
suit against Gailey herself. 
[**64] 
To sustain her claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, Retherford must show that (i) Gailey's, 
Randall's, Johnson's, and Bateson-Hough's conduct was 
outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality; 
(ii) they intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard 
of the likelihood of causing, emotional [*971] distress; 
(iii) Retherford suffered severe emotional distress; and 
(iv) their conduct proximately caused Retherford's emo-
tional distress. See Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 
293, 358P.2d344, 346-47(1961); White v. Blackburn, 
787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). To decide 
whether this tort claim is preempted, we must determine 
whether, on the record before us, there is any basis for 
concluding that defendants' conduct alleged to provide 
a basis for the tort claim might reasonably implicate any 
of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See 
Ungle, 486 U.S. at 405-06. 
A necessary element of Retherford's claim is that 
Bateson-Hough's, Gailey's, Randall's, and Johnson's 
behavior was outrageous [**65] and intolerable in that 
it offended against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. See Samms, 11 Utah 2d at 293, 
358 P. 2d at 347. Before analyzing this tort under the 
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t for section 301 preemption, it is helpful to identify 
conduct that Retherford alleges. Retherford details 
conduct of each co-worker as follows: With respect 
Bateson-Hough, Retherford contends that Bateson-
ugh responded to her complaining of sexual harass-
nt by requiring her to sit next to Gailey, telling her she 
1 a letter sanctioning her and Gailey, assigning her to 
tain "slow" work stations that hampered her produc-
ity, reprimanding and criticizing her, and threatening 
fire her if she continued to complain about Gailey. 
Vs for Gailey, Retherford alleges that Gailey avenged 
therford's complaint to the AT&T EEO coordinator 
following her, making threatening faces at her, and 
ceding by her late at night when she was trying to 
>ss the street. nl4 As for Randall, Retherford charges 
t Randall told her she must report to Boise within ten 
/s or lose her job. In addition, although the record 
ambiguous, Randall may [**66] have been among 
iley's friends who retaliated against Retherford by 
ring at her, making "threatening facial expressions" 
ler, walking extremely close to her, and following her 
>und the office. Finally, Johnson also may have been 
ong the group of Gailey's friends who discomfited 
therford by their staring and their threatening facial 
sessions. The record shows that on at least one oc-
;ion, Johnson accused Retherford of staring at her. 
therford also alleges that in her presence, Johnson 
i others lamented the fact that someone was watching 
sn and would report them if they broke company rules. 
ter one such comment, Johnson looked at Retherford 
i said, "Isn't that right, Debi?" Viewing the facts in 
\ light most favorable to Retherford, as we must, see 
llins v. Petersen, 813 R2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991), 
\ accept for the purposes of this appeal that Retherford 
s alleged at least that Randall and Johnson made a habit 
following her and mocking her after she complained 
Gailey's sexual harassment. 
nl4 Because Retherford claims only retaliatory 
harassment, not sexual harassment, we will not con-
sider evidence of Gailey's unwelcome sexual ad-
vances. 
*67] 
Defendants argue that section 301 preempts 
therford's claims of intentional infliction of 
lotional distress because a court deciding whether 
is conduct was intolerable and outrageous must 
terpret the collective bargaining agreement to 
:termine whether Bateson-Hough exceeded her 
pervisory authority and whether Gailey's, Randall's, 
id Johnson's workplace conduct was improper. We 
agree in part. 
In considering section 301 preemption of tort claims 
alleging infliction of emotional distress by a supervi-
sor or fellow employee, courts seem to have distin-
guished between situations in which the defendant has 
misused his or her authority under a collective bargain-
ing agreement to torment the plaintiff and situations in 
which the defendant has inflicted the distress through 
conduct that is purely personal and does not implicate 
the exercise of supervisory authority. See Paradis v. 
United Technologies Pratt & Whitney Div., 672 F. Supp. 
67, 71 (D. Conn. 1987). Compare Douglas, 877 
E2d at 571-72 and Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 
854 E2d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1988) and Truex v. 
Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784E2d 1347, 1350-51 (9th 
Cir. 1985) [**68] with [*972] Keehr v. Consolidated 
Freightways of Delaware, Inc., 825 E2d 133, 136-38 
(7th Cir. 1987) and Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 
817 E2d 536, 539-40 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 484 
U.S. 908, 98 L.Ed.2d 209, 108 S.Ct. 251 (1987) and 
Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 E2d 1367, 
1369 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 US. 1099, 
85L.Ed.2d839, 105S.Ct. 2319(1985). 
The Douglas and Keehr cases, both from the Seventh 
Circuit, illustrate this distinction. In Douglas, the plain-
tiff charged her employer with "extreme and outrageous" 
treatment because of the employer's allegedly arbitrary 
denials of her requests for days off, an "unjustified" fi-
nal warning, and "unwarranted and excessive" scrutiny 
of her work. 877 E2d at 572. The Seventh Circuit 
concluded that a state court would have to interpret the 
collective bargaining agreement's provisions regulating 
the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs employment to 
determine whether the employer's actions were indeed 
arbitrary, unjustified, unwarranted, and excessive. It 
therefore held that [**69] section 301 barred Douglas's 
state tort claim. Id. at 572-73. 
In contrast, the Keehr court found that section 301 did 
not preempt a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. There, Keehr complained that a com-
pany supervisor had engaged him in an altercation during 
which the supervisor allegedly made outrageous com-
ments about the sexual activities of Keehr's wife, and 
the verbal abuse escalated into a fist fight. 825 E2d 
at 135. The court reasoned that there was no section 
301 preemption because the supervisor's abuse of the 
employee could not reasonably be seen as implicating 
the supervisor's authority under the collective bargain-
ing agreement, even though it would have been possible 
for Keehr to file a grievance against his supervisor for 
using abusive language. Id. at 137-38. 
We find that this distinction has merit and apply it 
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to Retherford's emotional distress claim. Retherford's 
allegations that Randall ordered her to report to Boise 
within ten days or lose her job and that Bateson-Hough 
reprimanded Retherford, warned her to stop complain-
ing, told her where to sit, [**70] and assigned her cer-
tain tasks raise questions about their respective authority 
under the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, 
to the extent that this conduct constitutes a ground for 
the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
section 301 preempts Retherford's cause of action. 
However, other allegations regarding the conduct of 
Gailey, Randall, and Johnson can withstand the section 
301 preemption analysis. Specifically, Retherford al-
leges that Gailey responded to Retherford's complaint to 
the AT&T EEO coordinator with conduct ranging from 
following her around the office to attempting to frighten 
her as she crossed the street. She alleges that Randall and 
Johnson retaliated by following her and making threat-
ening faces at her. Such alleged behavior raises issues of 
purely personal misconduct. Evaluating the severity and 
the consequences of this conduct in order to adjudicate 
Retherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress should require no interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement. These allegations are analogous 
to those in Keehr, not to those in Douglas. To the extent 
that Retherford's tort claim is premised upon [**71] al-
legations of purely personal misconduct, as opposed to 
misconduct under color of possible contractual authority, 
section 301 does not preempt the cause of action. 
Having determined that Gailey, Johnson, and Randall 
may be held liable for the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress without implicating the col-
lective bargaining agreement, we turn to the question of 
whether Retherford can hold AT&T liable for Gailey's, 
Johnson's, and Randall's behavior under a theory of 
negligent employment without running afoul of section 
301 preemption. The issue is whether, in determining 
AT&T's liability under this claim, a court could avoid 
determining any issue that would implicate the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
Negligent employment is a tort of some novelty in 
Utah. Although we have recognized this cause of ac-
tion, see Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 R2d 1037, 
1048 [*973] (Utah 1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 
771 R2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989), Stone v. Hurst 
Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 51, 386 R2d 910, 911-
12 (1963), our cases do not describe its elements in 
detail. [**72] Consequently, we look to other juris-
dictions to provide a detailed description of this tort. To 
prevail on her claim of negligent employment against 
AT&T, Retherford must show that (i) AT&T knew or 
should have known that its employees posed a fore-
seeable risk of retaliatory harassment to third parties, 
including fellow employees; (ii) the employees did in-
deed inflict such harm; and (iii) the employer's negli-
gence in hiring, supervising, or retaining the employees 
proximately caused the injury. nl5 See, e.g., Pruitt v. 
Ravelin, 141 Ariz. 195, 685 R2d 1347, 1354-55 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1984); Kassmanv. Busfield Enters., Inc., 131 
Ariz. 163, 639R2d353, 356-57(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); 
Najerav. Southern Pac. Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d634,13 
Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 &n. 3 (Ct. App. 1961); Destefano 
v. Grabrian, 763 R2d 275, 287-88 (Colo. 1988); 
Tathamv. MbbashR.R., 412 III. 568, 107N.E.2d 735, 
739 (III. 1952); Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 
Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 653, 662 (Kan. 1984); LaBonte 
v. National Gypsum Co., 113 N.H. 678, 313 A.2d 403, 
405 (N.H. 1973);F&TCo. v. Wods, 92NM. 697, 594 
R2d 745, 746-49 (N.M. 1979); [**73] \hldez v. Warner, 
106 N.M. 305, 742R2d517, 519-20 (N.M. Ct. App.), 
cert, quashed sub nom. Z&E, Inc. v. \hldez, 742 R2d 
1058 (N.M. 1987); Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, 
Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 688 R2d 333, 339-41 (N.M. Ct. 
App.), writ quashed, 685 R2d 963 (N.M. 1984); Kelley 
v. Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., 183 Ore. 1, 189 R2d 
105, 106-07 (Or. 1948); Chesterman v. Barmon, 82 
Ore. App. 1, 727R2dl30, 131-32 (Or. Ct. App.), 
aff d and remanded, 305 Ore. 439, 753 R2d 404 (Or. 
1988); Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 
246A.2d418, 419-22 (Pa. 1968); Banks v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 57 Wish. App. 251, 787 R2d 953, 960 (Wish. 
Ct. App. 1990). See generally Kenneth R. Wallentine, 
Negligent Hiring: The Dual Sting of Pre-Employment 
Investigation, Utah Bar Journal, October 1989, at 15; 
Donald K. Armstrong, Negligent Hiring and Negligent 
Entrustment: The Case Against Exclusion, 52 Or. L. 
Rev. 296, 298-300 (1973); Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 213 (1958); Restatement (Second) [**74] of 
Torts §317 (1965). 
nl5 Because the tort of negligent employment 
has received little explication in our cases, we take 
this opportunity to provide some background. The 
causes of action variously termed "negligent hiring," 
"negligent supervision," and "negligent retention" 
are all basically subsets of the general tort of negli-
gent employment. See generally 53 Am. Jur. 2d 
Master and Servant §§ 212, 422 (1970 & Supp. 
1992). These variants differ only in that they arise 
at different points in the employment relationship. 
By way of illustration only, we offer the follow-
ing: a day-care provider who knowingly or neg-
ligently hires a convicted child molester might be 
liable for negligent hiring, see Broderick v. King's 
Wby Assembly of God Church, 808 R2d 1211, 1221 
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(Alaska 1991), while a day-care provider who unwit-
tingly hires a convicted child molester but retains him 
or her once his or her record and proclivities become 
apparent might risk liability for negligent retention. 
In both instances, once the day-care provider knows 
of the child molester's background, it might be liable 
for negligent supervision if it allows him or her un-
supervised interaction with the children in its care. 
See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 
(1958). 
**75] 
For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume 
lat Retherford can prove that Gailey, Randall, and 
3hnson intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon 
er. Also we note that because the tort of negligent 
mployment can impose liability on the employer even 
'hen the employer would not otherwise be liable under 
le doctrine of respondeat superior, we have no need 
) consult the collective bargaining agreement to deter-
line whether Gailey, Randall, and Johnson were acting 
l the scope of their employment. See Clover, 808 R2d 
11048; Birkner, 771 R2d at 1059. 
Defendants argue that a state court cannot determine 
le elements of the tort-i.e., that AT&T knew or rea-
Dnably should have known that Gailey, Randall, and 
ohnson posed a hazard of such tortious conduct and 
ould have taken steps to avoid this hazard—without 
rferring to any provision of the collective bargaining 
greement. Defendants insist that the court will have 
3 resort to the collective bargaining agreement's termi-
ation and discipline provisions to determine whether 
*974] AT&T acted "appropriately" in dealing with 
Jailey, Johnson, and Randall. We [**76] cannot agree 
iat the record before us makes clear that the trial court 
lust resort to the collective bargaining agreement to ad-
idicate this claim. 
In analyzing this issue, we first note that AT&T mis-
mderstands the source of its duty to control the conduct 
>f its employees. AT&T suggests that this obligation 
rises from the collective bargaining agreement. This 
s incorrect. The employer's duty toward those people 
vhom its employees place in a position of reasonably 
breseeable risk or injury does not stem from its private 
employment contract. Cf. \bldez, 742 R2d at 519. 
nstead, it is a duty imposed by the common law of the 
tate. The common law of tort expresses public policy, 
he scope of which is not generally determined by refer-
ence to privately contracted obligations. Certainly, we 
nay vindicate some public policies by implying them 
is covenants to private contracts. See, e.g., Beck v. 
farmers Ins. Exch., 701 R2d 795t 801 (Utah 1985). 
However, such covenants are judicial creations that ex-
press public policy and constitute public law; they are 
not private agreements between private parties, and they 
are not [**77] avoidable by contract. See id. at 801 n.4. 
In the present case, the duty that Retherford relies 
upon arises from the public law of tort, not from the pri-
vate collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the ex-
istence of the duty and the determination of its scope do 
not require resort to any term of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Other duties might be due to Retherford 
and other employees by reason of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, but their existence is not relevant to the 
duty inquiry for purposes of the tort of negligent em-
ployment. 
It is true, however, that in an action for negligent em-
ployment, the plaintiff must show that the employer's 
failure to fulfill the duty owed the injured party in hir-
ing, supervising, or retaining the malfeasing employee 
proximately caused the injury of which the plaintiff 
complains. In makhig this factual determination, a 
court might have to resort to the collective bargain-
ing agreement to discover whether contractual limita-
tions on the power of the employer to deal with the 
employee precluded it from taking steps to prevent the 
harm. Although such an eventuality might raise ques-
tions of section 301 preemption, [**78] the defendants 
in the present case have made no showing that the trial 
court, in adjudicating this particular matter, would have 
to refer to the collective bargaining agreement to de-
termine whether AT&T could have prevented Gailey's, 
Johnson's, and Randall's allegedly tortious acts. It is 
not enough that we might imagine a situation where a 
court might have to make such a reference. There must 
be a realistic possibility that it may occur. Because de-
fendants have not shown any such realistic possibility, 
we hold that there is no section 301 preemption of the 
claim for negligent employment. nl6 
nl6 As this case develops on remand, it may be-
come apparent that the trial court may have to resort 
to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 
If this occurs, defendants are free to raise the ques-
tion of preemption with the trial court, which should 
determine the issue. If the court finds section 301 
preemption, the preempted portion of the claim must 
be dismissed. Today, we hold only that it is improper 
to find preemption on the basis of unsupported spec-
ulation as to how a case may evolve. 
[**79] 
To summarize the preemptive effects of state and fed-
eral statutes on Retherford's claims, the UADA preempts 
rage zi 
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only Retherford's claim for discharge in violation of 
public policy, while the LMRA preempts Retherford's 
claims for breach of implied contract and malicious in-
terference with contract and partially preempts her claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We there-
fore affirm the trial court's summary judgment against 
Retherford on those preempted claims. The only claims 
to survive state and federal preemption are Retherford's 
claim for negligent employment and the part of her emo-
tional distress claim that alleges purely personal miscon-
duct on the part of Gailey, Johnson, and Randall. 
We now examine defendants' objections to 
Retherford's nonpreempted causes of action [*975] 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
negligent employment. First, defendants argue 
that Retherford's claims of negligent employment 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress are 
untimely. Second, they argue that the conduct alleged 
is insufficient as a matter of law to support a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
We discuss these arguments in [**80] turn. 
Defendants base their untimeliness contention on sec-
tion 78-12-25(3)'s four-year period of limitations. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). Defendants argue 
that the four years began to run May 10, 1984, when 
Retherford's submission of a written complaint to the 
AT&T EEO coordinator first indicated that she thought 
she was being harassed. Because more than four years 
had elapsed by April 7, 1989, when Retherford filed 
her state action, defendants claim that she failed to file 
her claims of negligent employment and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress in a timely manner. We 
disagree. 
The question presented is whether, taking the facts in 
a light most favorable to Retherford, the statute of lim-
itations ran before April 7, 1989. Defendants contend 
that as a matter of law, the statute began to run at the 
time of the first complaint. Under Utah law, the statute 
of limitations begins to run when the cause of action ac-
crues. See id. § 78-12-1; Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. 
v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 R2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). 
A tort cause of action accrues when all its elements come 
into being and the claim is actionable. Davidson Lumber 
Sales, Inc., 794R2datl9; [**81] see State Tax Comm'n 
v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 181, 100 R2d 575, 577 
(1940). In order to determine when the limitations pe-
riod began to run, then, we must determine when each 
of the causes of action became actionable in the courts. 
We begin with Retherford's claim of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. Because of the nature 
of this cause of action, it can be difficult to determine 
when all its elements-intentional, outrageous conduct 
proximately causing extreme distress-have come into 
being. Of particular difficulty is the element of injury-
-extreme emotional distress. Sometimes, to be sure, a 
single outrageous incident, such as an egregiously vi-
cious practical joke, see Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 46 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1965), results in immediate and 
easily identifiable emotional distress. Often, however, 
emotional distress does not so much occur as unfold-for 
example, where a defendant subjects a plaintiff, not to a 
single outrageous act, but to a pattern or practice of acts 
tolerable by themselves though clearly intolerable in the 
aggregate. 
Here, Retherford alleges a pattern of retaliatory ha-
rassment. [**82] Such patterns present courts with the 
difficult task of identifying when during a series of re-
lated acts the element of emotional distress "occurred." 
We have been unable to locate authority that is directly 
on point concerning the application of statutes of lim-
itation to a pattern of conduct that constitutes, in the 
aggregate, intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
However, we find the treatment of claims of alienation 
of affections instructive in this regard. In adjudicat-
ing such claims, which often allege a series of wrongful 
acts over a substantial period of time, courts have deter-
mined that the statute of limitations begins to run when 
the alienation is accomplished, i.e., when love and af-
fection are finally lost. See e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 244 
Ark. 327,424S.W.2d871,874(Ark. 1968);Dobrientv. 
Ciskowski, 54 Wis. 2d419, 195N.W2d449, 451 (Wis. 
1972); see also Flink v. Simpson, 49 Wish. 2d 639, 
305 P. 2d 803, 804 (Wish. 1957); Strode v. Gleason, 9 
Wish. App. 13, 510R2d250, 254 (Wish. Ct. App. 
1973). Applying this standard by analogy, we hold that 
the statute of limitations for intentional infliction [**83] 
of emotional distress does not begin to run until the dis-
tress is actually inflicted, i.e., when the plaintiff suffers 
severe emotional disturbance. 
Although easy to describe, this standard is difficult 
to apply, particularly because the element of emotional 
distress is specific to the plaintiff in each case. Because 
the tort of intentional infliction of [*976] emotional dis-
tress requires actual emotional distress, see Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965), this element is to be 
gauged subjectively. nl7 A particularly hardy or cal-
loused plaintiff may never accrue a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, even though 
he or she is subjected to outrageous conduct that no rea-
sonable person could be expected to bear. Consequently, 
our task is to determine when, given these allegations, 
Retherford experienced severe emotional distress, not 
when an ordinarily sensitive person would have experi-
enced such suffering. 
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nl7 For the guidance of the bench and bar, we 
make clear that while the standard for determining 
whether a plaintiff has experienced emotional dis-
tress is subjective, the standard for determining the 
outrageousness of the alleged conduct is objective. 
Consequently, a plaintiff claiming intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress must show both that a rea-
sonable person would consider the alleged conduct 
to be outrageous and that the plaintiff actually expe-
rienced subjective severe emotional anguish because 
of this objectively outrageous conduct. 
*84] 
The record before us identifies this moment. nl8 
September of 1985, after almost eighteen months 
retaliatory abuse by her co-workers, during which 
e repeatedly sought assistance from her immediate su-
rvisors, the AT&T EEO coordinator, and the EEOC, 
t^herford took medical disability leave at the instance 
her psychiatrist. She never returned to her job be-
use, physically and emotionally, she could not work 
proximity to "the people who started the panic in 
r." Retherford's dramatic steps of taking leave from 
r job, seeking medical and psychiatric attention to heal 
e stresses of her work place, and remaining on leave for 
proximately six months because she could not bring 
rself to face her harassers all support a factual in-
rence that the element of extreme emotional distress 
d not come into existence before September of 1985. 
977] This is sufficient to support the conclusion that 
e statute had not run by April of 1989, when the action 
as filed. 
nl8 We realize that not all cases will reveal so 
clearly the point at which the plaintiffs actually ex-
perienced emotional distress. Although we do not 
at this time adopt their analysis, we note that courts 
facing similar difficulties in adjudicating Title VII 
claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, have enunciated 
a theory of continuing violation in order to allow 
plaintiffs to recover for patterns of employment dis-
crimination. Like intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, employment discrimination often manifests 
itself as a series of small wrongful acts instead of 
one dramatic injustice. Indeed, changing attitudes 
toward minorities and women in the work place may 
have contributed to the incidence of long-term pat-
terns of employment discrimination because as so-
cial opprobrium of racial and sexual harassment has 
increased, people may have become more subtle in 
acting on or expressing their prejudices. While a de-
fendant may be able to dismiss separate acts of subtle 
discrimination as merely coincidences or attempts 
at humor, an examination of these acts as a whole 
often will reveal their underlying pattern of malig-
nity. To address these patterns, courts adjudicating 
Title VII claims allow recovery for an entire pattern 
of employment discrimination so long as one act of 
the continuing violation occurs within the statute of 
limitations period. See, e.g., Berry v. Board of 
Supervisors ofL.S.U., 715 E2d 971, 979 (5th Or. 
1983); Nelson v. Williams, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1214, 1215 (D.D.C. 1981); Williams 
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 627 E Supp. 
752, 756-57 (WD. Mo. 1986); Tarvesian v. Can 
Div. of TRW, Inc., 407 E Supp. 336, 339 (D. Mass. 
1976); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 E Supp. 1338, 1340 
(D. Haw. 1974); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 
310 E Supp. 891, 896 (D. Me. 1970); Johnson v. 
Ramsey County, 424 N.W2d 800, 810 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1988). At least one state has adopted the Title 
VII continuing violation theory for causes of action 
brought under the state's antidiscrimination act, see 
Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427Mich. 
505, 398N.W.2d368, 380-81 (Mich. 1986), and at 
least two states have codified the Title VII continuing 
violation theory in their administrative regulations 
governing employment, seetfy-\fce Food Stores, Inc. 
v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W2d 512, 
527 (Iowa 1990); Rock v. Massachusetts Comm'n 
Against Discrimination, 384Mass. 198, 424N.E.2d 
244, 248 & nn.12-13 (Mass. 1981). 
In determining the existence of a continuing vio-
lation, courts focus on the following factors, which 
are relevant to, but not dispositive of the existence 
of, a continuing violation: 
The first is subject matter. Do the alleged acts in-
volve the same type of discrimination, tending to 
connect them in a continuing violation? The second 
is frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring (e.g., 
a biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an 
isolated work assignment or employment decision? 
The third factor, perhaps of most importance, is de-
gree of permanence. Does the act have the degree 
of permanence which should trigger an employee's 
awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights, or 
which should indicate to the employee that the con-
tinued existence of the adverse consequences of the 
act is to be expected without being dependent on a 
continuing intent to discriminate? 
Berry, 715E2dat981. 
[**85] 
Of course, at trial defendants will have the opportu-
nity to prove to the satisfaction of the finder of fact that 
the element of extreme emotional distress accrued some 
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time before Retherford's leave of absence. However, on 
the facts before us, we cannot say as a matter of law that 
it accrued before April of 1985. Consequently, the four-
year statute of limitations poses no bar to Retherford's 
recovery for defendants' entire course of conduct. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). 
The next question is whether Retherford's claim for 
negligent employment also was filed within the four-year 
statute of limitations. Before an employer can be found 
liable for negligent employment, one of its employees 
must have committed a tort. See Mulhern v. City of 
Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 799 R2d 15, 18 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 
cmt. a (1958). Thus, as a general matter, the statute 
of limitations will not begin to run on a cause of action 
for negligent employment until all elements of the em-
ployee1 s tort are present. However, although the tort of 
negligent employment requires the employee's tort as a 
condition precedent, we note that in situations [**86] 
where the victim does not accrue a cause of action until 
she or he suffers a subjective harm, it may be contended 
that the employer's breach of duty has become evident 
long before that point, i.e., that the conduct element 
of the tort, the employee malfeasance, has become suf-
ficiently apparent that the employer should have taken 
steps to correct it, even before the victim has fully ac-
crued a cause of action. As a consequence, one might 
argue that the statute of limitations against the employer 
for negligent employment should begin to run before the 
statute begins to run on the tort by the employee. Such 
a situation might exist where, as here, the victim alleges 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
We need not decide today whether such an argument 
has merit or whether it applies to the facts of this case. 
Defendants did not advance the argument before this 
court or the trial court, we have found no legal authority 
that speaks to the issue, and most important, the record 
provides no basis for our concluding as a matter of law 
that if the cause of action against AT&T for negligent 
supervision did accrue before the cause of action against 
the employees, all this occurred before [**87] April of 
1985. There is therefore no basis for sustaining a sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the four-year statute 
of limitations bars the negligent employment claim. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25(3). 
As a final objection to Retherford's claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress against Randall and 
Johnson, defendants argue that the conduct alleged is in-
sufficiently outrageous and intolerable to support such a 
claim. We disagree. The standard Utah has adopted for 
determining whether the conduct of a defendant is suf-
ficiently offensive to permit recovery is whether the de-
fendant's actions "offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality." nl9 [*978] Samms 
v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289\ 293, 358 R2d 344, 347 
(1961). 
nl9 Although Samms v. Eccles cites the sec-
ond Restatement of Torts in support of this standard, 
see 11 Utah 2d 289, 293 n.14, 358 R2d 344, 347 
n.14 (1961), we note that Samms states a somewhat 
different threshold for outrageousness than does the 
Restatement. The Restatement requires that the con-
duct at issue be "extreme and outrageous," which it 
describes as "so outrageous in character, and so ex-
treme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds 
of decency." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, 
cmt. d (1965). On the other hand, Samms holds 
that conduct is considered "outrageous and intoler-
able" if it offends against "the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality." 11 Utah 2d at 
293, 358 PM at 347 (emphasis added). 
We have reviewed Samms and our subsequent 
cases dealing with intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and have found no evidence whatsoever that 
the court intended to weaken the Restatement's stan-
dard by this formulation. Cf. Pentecost v. Harward, 
699 R2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (citing both Samms 
and the Restatement without mentioning distinction). 
Moreover, although we recognize a theoretical dif-
ference between conduct that transgresses "all possi-
ble bounds of decency" and conduct that transgresses 
only "generally accepted standards of decency," we 
believe that in application, the distinction will be ir-
relevant, particularly in light of the Restatements 
explanation that "generally, the case [of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress] is one in which 
the recitation of the facts to an average member of 
the community would arouse his resentment against 
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'" 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d (1965) 
(emphasis added). We retain Samms' formulation of 
outrageousness to prevent any apprehension that we 
limit the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress to conduct that offends "all possible bounds 
of decency," an unrealistic and impossible standard. 
However, we stress that although our formulation 
differs slightly from the Restatement's, this differ-
ence is only a concession to the reality that no court 
would or could establish that certain conduct exceeds 
"all possible bounds of decency." We have in no way 
softened the Restatements requirement of extraordi-
narily vile conduct, conduct that is "atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. 
844 R2d 949, *978; 1992 Utah LEXIS 120, **88; 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; 8 BNA IER CAS 405 
**88] 
Applying this standard to the facts at bar and viewing 
lose facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we can 
ay as a matter of law that Retherford has alleged out-
igeous and intolerable conduct sufficient to support a 
ause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
ess. Certainly, as defendants claim, merely following 
r making faces at someone, without more, does not con-
tinue conduct of such objective offensiveness that it can 
ive rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
istress. However, Retherford alleges more than simple 
lsult or annoyance. She alleges months of persecution 
y her co-workers, during which Gailey, Johnson, and 
Landall shadowed her movements, intimidated her with 
ireatening looks and remarks, and manipulated circum-
tances at her work in ways that made her job markedly 
lore stressful, all in retaliation for her good-faith com-
laint of sexual harassment. Indulging all inferences in 
ivor of Retherford, as we must, Rollins v. Petersen, 
13 R2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1991), such allegations are 
nfficient to satisfy the objective conduct requirement 
f the tort of intentional infliction of emotional [**89] 
istress. 
It is worth stating forcefully that any other conclusion 
fould amount to an intolerable refusal to recognize that 
ur society has ceased seeing sexual harassment in the 
fork place as a playful inevitability that should be taken 
l good spirits and has awakened to the fact that sexual 
arassment has a corrosive effect on those who engage 
I it as well as those who are subjected to it and that such 
arassment has far more to do with the abusive exercise 
f one person's power over another than it does with sex. 
tee, e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The 
?ailure of Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 
• Cal. L. Rev. 1399, 1399 (1992); Carol Sanger, The 
Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S. Cal. 
,. Rev. 1411, 1415 (1992). This consensus extends into 
II sectors of our society. Indeed, although Utah Senator 
)rr in Hatch never wavered from his conviction that law 
>rofessor Anita Hill had fabricated her allegations that 
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually 
arassed her, he reportedly condemned the alleged con-
net in the strongest terms. Someone who would make 
uch vulgar [**90] and degrading comments "would not 
•e a normal person," Senator Hatch said. "That person 
. . would be a psychopathic sex fiend or a pervert." 
?itzgerald at 1405. 
As senator Hatch recognized, sexual harassment is 
imply unacceptable in today' s society. To refuse to label 
tie retaliatory conduct alleged here as outrageous and in-
olerable would be a travesty. Prosser and Keeton quite 
properly call sexual harassment on the job "undoubtedly 
an intentional infliction of emotional distress." W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §12, 
at 18 (Supp. 1988). By this, we take them to mean that 
the conduct generally labeled sexual harassment is out-
rageous and intolerable and, when performed with the 
requisite intent, satisfies the elements of the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. If the conduct 
that constitutes sexual harassment is per se outrageous 
and intolerable, it stands to reason that retaliation for 
complaining of sexual harassment must also be consid-
ered outrageous and intolerable. Retherford has stated a 
claim for [*979] intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress through retaliatory harassment, thereby meriting 
the opportunity to establish [**91] all the elements of 
this tort before the finder of fact. The trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment on the nonpreempted por-
tion of that claim. 
In sum, we hold as follows: First, both employees 
covered by just-cause employment contracts and em-
ployees who are at-will can assert a claim in tort for dis-
charge in violation of public policy; second, the UADA 
preempts only Retherford's claim for discharge in vi-
olation of public policy; third, the LMRA preempts 
Retherford's claims for breach of implied contract and 
malicious interference with contract, and partially pre-
empts her claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress; fourth, the statute of limitations does not bar 
Retherford's claim for negligent employment and the 
nonpreempted portion of her claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress; and fifth, Retherford has 
stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Consequently, we affirm the summary judgment 
in part, reverse in pari,, and remand for disposition con-
sistent with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
CONCURBY: HOWE 
CONCUR: HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
(Concurring with Reservation) 
I concur [**92] in the majority opinion with the fol-
lowing reservation: 
I would not reach the question whether Retherford can 
pursue a tort action for discharge in violation of pub-
lic policy and also a claim for breach of her collective 
bargaining agreement's just-cause provision. It is not 
necessary to resolve this issue because assuming such 
tort cause of action exists, it is preempted by UADA, as 
844 P.2d 949, *979; 1992 Utah LEXIS 120, **92; 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; 8 BNA IER CAS 405 
explained in the majority opinion. 
The majority holds that Retherford could pursue both 
a tort action and a contract claim, except for the pre-
emption. Not only would this be duplicative, at least in 
part, but it possibly may violate the collective bargain-
ing agreement, which requires that all grievances arising 
out of or resulting from the dismissal of a regular em-
ployee must be arbitrated. I therefore prefer to reserve 
judgment on this issue. 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
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HOWE, Chief Justice: 
51 Plaintiff Hubert C. Burton, M.D., appeals from the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants Exam Center 
Industrial & General Medical Clinic, Inc. (the "Clinic"), and 
Howard Boulter in this action wherein Burton alleges that his 
employment with the Clinic was terminated because of his age. 
BACKGROUND 
12 In July 1994, Boulter, president and chief operating 
officer of the Clinic, terminated the sixty-nine-year-old Burton, 
a part-time physician at the Clinic. Boulter told Burton that 
F I L E D 
on 
the Clinic had hired a full-time physician, eliminating the need 
for Burton's services. Boulter explained that the decision to 
hire this new physician was made suddenly, out of necessity, and 
stated: "I [Boulter] didn't know how much longer you older guys 
wanted to work, and I felt that we couldn't pass up this 
opportunity to employ a full-time physician."l Burton 
subsequently filed a complaint with the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division ("UADD"), alleging his termination was age related.2 
The UADD responded that because the Clinic had fewer than fifteen 
employees, under the terms of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
("UADA")3 the Clinic was not under the UADD7s jurisdiction. The 
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 2 9 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 
634 (1998) ("ADEA"), and many similar state acts typically exempt 
small employers from their provisions. 
13 Burton then filed this action against the Clinic and 
Boulter (collectively, "Exam Center"), alleging that his firing 
violated a public policy found in both state and federal statutes 
against taking employment actions toward employees because of 
their age and asserting that violation of that public policy 
1
 The parties dispute exactly what was said at that meeting; 
however, in reviewing a summary judgment, it is well settled that 
we relate the facts of the case and all reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom in a light favorable to the nonmoving party, 
see White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Utah 1994), and we 
do so here. 
2
 Burton alleged that this new doctor was a "much younger" 
man. His exact age .is unclear from the record, but he was over 
the age of forty. 
3
 At the time of Dr. Burton's termination, title 34, chapter 
35 of the Utah Code embodied the UADA. Unless noted otherwise, 
all references herein to the UADA will be to the 1994 statutes. 
The UADA contains the following definitions: 
(6) "Employee" means any person applying 
with or employed by an employer. 
(7) "Employer" means the state or any 
political subdivision . . . , and every other 
person employing 15 or more employees within 
the state for each working day in each of 20 
calendar weeks or more in the current or 
preceding calendar year; but it does not 
include religious organizations or 
associations . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(6), (7). 
M ^ QQnn/tn o 
gives rise to a claim for tortious wrongful termination.4 Exam 
Center moved for summary judgment on Burton's tortious wrongful 
termination allegation. After a hearing on the motion and the 
submission of supplemental briefs, the trial court denied the 
summary judgment, citing the existence of a factual dispute. 
Upon Exam Center' s motion for reconsideration, however, the tifial 
court reversed its earlier ruling and granted the summary 
judgment, based on language from Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992), and held that the UADA 
preempts any common law cause of action for tortious wrongful 
termination. Burton now appeals from this grant of summary 
judgment.5 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
54 Before granting summary judgment, a court must, after •"•" 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, find that no disputed issues of material fact exist and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harnicher v. University of Utah Med. 
Ctr. , 962 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah 1998). Review of a trial court's 
grant of summary judgment includes a determination of whether the 
trial court correctly applied governing law, affording no 
deference to the trial court's determination or conclusions of 
law. See Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 
1216 (Utah 1999); Harnicher, 962 P.2d at 69. 
ANALYSIS 
f5 The UADA provides: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice: 
(a) (i) for an employer to refuse to 
hire, or promote, or to discharge, 
demote, terminate any person, or to 
4
 In addition to tortious wrongful termination, Burton's 
complaint set forth two other causes of action: (1) failure to 
pay wages timely upon termination, and (2) recovery of attorney 
fees incurred in pursuing timely payment of those wages. 
5
 Upon this court's request, the Utah Manufacturers 
Association ("UMA"), the Utah State American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), and the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Utah Foundation, Inc. 
("ACLU"), provided amicus briefs. 
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retaliate against, harass, or 
discriminate in matters of compensation 
or in terms, privileges, and conditions 
of employment against any person 
otherwise qualified, because of race, 
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or 
pregnancy-related conditions, aae, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or 
older, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) (1994) (emphasis added). 
Burton contends that in enacting the foregoing statute, the 
legislature has recognized and declared a public policy against 
age discrimination in employment practices including termination 
of employment. He argues that because the UADA covers only 
employers with fifteen or more employees, he has no 
administrative remedy through the UADD and that this court should 
afford him a remedy by recognizing a tort cause of action for 
wrongful termination so as to put him on an equal basis with 
employees of employers of fifteen or more employees. In sum, 
Burton contends that we should create a cause of action to fill 
the void left by the enactment of the UADD. He also asserts that 
denying him a tort remedy would violate the open courts guarantee 
rs-f
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16 We begin by observing that under our case law, there is 
a presumption that an employment relationship which has no 
specified term of duration is an at-will relationship, but that 
presumption is subject to a number of limitations. See Fox v. 
MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997). In that 
case, we recognized: 
An at-will employee may overcome that 
presumption by demonstrating that (1) there 
is an implied or express agreement that the 
employment may be terminated only for cause 
or upon satisfaction of another agreed-upon 
condition; (2) a statute or regulation 
restricts the right of an employer to 
terminate an employee under certain 
conditions; or (3) the termination of 
employment constitutes a violation of a clear 
and substantial public policy. 
Id. (citations omitted). In that case, we further remarked that 
not every employment termination that has the effect of violating 
some public policy is actionable: "A public policy whose 
contravention is achieved by an employment termination must be 
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"clear and substantial7 to be actionable." Id. at 860. 
Declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and 
statutes, but not all statements made in statutes are expressions 
of public policy. See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 
(Utah 1992). We will not repeat the review of cases made in Fox 
wherein violations of public policy have and have not been found. 
Suffice it to observe here that none of them have involved 
termination due to the age of the employee. 
11 The trial court granted summary judgment to the Exam 
Center in reliance on Retherford's holding that the UADA provided 
the employee the exclusive remedy for wrongful termination in 
violation of the prohibited and discriminatory employment 
practices enumerated therein. The employee was not allowed to 
bring a tort action for wrongful discharge. However, in that 
case the complaining employee was covered by the UADA because her 
employer had fifteen or more employees. In the instant case, the 
Exam Center has less than fifteen employees, and the UADA affords 
Burton no protection or remedy. Thus Retherford's holding 
arguably did not extend to small employers who were not within 
the purview of the UADA. We must therefore decide whether a 
public policy exists justifying the creation of a common law 
cause of action for Burton against the Exam Center for allegedly 
firing him due to his age. 
18 In support of his position that we should create a 
common law cause of action to redress his termination, Burton 
relies on Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 
(1996) . In that case, the court had to decide whether a common 
law cause of action for wrongful discharge of a female employee 
based on sex discrimination lies against an employer with less 
than fifteen employees. Like our UADD, Maryland's Fair 
Employment Practices Act prohibits discrimination in employment 
based on race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, sex, 
age, marital status, and other grounds. The Maryland Act also 
exempts from its terms employers with less than fifteen 
employees. The court sustained the plaintiff's right to sue her 
employer on the basis of "at least thirty-four statutes, one 
executive order, and one constitutional amendment in Maryland 
that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain 
circumstances. Together these provisions provide strong evidence 
of the legislative intent to end discrimination based on sex in 
Maryland." Id. at 613-14. The court noted that the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland in Kerrigan v. 
Maanum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1992), had 
earlier come to the same conclusion, observing that the 
employer's interpretation of the Maryland Act would mean that the 
"General Assembly intended to grant small businesses in Maryland 
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a license to discriminate [on the basis of sex] against their 
employees with impunity." Id. at 735. 
19 In reaching its decision, the Maryland court relied 
upon Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St. 3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 
(1995), where the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a wrongful discharge 
claim based on the public policy and a statute prohibiting 
discrimination in employment from which the employer was exempt. 
The court also cited with approval Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 
912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990), where the Washington Supreme Court 
held that a cause of action for wrongful discharge was available 
based on a statute prohibiting age discrimination but providing 
no remedy. See also Williamson v. Greene, 200 W. Va. 421, 490 
S.E.2d 23 (1997), where it was held that even though an employer 
of less than twelve employees was not an "employer" within the 
meaning of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, a discharged at- •• 
will employee may maintain a common law action for retaliatory 
discharge against her employer based on alleged sex 
discrimination or sexual harassment because sex discrimination 
and sexual harassment in employment contravene the public policy 
of the state as articulated in the West Virginia Human Rights 
Act. For a general discussion of these issues, see Kimberly C. 
Simmons, Annotation, Preemption of Wrongful Discharge Cause of 
Action by Civil Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994); Cara Yates, 
Annotation, Application of State Law to Age Discrimination in 
Employment, 51 A.L.R.5th 1 (1997). 
510 The California Supreme Court reached the opposite 
result in Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074 (Cal. 1994). In 
that case, the court was considering a provision of California's 
Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), which declared a state 
public policy of protecting and safeguarding the right and 
opportunity to seek, obtain, and hold employment without 
discrimination on various grounds, including age, defined as over 
forty years. The administrative remedies provided for in the 
FEHA, however, were not made available to employees whose 
employer did not regularly employ five or more persons. The 
court was asked to decide whether an employee to whom the 
administrative remedies were not available may nonetheless 
maintain a common law tort action for damages for wrongful 
discharge in violation of the public policy stated in the FEHA. 
The court concluded that permitting such an action would be 
inconsistent with the legislative intent reflected in various 
provisions of the FEHA, and particularly that provision which 
restricts employer liability for violations of the FEHA age 
provision to employers subject to the FEHA. The court wrote: 
This exemption of small employers from the 
FEHA ban on age discrimination was enacted 
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simultaneously to and. is inseparable from the 
legislative statement of policy. For that 
reason, and because no other statute or 
constitutional provision bars age 
discrimination, we conclude that there 
presently exists no "fundamental policy" 
which precludes age discrimination by a small 
employer. Thus, there is no independent 
basis for an action for tortious discharge in 
violation of policy. 
Id. at 1076. 
Ull As we have earlier stated, Burton contends that the 
UADA declares a public policy against the termination of 
employees who are over the age of forty years and that such 
public policy applies to all employees, whether employed by an 
employer who has fifteen or more employees ("large employer") or 
an employer who has less than fifteen employees ("small 
employer"). He argues that small employers were exempted from 
the UADA because of the administrative burden it would place upon 
the UADD if all employers were under its jurisdiction. He points 
out that nothing in the UADA prohibits legal action against small 
employers who discriminate and that nationwide there are some 
eleven million workers who are not included within the purview of 
federal and state anti-discrimination employment acts. 
112 We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public 
policy which is "clear and substantial" with respect to small 
employers. The California Supreme Court's reasoning in Jennings 
that "the exemption of small employers from [California's] FEHA 
ban on age discrimination was enacted simultaneously to, and is 
inseparable from, the legislative statement of policy," id., is 
sound and unanswerable. Our legislature has made a similar 
decision to prohibit age discrimination in the termination of 
employees only by large employers, and if, as Burton contends, 
small employers should likewise be prohibited, that is a matter 
that the legislature, not the court, should address. An 
observation we made in Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 
1979), bears repeating here: 
Due respect for the legislative prerogative 
in lawmaking requires that the judiciary not 
interfere with enactments of the Legislature 
where disagreement is founded only on policy 
considerations and the legislative scheme 
legitimate object. In matters not affecting 
fundamental rights, the prerogative of the 
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legislative branch is broad and must by 
necessity be so if government is to be by the 
people through their elected representatives 
and not by judges. 
513 Amicus ACLU suggests that the legislature additionally 
has declared a public policy against age discrimination in 
employment in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2(4), which was repealed in 
1995 but was in effect at the time of Burton's termination in 
1994. In that statute, the legislature declared that: in rhe 
state's own employment practices, there should be equal 
employment opportunity without regard to age and other 
discriminatory practices. Amicus also relies on Utah 
Administrative Code R606-3-2, which prohibits age discrimination 
by persons contracting with the state. While arguably a public 
policy can be found in that statute and Code, it obviously has no 
application to a private employer. Nor do we find any federal 
statute that could provide the basis for a tort action against 
small employers. See Leathern v. Research Found, of City Univ. of 
N.Y. , 658 F"! Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that federal 
claim under federal statute "cannot serve as a basis to expand 
employees' remedies under New York State common law of tort"). 
Because we can find no constitutional provision or other statute 
which declares a clear and substantial public policy against age 
discrimination in employment practices, we must decline to create 
an exception to the general rule prevailing in this state that 
employment is presumed to be on an at-will basis for both the 
employer and the employee. 
514 The instant case can readily be distinguished from 
Molesworth, 672 A.2d at 608, one of the principal cases upon 
which Burton relies. Molesworth was a case of sex discrimination 
in employment. The Maryland court found "at least thirty-four 
statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional amendment" 
that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain 
circumstances. Id. at 613-14. There is no such constitutional 
or statutory declaration of public policy in Utah against 
discrimination on account of age in the termination of employment 
of employees of small employers. The dissent in the instant case 
relies on Molesworth but fails to note that in finding a public 
policy against sex discrimination by small employers, the court 
relied not on the anti-discrimination act that exempted them, but 
on "thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one 
constitutional amendment." In Utah, there is no such basis for 
as to find a public policy against age discrimination in 
employment. We have found no cases from other jurisdictions 
recognizing a public policy against age discrimination by small 
employers in a statute such as our UADA which expressly exempts 
small employers. 
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515 In Jennings, the California court offered an 
explanation of the FEHA small employer exception. They suggested 
that the legislature made the exception in the FEHA because the 
framers 
"believe[d] that discrimination on a small 
scale would prove exceedingly difficult to 
detect and police. . . . [I]t was believed 
that an employment situation in which there 
were less than five employees might involve a 
close personal relationship between employer 
and employees and that fair employment laws 
should not apply where such a relationship 
existed. Finally, the framers were 
interested primarily in attacking protracted 
large-scale discrimination by important 
employers and strong unions. Their aim was 
not so much to redress each discrete instance 
of individual discrimination as to eliminate 
the egregious and continued discriminatory 
practices of economically powerful 
organizations. Thus, they could afford to 
exempt the small employer. 
Jennings, 876 P.2d at 1082 (quoting Tobriner, California FEPC 
(1965), 16 Hastings L.J. 333, 342). 
516 Several federal courts have expressed the same reasons 
for the small employers exemption found in certain federal anti-
discrimination statutes. See e.g. , Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 
F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (legislative history indicates 
that "the protection of intimate and personal relations existing 
in small business" was reason for Title VII's small employer 
exemption); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 
(9th Cir. 1993) ("Congress did not want to burden small entities 
with the costs associated with litigating discrimination 
claims."). 
1117 There is an additional reason why we should not create 
a tort action against small employers. Under the UADA, a covered 
employee alleging age discrimination must assert his claim within 
180 days of the alleged discrimination. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-7.1 (1) (c) (1994). The charge is filed at the UADD and is 
handled administratively. Emphasis in the administrative process 
is placed on conciliation and voluntary resolution. The UADA 
mandates that the administrative agency "attempt a settlement 
between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(3) (a). If the claimant is successful, 
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the relief provided includes reinstatement, back pay and 
benefits, and attorney fees, but no compensatory or punitive 
damages may be awarded. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(9). This is 
all done without charge by the administrative agency. In 
contrast to that simplified procedure, if a small employer were 
subjected to a tort action in the courts, he would have to hire 
his own attorney to defend the action against him, and damages 
could be awarded against him. The action presumably could be 
brought within four years, not limited by the 180-day limitation 
in the UADA, and a jury trial might be demanded. The dissent 
would subject the small employers of this state to those burdens. 
As stated by the Jennings court: "It would be unreasonable to 
expect employers who are expressly exempted from the FEHA ban on 
age discrimination to nonetheless realize that they must comply 
with the law from which they are exempted under pain of possible 
tort liability. We do not ascribe such a purpose to the 
Legislature." 876 P.2d at 1083. To that sound expression, we 
add that we would be no more justified in creating a tort action 
to lie against small employers than we would be to create a tort 
action against religious organizations or associations, which are 
also expressly exempted from the provisions of the UADA. The 
dissent charges that our decision opens the door for small 
employers in Utah to discriminate not only on the basis of age, 
but on the basis of sex, race, religion, and disability. Suffice 
it to here say that sex, race, religion, and disability may 
present different considerations and a public policy against 
discrimination on those grounds might conceivably be found in 
other statutes of this state. That question is not before us and 
we express no opinion on that subject. 
118 Lastly, Burton contends that denying him a tort remedy 
against his employer violates article I, section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides in part, "All courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law 
. . . ." Burton cites no authority that would require us to 
create a remedy for him, and we know of no case law that would 
require this court to do so under that constitutional provision. 
To the contrary, nearly eighty-five years ago this court held 
that where no right of action is given or no remedy exists under 
sither the common law or statute, this section creates none. 
3rown v. Wiahtman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (1915). Thus, there is 
10 constitutional violation. 
519 Judgment affirmed. 
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120 Justice Zimmerman and Justice Russon concur in Chief 
Justice Howe's opinion. 
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting: 
121 I respectfully dissent. While the present case concerns 
the limited issue of age discrimination by employers with fewer 
than fifteen employees ("small employers'"), the majority's 
decision will apply to all kinds of employment discrimination. 
Specifically, by determining that Dr. Burton has no cause of 
action for age discrimination against his employer because the 
employer employs fewer than fifteen employees, the majority has 
opened the door to all small employers to discriminate not only 
on the basis of age, but also on the basis of the other 
categories protected by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("Act"), 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-5-101 to -108 (1997 and Supp. 1999),l 
including race, sex, religion, and disability. In light of the 
fact that the vast majority of Utah employers qualify as small 
employers, we should not open this door. Instead, this court 
should recognize a common law cause of action for wrongful 
termination against employers who discriminate on the basis of 
age. 
122 This court adopted a public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine in Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 
P.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.). 
There, we stated: 
[W]e recognize that a public policy exception 
is necessarily a threshold issue implicated 
in our reexamination of the scope of Utah' s 
at-will rule, and we have therefore been 
willing to consider and define it. We also 
stress that actions for wrongful termination 
based on this exception must involve 
substantial and important public policies. 
To this end, we will construe public policies 
narrowly and will generally utilize those 
based on prior legislative pronouncements 
. . . applying only those principles which 
1
 At the time the instant case was filed, the Act was 
codified at title 34, chapter 35 of the Utah Code. The relevant 
sections of the Act were not affected by the subsequent 
renumbering and amendments. Unless otherwise noted, all 
reference to the Act hereinafter are to the 1994 version. 
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are so substantial and fundamental that there 
can be virtually no question as to their 
importance for promotion of the public good. 
Id. at 1043 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.). The majority 
has failed to undertake the careful analysis of public policy 
that Berube demands, creating an enormous loophole which Utah 
employers may exploit to the detriment of many Utah employees. 
Prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of age 
constitutes a substantial and important public policy sufficient 
to support a common law cause of action. 
$23 In the Act, the legislature pronounced that "[i]t is a 
discriminatory . . . employment practice . . . for an employer to 
. . . discharge [or] . . . terminate any person . . . otherwise 
qualified, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or 
pregnancy-related conditions, age, . . . religion, national 
origin, or handicap." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1) (a) (i) . The 
legislature, in limiting the Act's coverage to employers with 
more than fifteen employees, appears to have been balancing two 
policies: vigorously opposing discrimination in employment 
practices while simultaneously protecting small business from the 
burdens of the statutory remedies. The legislature's decision 
not to extend the Act's remedies to employees of small employers 
in no way undermines the significance of its core policy 
principles. It is not in the public interest to permit 
discrimination in employment based on age, race, sex, religion, 
and disability. 
124 The Act creates a substantial bureaucratic system to 
implement its aims. It mandates the creation of the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division (the "Division") , as well as the Anti-
Discrimination Advisory Committee to that Division (the 
"Committee"). See id. §§ 34-35-3, -4.5(1). The governor is 
directed to appoint the members of the Committee, including "one 
small business representative." Id. § 34-35-4.5(1)(a)(i) 
(emphasis added). The Division is given broad powers, including 
the authority to "receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon 
complaints alleging discrimination in employment . . . or the 
existence of a discriminatory.or prohibited employment practice 
by a person, [or] an employer." Id. § 34-35-5(1)(c) (emphasis 
added). Significantly, the Division is not limited to acting 
against "employers" in its fact finding or its passing upon 
discrimination complaints; rather, it is also empowered to act 
against "persons." Id. § 34-35-5(1) (c) . Repeatedly, the 
Division is charged with the ambitious task of fighting 
employment discrimination by such means as advising the governor, 
recommending legislation, and cooperating with both public and 
private groups. See id. § 34-35-5(1)(h), (j), (k). It is even 
No. 980040 12 
given the power to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths and 
compel the production of documents and papers. See id. 
§ 34-35-5(3)(a)(i) to (iii) - Finally, the legislature has 
instructed the Division to "issue publications and reports of 
investigations and research that will tend to promote good will 
among the various racial, religious, and ethnic groups of the 
state, and that will minimize or eliminate discrimination in 
employment because of race, color, sex, religion, national 
origin, age, or handicap." Id. § 34-35-5(1)(g) (emphasis 
added). Clearly, the legislature believed the Act's purposes 
were to have broad and important implications for the welfare of 
Utah workers. 
525 In addition to this strong statutory support for 
recognizing claims for wrongful termination based on age 
discrimination, two other policy considerations support the 
availabilitw of such a cause of action. First, a significant 
majority—69.7%--of the Utah employer population employs fourteen 
or fewer employees.2 Thus, the legislature's broad goal of 
eliminating employment discrimination is addressed in only a 
limited way by the Act, and can in fact be avoided by the 
majority of Utah•employers. Second, the way in which a state 
regulates relations between employees and employers has a 
significant impact on the quality of life for many of its 
citizens, and ultimately for the society as a whole. The 
"workplace climate'' of a state is an important part of its 
opportunities for economic growth and long-term development. It 
is an entirely appropriate arena for the operation of policy 
choices intended to benefit the public interest, as indeed is 
manifest by the legislature's, choice to embody anti-
discrimination principles in statute. Utah should not be a place 
where workers can be fired, paid less, or otherwise treated less 
favorably by nearly 70% of all employers on the basis of their 
race, sex, religion, disability, or age. 
526 The majority decision undermines Utah's publicly 
proclaimed desire to eliminate employment discrimination. 
Because there is no reason in logic, history, case law, or policy 
why discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and 
disability may be distinguished from that based on age, I believe 
the majority's decision will apply to all categories protected in 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act and will affect all forms of 
invidious discrimination by small employers. It seems strange 
indeed that this court should declare that it is not a violation 
2
 This number is based on data from the second quarter of 
1999 and is provided by the Division of Workforce Information and 
Payment Services. 
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of public policy to discriminate against someone in employment 
because of race, sex, religion, disability, or age, no matter the 
size of the employer. 
527 The issue before us has been addressed by other 
jurisdictions. Noteworthy is Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 
(Md. 1996) . In that case, the plaintiff, alleging sex 
discrimination against a small employer, also sought to bring an 
action based on common law wrongful termination.. Id. at 611-12. 
The court was faced with a broad statute including the Maryland 
Legislature's intent to prohibit invidious employment 
discrimination and a limitation appearing to exempt small 
employers. See Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, §§ 14, 15(b) (1999). The 
court stated that ''absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of 
public policy, there ordinarily is no violation of public policy 
by an employer's discharging an at will employee." Molesworth, 
672 A.2d at 613 (internal quotation and citations omitted). The 
court then analyzed the various enforcement provisions of the 
statute including- one creatine an acency called the Commission 
on Human Relations, with powers and a mandate similar to the Utah 
Division. Id. at 613. While there are differences between the 
Maryland statute and case law and our own, they are minor 
compared to the similarity of the overall intent exhibited in 
both cases: the elimination of the detrimental effects of 
employment discrimination on the public interest. The Molesworth 
court found that the statutory scheme was not intended to exclude 
small employers from employment discrimination policies, but 
rather to "provide[] a clear statement of public policy 
sufficient to support a common law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge against an employer exempted by [having fewer than 
fifteen employees]." Id. at 616. The court, in analyzing the 
intent of the legislative scheme, found that while small 
businesses were excluded from the burdens imposed by the 
administrative mechanism, they were not excluded from the 
important public policy at the heart of the statute. See id.; 
Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733, 735-36 
(D. Md. 1992); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 660-61 (Ohio 
1995); Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1264-66 (Wash. 1990). I 
tfould adopt the reasoning of the Molesworth court as I believe 
its holding is in keeping with the legislature's statutory scheme 
and with the substantial and important public policy behind that 
statutory scheme. 
K28 In conclusion, the language of Berube is clear: 
"Public policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied 
Ln legislative enactments. The legislature, acting in consonance 
tfith constitutional principles and expressing the will of the 
Deople, determines that which is in the public interest and 
serves the public good." Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043. I believe 
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that the "public good" in this case would be best served by 
permitting a common law cause of action for wrongful termination 
against employers who discriminate on the basis of age, race, 
sex, religion, and disability. 
(I29 Justice Stewart concurs in Associate Chief Justice 
Durham's dissenting opinion. 
15 No. 980040 
10 USC Sec. 113 
42 USC Sec. 2000e 
5 USC Sec. 7101 
15 USC Sec. 631 
12 USC Sec. 1441a 
42 USC Sec. 2000e-2 
42 USC Sec. 2000e-5 
47 USC Sec. 554 
15 USC Sec. 1691 
3 USC Sec. 411 
2 USC Sec. 1311 
33 USC Sec. 1251 
2 USC Sec. 1202 
5 USC Sec. 2302 
12 USC Sec. 4545 
23 USC Sec. 101 
23 USC Sec. 324 
2 USC Sec. 1203 to 1218 
22 USC Sec. 4115 
8 USC Sec. 1152 
20 USC Sec. 1066c 
36 USC Sec. 5108 
36 USC Sec. 5008 
36 USC Sec. 4008 
36 USC Sec. 3808 
29 USC Sec. 1577 
5 USC Sec. 7116 
29 USC Sec. 206 
20 USC Sec. 1071 
5 USC Sec. 7201 
42 USC Sec. 5891 
42 USC Sec. 6709 
42 USC Sec. 3608 
42 USC Sec. 3604 
29 USC Sec. 2601 
42 USC Sec. 2000e-3 
42 USC Sec. 9849 
42 USC Sec. 1982 
42 USC Sec. 5057 
42 USC Sec. 3789d 
42 USC Sec. 12635 
42 USC Sec. 3605 
42 USC Sec. 295m 
42 USC Sec. 12101 
42 USC Sec. 6727 
42USCSec.2000e-16 
42 USC Sec. 298b-2 
42 USC Sec. 9821 
42 USC Sec. 3606 
42 USC Sec. 2000d-l 
43 USC Sec. 1747 
36 USC Sec. 67e 
15 USC Sec. 633 
45 USC Sec. 803 
49 USC Sec. 5332 
12 USC Sec. 302 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
113. Secretary of Defense 
2000e. Definitions 
7101. Findings and purpose 
631. Declaration of policy 
1441a. Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board and Resolution 
2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices 
2000e-5. Enforcement provisions 
554. Equal employment opportunity 
1691. Scope of prohibition 
411. Rights and protections under title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
1311. Rights and protections under title VII of Civil Rights Act 
1251. Congressional declaration of goals and policy 
1202. Discriminatory practices prohibited 
2302. Prohibited personnel practices 
4545. Fair housing 
101. Definitions and declaration of policy 
324. Prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex 
1203 to 1218. Pub. L. 104-1, title V, Sec. 504(a)(2), (5 
4115. Unfair labor practices 
1152. Numerical limitations on individual foreign states 
1066c. Limitations on Federal insurance for bonds 
5108. Prohibition on discrimination 
5008. Prohibition on discrimination 
4008. Prohibition on discrimination 
3808. Prohibition on discrimination 
1577. Nondiscrimination 
7116. Unfair labor practices 
206. Minimum wage 
1071. Statement of purpose; nondiscrimination; andappropriations 
7201. Antidiscrimination policy; minority recruitmentprogram 
5891. Sex discrimination prohibited 
6709. Sex discrimination; prohibition; enforcement 
3608. Administration 
3604. Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing and other p 
2601. Findings and purposes 
2000e-3. Other unlawful employment practices 
9849. Nondiscrimination provisions 
1982. Property rights of citizens 
5057. Nondiscrimination provisions 
3789d. Prohibition of Federal control over State and local crimin 
12635. Nondiscrimination 
3605. Discrimination in residential real estate-related transacti 
295m. Prohibition against discrimination on basis of sex 
12101. Findings and purpose 
6727. Nondiscrimination 
2000e-16. Employment by Federal Government 
298b-2. Prohibition against discrimination by schools on basis of 
9821. Nondiscrimination provisions 
3606. Discrimination in the provision of brokerage services 
2000d-l. Federal authority and financial assistance to programs o 
1747. Loans to States and political subdivisions; purposes; 
67e. Membership 
633. Small Business Administration 
803. Repealed. Pub. L. 97-449, Sec. 7(b), Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 
5332. Nondiscrirnination 
302. Number of members; classes 
40 USC Sec. 476 
15 USC Sec. 775 
20 USC Sec. 1681 
28 USC Sec. 1862 
28 USC Sec. 602 
36 USC Sec. 5808 
36 USC Sec. 5608 
36 USC Sec. 4805 
22 USC Sec. 3905 
50 USC Sec. 435 
47 USC Sec. 151 
5 USC Sec. 7204 
20 USC Sec. 1087-2 
22 USC Sec. 2755 
22 USC Sec. 2314 
15 USC Sec. 1691d 
22 USC Sec. 2504 
48 USC Sec. 1542 
36 USC Sec. 391 
47 USC Sec. 555a 
21 USC Sec. 848 
49 USC Sec. 306 
7 USC Sec. 2020 
2 USC Sec. 1503 
2 USC Sec. 1201 
2 USC Sec. 658a 
12 USC Sec. 3106a 
20 USC Sec. 2561-2563 
20 USC Sec. 1087tt 
28 USC Sec. 1867 
22 USC Sec. 2426 
15 USC Sec. 3151 
15 USC Sec. 3101 
48 USC Sec. 1708 
15 USC Sec. 1691c 
47 USC Sec. 398 
18 USC Sec. 3593 
42USCSec.290ff-l 
5 USC Sec. 3302 
20 USC Sec. 1231e 
5 USC Sec. 7151 to 7154 
29 USC Sec. 1501 
10 USC Sec. 1034 
12 USC Sec. 3015 
12 USC Sec. 1735f-5 
20 USC Sec. 1756 
20 USC Sec. 1703 
20 USC Sec. 1011 
31 USC Sec. 6711 
29 USC Sec. 633a 
31 USC Sec. 6720 
12 USC Sec. 1823 
12 USC Sec. 1821 
20 USC Sec. 7235 
20 USC Sec. 7233 
20 USC Sec. 7232 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 (Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/26/98 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
01/05/99 Sec. 
476. Sex discrimination prohibited 
775. Sex discrimination; enforcement; other legal remedies 
1681. Sex 
1862. Discrimination prohibited 
602. Employees 
5808. Restrictions 
5608. Restrictions 
4805. Membership 
3905. Personnel actions 
435. Procedures 
151. Purposes of chapter; Federal Communications Commission 
7204. Other prohibitions 
1087-2. Student Loan Marketing Association 
2755. Discrimination prohibited if based on race, religion, natio 
2314. Furnishing of defense articles or related training or other 
169 Id. Applicability of other laws 
2504. Peace Corps volunteers 
1542. Voting franchise; discrimination prohibited 
391. Recognition of amateur sports organizations 
555a. Limitation of franchising authority liability 
848. Continuing criminal enterprise 
306. Prohibited discrimination 
2020. Administration 
1503. Exclusions 
1201. Short title; purpose; definition 
658a. Exclusions 
3106a. Compliance with State and Federal laws 
2561 to 2563. 
1087tt. Discretion of student financial aid administrators 
1867. Challenging compliance with selection procedures 
2426. Discrimination against United States personnel 
3151. Nondiscrimination 
3101. Congressional findings 
1708. Discrimination prohibited in rights of access to, and benefits 
1691c. Administrative enforcement 
398. Federal interference or control 
3593. Special hearing to determine whether a sentence of death is 
290ff-l. Requirements with respect to carrying out purpose 
3302. Competitive service; rules 
1231e. Use of funds withheld 
. 7151 to 7154. Transferred) 
1501, Statement of purpose 
1034. Protected communications; prohibition of retaliatory person 
3015. Eligibility of cooperatives 
1735f-5. Prohibition against discrimination on account of sex in 
1756. Remedies with respect to school district lines 
1703. Denial of equal educational opportunity prohibited 
1011. Antidiscrimination 
6711. Prohibited discrimination 
633a. Nondiscrimination on account of age in Federal Government e 
6720. Definitions, application, and administration 
1823. Corporation monies 
1821. Insurance Funds 
7235. Criteria and priorities 
7233. Programs authorized 
7232. Statement of purposes 
20 USC Sec 7206 
20 USC Sec 
22 USC Sec 
20 USC Sec 
22 USC Sec 
31 USC Sec 
10 USC Sec 
29 USC Sec 
2396 
6401 
1087-4 
2661a 
732 
1561 
1532 
42 USC Sec 2000e-4 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
10406 
13791 
29 USC Sec 2651 
29 USC Sec 
29 USC Sec 
29 USC Sec 
29 USC Sec 
29 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
1737 
1533 
1531 
1514 
1503 
3631 
708 
300x-57 
42 USC Sec 300w-7 
42 USC Sec 290cc-33 
42 USC Sec 5309 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
9906 01/ 
8625 
1437w 
12832 
42 USC Sec 3123 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
15 USC Sec 
20 USC Sec 
22 USC Sec 
902 
6870 
10604 
10504 
1975a 
11504 
5919 
5151 
292d 
631 
5934 
262p-4n 
10 USC Sec 481 
42 USC Sec 
20 USC Sec 
42 USC Sec 
603 
6231 
14193 
01/05/99 Sec 7206 Applications and requirements 
01/05/99 Sec 2396 Federal laws guaranteeing civil rights 
01/05/99 Sec 6401 Findings, policy 
01/05/99 Sec 1087-4 Discrimination in secondary markets prohibited 
01/05/99 Sec 2661a Foreign contracts or arrangements, discrimination 
01/26/98 Sec 732 Personnel management system 
01/05/99 Sec 1561 Complaints of sexual harassment investigation 
01/26/98 Sec 1532 State job training coordinating council 
01/26/98 Sec 2000e-4 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
01/26/98 Sec 10406 Discrimination prohibited 
01/26/98 Sec 13791 Community schools youth services and supervision grant pro 
01/26/98 Sec 2651 Effect on other laws 
01/26/98 Sec 1737 Nontraditional employment demonstration program 
01/26/98 Sec 1533 State education coordination and grants 
01/26/98 Sec 1531 Governor's coordmation and special services plan 
01/26/98 Sec 1514 Job training plan 
01/26/98 Sec 1503 Definitions 
01/26/98 Sec 3631 Violations, penalties 
01/26/98 Sec 708 Nondiscrimination provisions 
01/26/98 Sec 300x-57 Nondiscrimination 
01/26/98 Sec 300w-7 Nondiscrimination provisions 
01/26/98 Sec 290cc-33 Nondiscrimination 
01/26/98 Sec 5309 Nondiscrimination m programs and activities 
26/98 Sec 9906 Nondiscrimination provisions 
01/26/98 Sec 8625 Nondiscrimination provisions 
01/26/98 Sec 1437w Choice in public housing management 
01/26/98 Sec 12832 Nondiscrimination 
01/26/98 Sec 3123 Discrimination on basis of sex 
01/26/98 Sec 902 Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, other officers 
01/26/98 Sec 6870 Prohibition agamst discrimination, notification to funded 
01/26/98 Sec 10604 Administrative provisions 
01/26/98 Sec 10504 Prohibition of discrimination 
01/26/98 Sec 1975a Duties of Commission 
01/26/98 Sec 11504 Waiver or modification of housing and community development 
01/26/98 Sec 5919 Loan guarantees and commitments for alternative fuel demons 
01/26/98 Sec 5151 Nondiscrimination in disaster assistance 
01/26/98 Sec 292d Eligibility of borrowers and terms of insured loans 
01/05/99 Sec 631 Declaration of policy 
01/05/99 Sec 5934 Functions of National Board 
01/05/99 Sec 262p-4n Equal employment opportunities 
01/05/99 Sec 481 Race relations, gender discrimination, and hate group activi 
01/26/98 Sec 603 Grants to States 
01/05/99 Sec 6231 Requirements 
01/26/98 Sec 14193 Purposes 
K ) N J K ) K ) K ) K ) K ) K ) K ) h O K ) t O K ) 
O O O O O O 
—3 -—I —J —J —I - O - ^ --J 
n ^ o 
< l ^ ) ^ ^ ^ i ^ < ^ v y i 4 ^ 4 ^ 
KJ\ U\ ^h KJ\ tO •—l •—* 
W K ) O ^ • - * O - O U> 
• ^ --J ON ON t o - 0 H-* 
O 
O LO O O U> »— C \ OO OO W K ) 
U ) 
- J H - 4 ^ ; _ — o o^ Z^ o 
oo ,\, ^ 4^  O 
O 
oo 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ O K ) W ; 
to 
4 ^ W M 
OO 
t O t O •—* i—» i—* VD 
- O L/i ^h ^h K ) O 
to P O O 
\ l OJ K ) K ) to o vo oo 
o o 
4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 
VO - O - J --J 
n o o n 
•rj hrj ' r j hrj 
Jd ?0 Jtf 5?d K ) VO v l v j 
4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ U ) L O L O L O L O L O U ) L O L O b O t O M ^ K ) h O t O t O b O t O 
S J ^ N J ^ U ^ U I ^ M 0 0 ^ ^ ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ K ) K ) K ) ^ V O ^ V O ^ ^ V O V O O O O O C X ) 0 0 ( X ) 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
G o o o o o o n n n o o o o o n o o o o n o o Q n o o n o o n o o o n o o o o o o n o 
,JJ hrj 'TTJ , r j ^ h r j ^ T j ^ T j ' T j ' T r j h c j h r j hrj ^rj >"rj >rj hcj hrj hrj hrj hrj 'Tj ^xj ^J hrj hrj hrj hrj >rj ^r) 'TJ ^d '"d *Tl lTJ hrj ^TJ hrj >~rj hrj ,TJ ' r j hrj 
U ) K ) ( O M C O O O O O C O < ^ W N a 4 i M M M s J t ^ K ) M ^ M ^ M ^ ^ ^ W ^ ^ 4 ^ W U ) V O ^ ^ V O V O W 
; h t O H W O \ ^ W O O ^ i O O O O U I M 4 ^ \ O M O \ ^ ^ O C \ ^ ^ O K ) H O \ M O O O O V 1 ^ 0 0 \ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ^ ) 
^ ; , ; ! O U ) C \ 4 ^ O C \ C \ K ) 0 0 t O H - * ^ O O W N J O ^ W M C h ^ K J O ^ 
to O ^ 0 0 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 
4 ^ 
O 
to 
ON 
Utah Sex Discrimination Regulations Sc Code 
Utah Code Anno. 11-25-12 
Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1,3 
Utah Code Anno. 26-8a-501-
Utah Code Anno. 57-3,5,6,7_ 
Regulations 
R137-1-3 
R199-8-3 
R277-112-3 
R277-911-3 
R432-200-7 
R432-270-5 
R432-550-7 
R432-700-8 
R432-750-7 
R477-1-1 
R477-2-4 
R477-2-5 
R477-15-1 
R512-10-3 
R547-2-16 
R547-4-16 
R590-76-6 
R590-83 
R606-3-2 
R606-4-2 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ANGELA BYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CREATIVE CORNER, INC., and 
LYN PELTON, 
Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM TO 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
AUTHORITY 
Case No. 990911231 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
-00O00-
Defendants' Creative Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton submit their Reply Memorandum 
to the Supplemental Authority submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. This Memorandum shall show the Court that the case 
law and statutes submitted by Plaintiff as "Supplemental Authority" unequivocally 
demonstrates that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and 
that Defendants are also entitled to judgment on the pleadings. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I. 
THE BURTON CASE ENTITLES DEFENDANTS TO JUDGEMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS. 
Fundamentally, all legal issues advanced by the Plaintiff against the Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim were rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and Medical Clinic, et.al. 2000 UT 18 (Utah 
2000). attached as Exhibit "A". The Burton case is virtually identical to the case now before 
the Court, except the Plaintiff in the Burton matter alleged age discrimination. Plaintiff 
Burton alleged that his employer, Exam Center and Industrial General Medical Clinic and its 
president and chief operating officer, Howard Boulter, terminated him based upon age. 
However, since the employer maintained less than 15 employees, no case could be filed 
against the employer under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. ("UADA") The Plaintiff took 
the legal position that the UADA created a public policy exception to the general employee-
at-will rule, allowing employers to terminate employees without cause. The trial court 
granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, relying on the case of Retherford v. 
AT&T Communication, 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992), holding that the UADA pre-empts any 
:ommon law cause of action for wrongful termination and since no remedy was available 
ander the UADA, Burton's claim for age discrimination must be dismissed. Burton appealed 
he grant of summary judgment. 
2 
The Utah Supreme Court commenced its analysis by indicating that an at-will 
employee may overcome the presumption that the employment relationship has no specific 
duration by demonstrating, inter alia, that termination of employment constitutes a violation 
of a clear and substantial public policy. In deciding that the UADA did not create a "clear 
and substantial" public policy against termination of employment based upon age, the Utah 
Supreme Court cited the California Supreme Court case of Jennings v. Marralle 8 CAL. 4th 
121, 876 P. 2d 1074, 32 CAL. RPTR. 2d 275 (Cal. 1994), which addressed California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act. ("FEHA"). The FEHA declared a state public policy of 
protecting and safe guarding the right and opportunity to seek and hold employment without 
discrimination on various ground, including age, which was defined as being older than 40 
years. However, the act applied only to those employers who regularly employed 5 or more 
people. The Jennings Court was asked to decide whether wrongful termination based upon 
the FEHA prohibited against discrimination violated public policy thereby creating a tort 
claim against an employee of less than 5 people. The Jennings Court held: 
This exemption of small employers from the FEHA ban on age discrimination 
was enacted simultaneously to and is inseparable from the legislative statement 
of policy. For that reason, and because no other statute or constitutional 
provision bars age discrimination, we conclude that there presently exist no 
"fundamental policy" which precludes age discrimination by a small employer. 
Thus, there is no independent basis for an action for tortious discharge in 
violation of policy. Burton at 7, citing Jennings, 876 P. 2d at 1076. 
Reply on Jennings, the Utah Supreme Court then generally rejected the primary 
argument advanced by Plaintiff Byers in this case that the UADA creates a public policy of 
any nature against discrimination: 
3 
We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public policy that is "clear 
and substantial" with respect to small employers. The California Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Jennings that "the exemption of small employers from 
[California's] FEHA ban on age discrimination was enacted simultaneously to, 
and is inseparable from, the legislative statement of policy," is sound and 
unanswerable. Our legislature has made a similar decision to prohibit age 
discrimination in the termination of employees only by large employers, and 
if, as Burton contends, small employers should likewise be prohibited, that is a 
matter that the legislature, not the Court, should address. Burton at 7. 
The Burton Court also cited Jennings with approval to the effect that laws prohibiting 
discrimination should not apply to the employer/employee relationship of small employers 
and that the legislature intended to create a redress for discrimination only against larger 
employers. Burton at 9. 
Finally, the Burton Court again cited the Jennings case for the proposition that the 
Utah legislature did not extend liability to small employers for discrimination: 
As stated by the Jennings Court: "It would be unreasonable to expect 
employers who are expressly exempted from FEHA ban on age discrimination 
to nonetheless realize that they must comply with the law from which they are 
exempted under pain of possible Court liability. We do not ascribe such a 
purpose to the legislature." Jennings, 876 P. 2d at 1083. To that sound 
expression, we add that we would be no more justified in creating a tort action 
to lie against small employers then we would to create a tort action against 
religious organizations or associations, which are also expressly exempted 
from the provisions of the UADA. Burton at 10. 
The Burton Court's judicial interpretation of the UADA extending an exemption from 
liability for discrimination to small employers is particularly applicable to Creative Corner, 
4 
Inc., and Lyn Pelton, the Defendants in the case before the Court. Creative Corner, Inc., 
employs four (4) people. 
The Burton Court decided against the Plaintiff on all significant legal propositions 
which are advanced in this case. In the Complaint in this case, the only Utah statute cited is 
the UADA in support of Plaintiffs claim that a public policy exists against small employer's 
terminating employees based upon sex. However, the Burton Court specifically addressed 
that issue holding: "We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public policy which is 
"clear and substantial" with respect to small employers. Burton at 7. Therefore, the 
Complaint should be dismissed as deficient on its face. 
If the Plaintiff desired to go forth under the dictum stated in the Burton case, the 
Plaintiff should have sought leave of this Court to amend the Complaint and state in the 
Complaint other state statutes creating a public policy exception to the at-will rule. This, the 
Plaintiff failed to do and Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleading since the Utah 
Supreme Court held in Burton that the UADA generally does not create a "clear and 
substantial public policy" relating to small employers. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF HAS COMPLETELY FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A 
"VIOLATION OF A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY" 
Plaintiffs extraordinarily feeble attempt to capitalize on the dictum in the Burton case 
falls catastrophically short of the mark. The Burton Court, in dictum, stated: 
5 
Suffice it to here say that sex, race, religion, and disability may present 
different considerations and a public policy against discrimination on those 
grounds might conceivably be found in other statutes of this state. Burton at 
10. 
The Plaintiff apparently takes the position that this Court should perform Plaintiff's 
work and prove Plaintiffs case for her by researching the 156 federal statutes, 5 Utah State 
statutes and 22 Utah regulations cited by Plaintiff to discover whether there is an applicable 
public policy which is "clear and substantial" among all of the statutes. No analysis of any 
:ited statute to support the public policy exception was performed by Plaintiff in her 
Supplemental Authority. 
The Plaintiff has remarkably failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a clear and 
substantial public policy required under the circumstances by the Utah Supreme Court to 
;how an exception to the employee-at-will doctrine. The pubic policy exception was first 
:learly ennuniciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Peterson v. Browning 832 P. 2d 1280 
Utah 1992). In Peterson, the Utah Supreme Court described the public policy exception as 
bllows: 
Actions falling within the public policy exception typically involve termination 
of employment for (1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, (2) 
performing a public obligation, or (3) exercising a legal right or privilege, 
(citations omitted) Peterson, 832 P. 2d at 1281. 
The Court then stated: 
This Court has indicated that it will narrowly construe the public policies on 
which a wrongful termination action may be based, (citations omitted) It is 
not the purpose of the exception to eliminate employer discretion in 
6 
discharging at-will employees (citations omitted), or to impose a requirement 
of "good cause" for discharge of every employee. Accordingly, we hold that 
the public policy exception applies in this state when the statutory language 
expressing the public conscience is clear and when the effected interest of 
society are substantial. The identification of clear and substantial public 
policies will require case-by-case development. Peterson 832 P. 2d 1281 - 82. 
The Peterson Court then clearly delineated the requirements a Plaintiff must establish 
to provide a showing of a "clear and substantial public policy": 
To provide the basis for an action under the public policy exception, a 
violation of a state or federal law must contravene the clear and substantial 
public policy of the State of Utah. Although many state and federal laws will 
reflect Utah pubic policy, and may, in fact, provide a source of Utah public 
policy, a Plaintiff must establish the connection between the law violated and 
the public policies of Utah. Peterson, 832 P. 2d at 1282. 
The Peterson Court then examined a specific statute which allegedly had been violated 
and examined how violation of the specific statute contravene public policy holding "based 
on the information available to us, it appears that the Utah Public Policy at issue is both clear 
and substantial". Peterson, 832 P. 2d at 1282. 
In this case, Angela Byers has done nothing more in her "Supplemental Authority" 
than request a search engine in a computer to search state and federal statutes for the words 
"sex discrimination" and regurgitate the computer's response. The Supplemental Authority 
contains virtually no required showing of any statute which has been violated. There is no 
statute which is cited that prohibits discrimination based upon sex in private employment. 
The Supplemental Authority contains no demonstration of violation of a "clear and substantial 
public policy". 
7 
Each of the Utah statutes and regulations cited by Angela Byers in support of her 
claim have been reviewed at length by Defendant's counsel. All of the statutes refer to 
either state employment, state funded jobs, or state licensed facilities. There is virtually no 
reference to solely private employment. Additionally, many of the statutes and regulations 
prohibits discrimination based upon age, which the Burton Court has already held to not 
create a clear and substantial public policy against discrimination in the State of Utah. 
The Burton Court directly rejected the argument that a statute governing state 
employment or involving state action, creates a clear and substantial public policy. The 
Burton Court stated: 
Amicus ACLU suggests that the legislature additionally has declared a public policy 
against age discrimination in employment in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2(4), which was 
repealed in 1995 but was in effect at the time of Burton's termination in 1994. In that 
statute, the legislature declared that in the state's own employment practices, there 
should be equal employment opportunity without regard to age and other 
discriminatory practices. Amicus also relies on Utah Administrative Code R606-3-2, 
which prohibits age discrimination by persons contracting with the state. "While 
arguably a public policy can be found in that statute and code, it obviously has no 
application to a private employer. Nor do we find any federal statute that could 
provide the basis for a tort action against small employers, citing Leathern v. Research 
Found of City Univ. of N.Y., 658 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that federal 
claim under federal statute "cannot service as a basis to expand employees' remedies 
under New York State common law of tort"). Burton at 8. 
Angela Byers has not, and cannot, cite a statute which creates a clear and substantial 
public policy in the State of Utah against private employers with less then 15 employees 
liscriminating against employees based upon sex. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
Angela Byer's Complaint has been challenged on its face and is singularly deficient. 
After having been provided an opportunity to address the deficiency, Angela Byers has failed 
in her burden to demonstrate an exception to the at-will employment policy in the State of 
Utah where she is employed by an employer having less then 15 employees. The state 
legislature his not provided a remedy for the allegation nor is there any statute which Angela 
Byers has demonstrated creates a clear and substantial public policy. Angela Byers claims 
should be dismissed both on the face of the pleading and for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
DATED this ^ d a y of February, 2000. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Paul Wood 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this _//_ day of February, 2000, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
AUTHORITY to be hand delivered, to the following: 
Robert H. Wilde 
Blake A. Nakamura 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
935 East South Union Ave., Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
{^creative, rpy 
10 
EXHIBA? A 
2 0 0 0 UT 18 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
[ubert C. Burton, M.D., No. 980040 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v 
xam Center Industrial & 
eneral Medical Clinic, Inc., 
nd Howard Boulter, 
Defendants and A.ppellees 
hird District, Salt Lake County 
he Honorable Sandra Peuler 
trorneys: Robert H. Wilde, Kevin C. Probasco, Midvale, for 
plaintiff 
Glen M. Richman, Bart J. Johnsen, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants 
Lois A. Baar, W. Mark Gavre, Salt Lake City, for 
amicus Utah Manufacturers Association 
Stephen C. Clark, Salt Lake City, for amicus American 
Civil Liberties Union of Utah Foundation, Inc. 
Arthur F. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah 
State American Federation of Labor—Congress of 
Industrial Organizations 
)WE, Chief Justice: 
11 Plaintiff Hubert C. Burton, M.D., appeals from the 
•ial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants Exam Center 
Ldustrial & General Medical Clinic, Inc. (the "Clinic") , and 
>ward Boulter in this action wherein Burton alleges that his 
iployment with the Clinic was terminated because of his age. 
BACKGROUND 
i2 In July 1994, Boulter, president and chief operating 
ficer of the Clinic, terminated the sixty-nine-year-old Burton, 
part-time physician at the Clinic. Boulter told Burton that 
F I L E D 
January 19, 2000 
the Clinic had hired a full-time physician, eliminating the need 
for Burton's services. Boulter explained that the decision to 
hire this new physician was made suddenly, out of necessity, and 
stated: "I [Boulter] didn't know how much longer you older guys 
wanted to work, and I felt that we couldn't pass up this 
opportunity to employ a full-time physician."1 Burton 
subsequently filed a complaint with the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division ("UADD"), alleging his termination was age related.2 
The UADD responded that because the Clinic had fewer than fifteen 
employees, under the terms of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
("UADA")3 the Clinic was not under the UADD's jurisdiction. The 
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 
634 (1998) ("ADEA"), and many similar state acts typically exempt 
small employers from their provisions. 
13 Burton then filed this action against the Clinic and 
Boulter (collectively, "Exam Center"), alleging that his firing 
violated a public policy found in both state and federal statutes 
against taking employment actions toward employees because of 
their age and asserting that violation of that public policy 
1
 The parties dispute exactly what was said at that meeting; 
however, in reviewing a summary judgment, it is well settled that 
we relate the facts of the case and all reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom in a light favorable to the nonmoving party, 
see White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Utah 1994), and we 
do so here. 
2
 Burton alleged that this new doctor was a "much younger" 
man. His exact age .is unclear from the record, but he was over 
the age of forty. 
3
 At the time of Dr. Burton's termination, title 34, chapter 
35 of the Utah Code embodied the UADA. Unless noted otherwise, 
all references herein to the UADA will be to the 1994 statutes. 
The UADA contains the following definitions: 
(6) "Employee" means any person applying 
with or employed by an employer. 
(7) "Employer" means the state or any 
political subdivision . . . , and every other 
person employing 15 or more employees within 
the state for each working day in each of 20 
calendar weeks or more in the current or 
preceding calendar year; but it does not 
include religious organizations or 
associations . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(6), (7). 
gives rise to a claim for tortious wrongful termination.4 Exam 
Center moved for summary judgment on Burton's tortious wrongful 
termination allegation. After a hearing on the motion and the 
submission of supplemental briefs, the trial court denied the 
summary judgment, citing the existence of a factual dispute. 
Upon Exam Center's motion for reconsideration, however, the trial 
court reversed its earlier ruling and granted the summary 
judgment, based on language from Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992), and held that the UADA 
preempts any common law cause of action for tortious wrongful 
termination. Burton now appeals from rhis grant of summary 
judgment.5 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f4 Before granting summary judgment, a court must, after »"• 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, find that no disputed issues of material fact exist and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harnicher v. University of Utah Med. 
Ctr. , 962 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah 1998). Review of a trial court's 
grant of summary judgment includes a determination of whether the 
trial court correctly applied governing law, affording no 
deference to the trial court's determination or conclusions of 
Law. See Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 
L216 (Utah 1999); Harnicher, 962 P.2d at 69. 
ANALYSIS 
15 The UADA provides: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice: 
(a)(i) for an employer to refuse to 
hire, or promote, or to discharge, 
demote, terminate any person, or to 
4
 In addition to tortious wrongful termination, Burton's 
:omplaint set forth two other causes of action: (1) failure to 
>ay wages timely upon termination, and (2) recovery of attorney 
ees incurred in pursuing timely payment of those wages. 
5
 Upon this court's request, the Utah Manufacturers 
ssociation PUMA"), the Utah State American Federation of Labor-
ongress of Industrial Organizations CxAFL-CIO") , and the 
merican Civil Liberties Union of Utah Foundation, Inc. 
"ACLU"), provided amicus briefs. 
3 
retaliate against, harass, o i: 
discriminate in matters of compensation 
or in terms, privileges, and conditions 
of employment against any person 
otherwise qualified, because of race, 
color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or 
pregnancy-related conditions, age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or 
older, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) (1994) (emphasi s added). 
Burton contends t.hat In enacting the foregoing st:atute, the 
]egislature has recognized and declared a public policy against 
age discrimination in employment practices including termination 
of employment. He argues that because the UADA covers only 
employers with fifteen or more employees, he has no 
administrative remedy through the UADD and that this court should 
afford him a remedy by recognizing a tort cause of action for 
wrongful termination so as to put him on an equal basis with 
employees of employers of fifteen or more employees. In sum, 
Burton contends that we should create a cause of action to fill 
the void left by the enactment: of the UADD. He also asserts that 
denying him. a tort remedy would violate the open courts guarantee 
^ -p _ ^ +_ ..; 1 „._,
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16 We begin by observing that under our case law, there is 
a presumption that an employment relationship which has no 
specified term of duration is an at-will relationship, but that 
presumption is subject to a number of limitations. See Fox v. 
MCI Communications Corp,, 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997). In that 
case, we recognized: • 
An at -wil 1 employee may overcome that 
presumption by demonstrating that (] ) there 
is an implied or express agreement that the 
employment may be terminated only for cause 
or upon satisfaction of another agreed-upon 
condition; (2) a statute or regulation 
restricts the right of an employer to 
terminate an employee under certain 
c o n d i t i o n s ; o r ( 3) t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f 
employment constitutes a violation of a clear 
a i i • :i s u b s t a n t j a I p \ I b J i c p o 1 j c y 
Id. (citations omitted). In that casef we further remarked, that 
not every employment termination that has the effect of violating 
some public policy is actionable: "A public policy whose 
contravention is achieved by an employment termination must be 
' c l ea r and s u b s t a n t i a l " to be actionable. '7 Id. at 860. 
Declarations of pub l i c pol icy can be found in const i tut ions and 
s t a t u t e s , but not a l l s tatements made in s t a t u t e s are expressions 
of public po l icy . See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 
(Utah 1992) . We w i l l not repeat the review of cases made in Fox 
wherein v i o l a t i o n s of publ ic policy have and have not been found. 
Suffice i t to observe here tha t none of them have involved 
termination due to the age of the employee. 
l7 The t r i a l court granted summary judgment to the Exam 
-enter in r e l i a n c e on Retherford 's holding tha t the UADA provided 
the employee the exc lus ive remedy for wrongful termination in 
violat ion of the p r o h i b i t e d and discriminatory employment 
pract ices enumerated t h e r e i n . The employee was not allowed to 
Dring a t o r t a c t i on for wrongful discharge. However, in that 
:ase the complaining employee was covered by the UADA because her 
employer had f i f t e e n or more employees. In the ins tant case, the 
Cxam Center has l e s s than f i f teen employees, and the UADA affords 
3urton no p r o t e c t i o n or remedy. Thus Retherford 's holding 
irguably did not extend to small employers who were not within 
:he purview of the UADA. We must therefore decide whether a 
mbl ic policy e x i s t s j u s t i f y i n g the creat ion of a common law 
:ause of ac t ion for Burton against the Exam Center for allegedly 
: i r ing him due to h i s age. 
f8 In support of h i s position that we should create a 
:ommon law cause of ac t ion to redress his terminat ion, Burton 
e l i e s on Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 
1996) . In t h a t c a se , the court had to decide whether a common 
aw cause of a c t i on for wrongful discharge of a female employee 
ased on sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n l i e s against an employer with less 
han f if teen employees. Like our UADD, Maryland's Fair 
mployment P r a c t i c e s Act prohib i t s discr iminat ion in employment 
ased on race , c o l o r , r e l i g i o n , ancestry or na t iona l origin, sex, 
ge, mari tal s t a t u s , and other grounds. The Maryland Act also 
xempts from i t s terms employers with less than f i f teen 
mployees. The cou r t sus ta ined the p l a i n t i f f s r igh t to sue her 
mployer on the b a s i s of "a t least t h i r t y - fou r s t a t u t e s , one 
xecutive order , and one cons t i tu t iona l amendment in Maryland 
hat prohibi t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n based on sex in ce r t a in 
ircurastances. Together these provisions provide strong evidence 
f the l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t to end discriminat ion based on sex in 
aryland." Id. a t 613-14. The court noted tha t the United 
t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court for the Distr ic t of Maryland in Kerrigan v. 
aanum Entertainment, I n c . , 804 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1992), had 
a r l i e r come to the same conclusion, observing tha t the 
nployer 's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Maryland Act would mean that the 
General Assembly intended to grant small businesses in Maryland 
5 
a 1 icense to discriminate [on the basis of sex] against their 
emp 1 oyees with impunity . " Id . at 7 35 .  
19 11 I r e a c h i n g 11 s d e c i s i o i i, 11: I e M a r y 1 a i I d c o u r t r e 1 i e d 
upon Collins v.. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St. 3d 65, 652 N.E.2d 653 
(1995), where the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a wrongful discharge 
claim based on the public policy and a statute prohibiting 
discrimination in employment from which the employer was exempt. 
The court also cited with approval Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 
912
 P 784 P. 2d 1258 ' 19 9 CM where the Washin^ton Suorerne Court 
held that a cause of action for wrongful discharge was available 
based on a statute prohibiting age discrimination but providing 
i Io remedy. See also Williamson v. Greene, 200 W. Va. 421, 4 90 
S.E,2d 23 (1997), where it was held that even though an employer 
of less than twelve employees was not an "employer" within the 
meaning of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, a discharged at-
will employee may maintain a common law action for retaliatory 
discharge against her employer based on alleged sex 
discrimination or sexual harassment because sex discrirnii latioi I 
and sexual harassment in employment contravene the public policy 
of the state as articulated in the West Vi rginia Human.Rights 
Act. For a general discussion of these issues, see Kimberly C. 
Simmons, Annotation, Preemption of Wrongful Discharge Cause of 
Action by Civil Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R.Sth 1 (1994); Cara Yates, 
Annotation, Application of State Law to Age Discrimination in 
Employment, 51 A.L.R.51h ] (nn°nx . 
110 The California Supreme Court reached the opposite 
result in Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074 (Cal. 1994). In 
that case, the court was considering a provision of California's 
Fair Employment: and Housing Act ("FEHA") , which declared a state 
pub! ic policy of protecting and safeguarding the right and 
opportunity to seek, obtain, and hold employment without 
discrimination on various grounds, including age, defined as o i- < *r 
forty years. The administrative remedies provided for in the 
FEHA, however, were not made available to employees whose 
employer did not regularly employ five or more persons. The 
court was asked to decide whether an employee to whom the 
administrative remedies were not avail able may nonetheless 
maintain a common law tort action for damages for wrongful 
discharge in violation of the public policy stated in. the FEf I A 
The court concluded that permitting such an action would be 
inconsistent: with the legislative intent reflected in various 
provisions of the FEHA, and particularly that provision which 
restricts employer liability for violations of the FEHA age 
provision to employer's subject to the FEHA. The court wrote: 
Tl lis exemption i of si nail employers from, the 
FEHA ban on age discrimination was enacted 
simultaneously to and is inseparable from the 
legislative statement of policy. For that 
reason, and because no other statute or 
constitutional provision bars age 
discrimination, we conclude that there 
presently exists no "fundamental policy" 
which precludes age discrimination by a small 
employer. Thus, there is no independent 
basis for an action for tortious discharge in 
violation of policy. 
[d. at 1076. 
ill As we have earlier stated, Burton contends that the 
JADA declares a public policy against the termination of 
employees who are over the age of forty years and that such 
mblic policy applies to all employees, whether employed by an 
imployer who has fifteen or more employees ("large employer") or 
m employer who has less than fifteen employees ("small 
imployer"). He argues that small employers were exempted from 
.he UADA because of the administrative burden it would place upon 
he UADD if all employers were under its jurisdiction. He points 
>ut that nothing in the UADA prohibits legal action againsi: small 
mployers who discriminate and that nationwide there are some 
leven million workers who are not included within the purview of 
ederai and state anti-discrimination employment acts. 
512 We are not persuaded that the UADA declares a public 
olicy which is "clear and substantial" with respect to small 
mployers. The California Supreme Court's reasoning in Jennings 
hat "the exemption of small employers from [California's] FEHA 
an on age discrimination was enacted simultaneously to, and is 
nseparable from, the legislative statement of policy," id. , is 
ound and unanswerable. Our legislature has made a similar 
ecision to prohibit age discrimination in the termination of 
mployees only by large employers, and if, as Burton contends, 
[nail employers should likewise be prohibited, that is a matter 
hat the legislature, not the court, should address. An 
bservation we made in Baker v. Matheson, 607 P. 2d 233, 237 (Utah 
979), bears repeating here: 
Due respect for the legislative prerogative 
in lawmaking requires that the judiciary not 
interfere with enactments of the Legislature 
where disagreement is founded only on policy 
considerations and the legislative scheme 
employs reasonable means to effectuate a 
legitimate object. In matters not affecting 
fundamental rights, the prerogative of the 
7 
legislative branch. Is broad, and must by-
necessity be so if government is to be by the 
people through their elected, representatives 
and not by j 1 idges. 
ID 3 Amicus ACLU suggests that the legislature additionally 
Iias declared a public policy against age discrimination in 
employment in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2(4), which was repealed in 
1.995 but was in effect at the time of Burton's termination, in 
1994. In that statute, the legislature declared that I n the 
state7s own employment practices, there should be equal 
employment opportunity without regard to age and other 
discriminatory practices,. Amicus also relies on Utah 
Administrative Code R606-3-2, which prohibits age discrimination 
by persons contracting with the state. While arguably a public 
policy can be found in that statute and Code, it obviously has no 
application, to a private employer. Nor do we find any federal 
statute that could provide the basis for a tort action against 
small emplovers. See Leathern v. Research Found, of City Univ. of 
N.Y. , 658 ?\ Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that federal 
claim under federal statute "cannot, serve as a basis to expand 
employees' remedies under New York State common law of tort7'). 
Because we can find no constitutional provision or other statute 
which declares a clear and substantial public policy against age 
uiscriiuiuation in erripxoynient practices, we must decline to create 
an exception to the general rule prevailing in this state that 
employment, is presumed to be on an at-will basis for both the 
employer and, the employee. 
114 11 ie ins tant. case car i readi 1 y be dis111 iguished from 
Molesworth, 672 A.2d at 608, one of the principal cases upon 
which Burton, relies. Molesworth was a, case of sex, discrimination 
in employment. The Maryland court found "at least thirty-four 
statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional amendment" 
t ha t p r ohibi t di s c r irni i ia t i on based on, s ex i n cert a in 
circumstances. Id. at 613-14. There is no such constitutional 
or statutory declaration of public policy in Utah against: 
discrimination on account of age in, the termination of employment 
of employees of small employers. The dissent in the instant case 
relies on Molesworth but fails to note that in finding a public 
policy against sex discrimination by smal 1 employers, the court 
relied not on, the anti-discrimination' act that exempted them,, but 
on "thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one 
constitutional amendment/' In Utah, there is no such basis for 
us to find a public policy against age discrimination in 
employment. We have found no cases from other jurisdictions 
recognizing a public policy against age discrimination by small 
e mp 1 o y e r s in a sta 11 I t e s \ i c h a s o i i r I I£ DA, w h i c h express 1 y e x, e mp t s 
sma 11 emp 1 o ye r s 
1115 In Jennings, the California court offered an 
explanation of the FEHA small employer exception. They suggested 
hat the legislature made the exception in the FE^ HA because the 
"ramers 
''believe [d] that discrimination on a small 
scale would prove exceedingly difficult to 
detect and police. . . . [I]t was believed 
that an employment situation in which there 
were less than five employees might involve a 
close personal relationship between employer 
and employees and that fair employment laws 
should not apply where such a relationship 
existed. Finally, the framers were 
interested primarily in attacking protracted 
large-scale discrimination by important 
employers and strong unions. Their aim was 
not so much to redress each discrete instance 
of individual discrimination as to eliminate 
the egregious and continued discriminatory 
practices of economically powerful 
organizations. Thus, they could afford to 
exempt the small employer. 
innings, 876 P.2d at 1082 (quoting Tobriner, California FEPC 
965), 16 Hastings L.J. 333, 342). 
516 Several federal courts have expressed the same reasons 
r the small employers exemption found in certain federal anti-
scrimination statutes. See e.g., Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66 
3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (legislative history indicates 
at xxthe protection of intimate and personal relations existing 
small business" was reason for Title VII's small employer 
eruption) ; Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 
th Cir. 1993) ("Congress did not want to burden small entities 
th the costs associated with litigating discrimination 
aims."). 
1117 There is an additional reason why we should not create 
tort action against small employers. Under the UADA, a covered 
Dloyee alleging age discrimination must assert his claim within 
3 days of the alleged discrimination. Utah Code Ann. 
34-35-7. 1 (1) (c) (1994). The charge is filed at the UADD and is 
idled administratively. Emphasis in the administrative process 
placed on conciliation and voluntary resolution. The UADA 
idates that the administrative agency "attempt a settlement 
:ween the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion." 
ih Code Ann. § 34-35-7. 1 (3) (a) . If the claimant is successful, 
9 
the relief provided n icludes reinstatement, back pay and 
benefits, and attorney fees, but no compensatory or punitive 
damages may be awarded. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(9). This is 
all done without charge by the administrative agency. In 
contrast to that simplified procedure, if a small employer were 
subjected to a. tort action in the courts, he would have to hire 
his own attorney to defend the action against him, and damages 
could be awarded against him. The action presumably could be 
brought within four years, not limited by the 180-day limitation 
in the UADA, and a jury trial might be demanded. The dissent 
would subject the small employers of this state to those burdens. 
As stated by the Jennings court: "It would be unreasonable to 
expect employers who are expressly exempted from the F'EHA ban on 
age- discrimination to nonetheless realize that they must comply 
with the law from which they are exempted under pain of possi b] e 
tort liability- We do not ascribe such a purpose to the 
Legislature." 876 P.2d at 1083. To that sound expression, we 
add that we would be no more justified in creating a tort action 
to lie against small employers than we would be to create a tort 
action against religious organizations or associations, which are 
also expressly exempted from the provisions of the UADA. The 
dissent charges that our decision opens the door for small 
employers in Utah to discrimii late not only on the basis of age, 
but on the basis of sex, race, religion, and. disability. Suffice 
it to here say that sex, race, religion, and disability may 
present different considerations and a public policy against• 
discrimination on those grounds might: conceivably be found in 
other statutes of this state. That question is not: before us and 
we express no opinion on that: subject. 
118 Lastly, Burton contends that denying him. a. tort remedy 
against his employer violates article 1, section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides in part, XXA1 1 courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law 
. . . ." Burton cites no authority that would require us to 
create a remedy for him, and we know of no case law that would. 
require this court to do so under that constitutional provision. 
To the contrary, nearly eighty-five years ago this court held 
that where no right of action is given or no remedy exists und*-r 
either the common law or statute, this section creates none. 
Brown v. Wiqhtman, 4 7 Utah. 31, 1.5] P 3 66 (1 91,5). Thus, there is 
no constitut i ona] vi o..] a,t i on . 
i 19 Judgme n. t a f f i rmed. 
120 Justice Zimmerman and Justice Russon concur in Chief 
Justice Howe's opinion. 
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting: 
121 I respectfully dissent. While the present case concerns 
:he limited issue of age discrimination by employers with fewer 
:han fifteen employees ("small employers"), the majority's 
iecision will apply to all kinds of employment discrimination. 
Specifically, by determining that Dr. Burton has no cause of 
iction for age discrimination against his employer because the 
employer employs fewer than fifteen employees, the majority has 
>pened the door to all small employers to discriminate not only 
>n the basis of age, but also on the basis of the other 
:ategories protected by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("Act"), 
ftah Code Ann. §§ 34A-5-101 to -108 (1997 and Supp. 1999) / 
.ncluding race, sex, religion, and disability. In light of the 
:act that the vast majority of Utah employers qualify as small 
employers, we should not open this door. Instead, this court 
;hould recognize a common law cause of action for wrongful 
ermination against employers who discriminate on the basis of 
ge. 
122 This, court adopted a public policy exception to the 
mployment-at-will doctrine in Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 
.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), 
here, we stated: 
[W]e recognize that a public policy exception 
is necessarily a threshold issue implicated 
in our reexamination of the scope of Utah's 
at-will rule, and we have therefore been 
willing to consider and define it. We also 
stress that actions for wrongful termination 
based on this exception must involve 
substantial and important public policies. 
To this end, we will construe public policies 
narrowly and will generally utilize those 
based on prior legislative pronouncements 
. . . applying only those principles which 
1
 At the time the instant case was filed, the Act was 
odified at title 34, chapter 35 of the Utah Code. The relevant 
ections of the Act were not affected by the subsequent 
enumbering and amendments. Unless otherwise noted, all 
eference to the Act hereinafter are to the 1994 version. 
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are so substantial and fundamental that there 
can be virtua 1 Ly ' no question as to their 
importance for promotion of the public good. 
Id. at 10 4 3 (Durham, ] , joined by Stewart, > J ). rhe majority 
has failed to undertake the careful analysis of public, policy 
that Berube demands, creating an enormous loophole which Utah 
employers may exploit to the detriment of many Utah employees. 
Prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of age 
constitutes a substantial and important public policy sufficient 
to support a common law cause of action. 
123 In the Act, the legislature pronounced that "[i]t is a 
discriminatory employment practice .  . . for an employer to 
. . . discharge [or] . . . terminate any person . . . otherwise, 
qualified, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or 
pregnancy-related conditions, ag' religion, national 
origin, or handicap." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) . The 
legislature, in limiting the Act's coverage to employers with 
more than fifteen employees, appears to have been balancing two 
policies: vigorously opposing discrimination in employment 
practices while simultaneously protecting small business from the 
burdens of the statutory remedies. The legislature's decision 
not to extend the Act's remedies to employees of small employers 
in no way undermines the significance of its core policy 
principles. It is not in the public interest: to permit 
discrimination in employment based on age, race, sex, religion,,, 
and disability. 
124 The Av-._ ^.cutes u substantial buj^au^i.a^. .//s;-:., ... 
implement its aims. It mandates the creation of the Utah Ant i -
Discrimination Division (the "Division"), a-> w< ]] as the Ant i 
Discrimination Advisory Committee to that Division (the 
"Committee") . See id. §§ 34-35-3, -4.5(1). The governor is 
directed to appoint the members of the Committee, I nc 1 uding "on e 
small business representative." Id. § 34-35-4. 5(1) •(a) (i) 
(emphasis added) , The Division is given broad powers, includi i: ig 
the authority to "receive, reject, Investigate, and pass upon 
comp 1 a in t s a 11 eg i ng di s c r imi na t ion I n emp 1 oyme nt: • ::«i: t: h e 
existence of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
by a person, [or] an employer." Id. § 34-35-5(1) (c) (emphasis 
added) . Significantly, the Division is i lot limited to acting 
against v"employers" in its fact finding or its passing upon 
discrimination complaints; rather, It: is also empowered to act 
against "persons." Id. § 34-35-5(1)(c). Repeatedly, the 
Division is charged with the ambitious task: of fighting 
employment discrimination by such means as advising the governor, 
recommending legislation, and cooperating with both public and 
private groups. See id. § 34-35-5(1) (h) , (j), (k). It is even 
i v e n t h e power t o s u b p o e n a w i t n e s s e s , a d m i n i s t e r o a t h s and 
ompel t he p r o d u c t i o n o f documents and p a p e r s . S'>ee i d . 
3 4 - 3 5 - 5 ( 3 ) (a) ( i ) t o ( i i i ) . F i n a l l y , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has 
n s t r u c t e d t he D i v i s i o n t o " i s s u e p u b l i c a t i o n s and r e p o r t s of 
n v e s t i g a t i o n s and r e s e a r c h t h a t w i l l t end t o p romote good w i l l 
mong t h e v a r i o u s r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s , and e t h n i c g r o u p s of t h e 
t a t e , and t h a t w i l l m i n i m i z e o r e l i m i n a t e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in 
mployment b e c a u s e of r a c e , c o l o r , s e x , r e l i g i o n , n a t i o n a l 
r i q i n , age , o r h a n d i c a p . " I d . § 34 -35 -5 (1) (g) (emphas is 
dded) . C l e a r l y , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e b e l i e v e d t h e A c t ' s p u r p o s e s 
e r e t o have b r o a d a n d i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e w e l f a r e of 
t a h w o r k e r s . 
125 In a d d i t i o n t o t h i s s t r o n g s t a t u t o r y s u p p o r t for 
e c o g n i z i n g c l a i m s f o r w r o n g f u l t e r m i n a t i o n b a s e d on age 
i s c r i m i n a t i o n , two o t h e r p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t the 
v a i l a b i l i t y of s u c h a c a u s e of a c t i o n . F i r s t , a s i g n i f i c a n t 
a j o r i t y — 6 9 . 7 % — o f t h e U t a h employer p o p u l a t i o n employs f o u r t e e n 
r f ewer e m p l o y e e s . 2 T h u s , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s b r o a d g o a l of 
L i m i n a t i n g employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s a d d r e s s e d i n on ly a 
Lmited way by t h e A c t , a n d can in f a c t be a v o i d e d by t h e 
a j o r i t y of Utah - e m p l o y e r s . Second, t h e way i n which a s t a t e 
^ g u l a t e s r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n employees and e m p l o y e r s ha s a 
L g n i f i c a n t impac t on t h e q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r many of i t s 
L t i z e n s , and u l t i m a t e l y f o r t h e s o c i e t y a s a w h o l e . The 
workplace c l i m a t e " o f a s t a t e i s an i m p o r t a n t p a r t of i t s 
} p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e c o n o m i c growth and l o n g - t e r m d e v e l o p m e n t . I t 
> an e n t i r e l y a p p r o p r i a t e a r e n a fo r t h e o p e r a t i o n of p o l i c y 
l o i c e s i n t e n d e d t o b e n e f i t t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , as i ndeed i s 
m i f e s t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s , c h o i c e t o embody a n t i -
. s c r i m i n a t i o n p r i n c i p l e s i n s t a t u t e . Utah s h o u l d n o t be a p l a c e 
i e r e worke r s can b e f i r e d , * p a i d l e s s , o r o t h e r w i s e t r e a t e d l e s s 
t v o r a b l y by n e a r l y 70% o f a l l employers on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r 
t ee , s e x , r e l i g i o n , d i s a b i l i t y , or a g e . 
126 The m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n undermines U t a h ' s p u b l i c l y 
"ocla imed d e s i r e t o e l i m i n a t e employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
i cause t h e r e i s no r e a s o n i n l o g i c , h i s t o r y , case l aw, or p o l i c y 
iy d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on t h e b a s i s of r a c e , s e x , r e l i g i o n , and 
s a b i l i t y may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h a t b a s e d on a g e , I b e l i e v e 
.e m a j o r i t y ' s d e c i s i o n w i l l app ly t o a l l c a t e g o r i e s p r o t e c t e d i n 
e Utah A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Act and w i l l a f f e c t a l l forms of 
v i d i o u s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n by s m a l l e m p l o y e r s . I t seems s t r a n g e 
d e e d t h a t t h i s c o u r t s h o u l d d e c l a r e t h a t i t i s n o t a v i o l a t i o n 
2
 T h i s number i s b a s e d on d a t a from t h e s e c o n d q u a r t e r of 
99 and i s p r o v i d e d by t h e D i v i s i o n of Workforce I n f o r m a t i o n and 
yment S e r v i c e s . 
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of public policy to d iscriminate against: someone in employment: 
because of race, sex, religion, disability, or age, no matter the 
size of the employer. 
CI27 The issue before us has been addressed by otl ler 
jurisdictions. Noteworthy is Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 
(Md. 1996) . In that case, the plaintiff, alleging- sex 
discrimination against a small employer, also sought to bring ai i 
action based on common law wrongful termination. Id. at 611-12. 
The court was faced wi th a broad statute including the Maryland 
Legislature's Intent to prohibit invidious employment 
discrimination and a limitation appearing to exempt small 
employers. See Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, §§ 14, 15(b) (1999). The 
court stated that "absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of 
public policy, there ordinarily is no violation of public policy 
by an employer's discharging an at will employee." Molesworth, '-
672 A.2d at 613 (internal quotation and citations omitted). The 
court then analyzed the various enforcement provisions of the 
S f a f n f o i n r 1 n rl T n rr rM^ o r r o ^ f i n n ^ n 3 rxo.r\r^\r r p l 1 o r l t~ H o. C o mm S c c i n n 
on Human Relations, with powers and a mandate similar to the Utah 
Division. Id. at 613. Whi] e there are differences between the 
Maryland statute and case law and our own, they are minor 
compared to the similarity of the overall intent exhibited in 
both cases: the elimination of the detrimental effects of 
empIoyment discrimina11on on the pub 1 ic i nterest... The Molesworth 
court found that" the statutory scheme was not intended to exclude 
small employers from employment discrimination policies, biit 
rather to "provide [] a clear statement of public policy 
sufficient to support a common law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge against an employer exempted by [having fewer than 
fifteen employees]." Id. at 616. The court., in analyzing the 
:m;"nt of ti le ] egislative scheme, found, that while small. 
•messes were excluded from the burdens imposed by the 
-.uministrative mechanism, they were not excluded from the 
important public policy at the heart of the statute. See id. ; 
Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733, 735-36 
(D. Md. 1992); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 660-61 (Ohio 
1995); Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1264-66 (Wash. 1990). I 
would adopt the reasoning of the Molesworth court as I believe 
its holding is in keeping with the legislature's statutory scheme 
and with the substantia.] and i mportant pi ibl.,i c policy behi nd that 
statutory scheme. 
128 Ii i conclusion, the language of Berube is clear: 
"Public policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied 
i n legislative enactments. The legislature, acting in. consonance 
with constitutional principles and expressing the will of the 
people, determines that which is in the public interest and 
serves the public good." Berube, 771 P..2d at 1 04.3. I be ] i eve 
that the "public good" in this case would be best served by 
permitting a common, law cause of action for wrongful termination 
against employers who discriminate on the basis of age, race, 
sex, religion, and disability. 
H29 Justice Stewart concurs in Associate Chief Justice 
Durham's dissenting opinion. 
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935 East South Union Ave., Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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Telephone: (801) 255-4774 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo 
ANGELA BYERS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
CREATIVE CORNER, INC. AND LYN 
PELTON, 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
RULE 59 MOTION 
Civil No. 990911231 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to Rule 59(a) (7), Utah R. Civ. P. Plaintiff moves 
this court for a new trial on the grounds that the court 
committed an error of law when it dismissed Plaintiff's 
complaint 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 59 provides, in relevant part; 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion 
for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
L:\D\11735\Rule 59 motion -1-
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, 
take additional testimony, ameadfindings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new finHirrgs-^and 
conclusions, and direct the erTtry^bt a 'new judgment: 
(7) Error in law. 
BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT 
The court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds 
that there does not exist a clear and substantial public policy 
in Utah against terminating an employee of a small employer (an 
employer with fewer than 15 employees) because of her sex. In so 
doing the court overlooked the fact that the Utah Supreme Court 
has said that Utah courts should look to either Utah or Federal 
statutes or regulations to find such policies. Retherford v. 
AT&T, 844 P.2d 949, 968-969 (Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court 
has also given credence to executive orders in determining 
whether a public policy was clear and substantial. Burton v. 
Exam Center, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2000 UT 18 (Utah 2000) at 
2000 UT Kl4. 
In Burton the court examined the plaintiff's age 
discrimination case under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA) 
and determined held that statute did not provide a clear and 
substantial public policy against age discrimination. There the 
court specifically said its decision did not preclude an 
L:\D\ll735\Rule 59 motion -2-
examination of other statutes to determine whether there was a 
clear and substantial public policy against sex, race, or 
religious or disability discrimination. Burton at 2000 UT 18 
1Jl7. The court's major emphasis was on the UADA' s simplified and 
expedited resolution procedure. 
In this matter Plaintiff has asked the court to find that a 
clear and substantial public policy against termination on the 
basis of sex is found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (as amended). The Burton analysis does not apply to Title 
VII. While sex discrimination claims brought under Title VII are 
investigated by the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division 
(UALD) unlike UADA claims are they are not tried in the UALD 
venue. If a negotiated resolution is not reached within the UALD 
a Notice of Right to Sue is issued by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the claimant then becomes a 
plaintiff in a law suit brought in state or federal court. In 
short, a Title VII sex discrimination claim does not have the 
benefit of the expedited procedures a UADA claim does and the 
Burton holding does not apply to Title VII claims. { Further, the 
legislative history of Title VII shows that the purpose for 
excluding small employers was to reduce the case load of the EEOC 
and not to provide some alternative to litigation as the court 
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found in Burton. In short, the Burton analysis does not apply to 
Title VII and Title VII provides a clear and substantial public 
policy against termination because of sex. 
Title VII is not alone as a federal statutory basis for the 
clear and substantial public policy against termination because 
of sex. At 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) congress prohibited discrimination 
in compensation based on sex, regardless of the number of 
employees, so long as the employer meets the other requirements 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It goes without saying that if 
an employer may not discriminate in the amount of compensation it 
cannot discrimination in whether to pay any compensation at all, 
i.e., whether to fire on the basis of sex. 
42 U.S.C. §5057 makes it illegal to for an employer, 
regardless of size, to discriminate based on sex among certain 
volunteers, i.e., people who do not get paid. If clear and 
substantial public policy prevents sex discrimination among 
volunteers clearly there is such a policy preventing the 
termination, based on sex, from employment upon which a woman 
relies for her livelihood. 
The Utah Supreme Court has analyzed government regulations 
in determining whether a public policy is clear and substantial. 
See Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 406 (Utah 
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1998). Specific regulations of the federal government show a 
clear and substantial public policy against sex discrimination, 
regardless of the size of the employer. Businesses who contract 
with the Federal Railroad Administration1, the Federal Highway 
Administration2, the Federal Communications Commission3 
specifically, and the government generally4 may not discriminate 
based on sex no matter how few employees they have. In analyzing 
regulations and statutes we must remember that the Peterson v. 
Browning, did not create a cause of action for the violation of 
individual statutes or regulations. It merely held that the 
statutes or regulations must be analyzed to see whether their 
policy is clear and substantial. If there is a clear and 
substantial public policy against sex discrimination for small 
firms who contract with the federal government to perform 
janitorial services the policy remains clear and substantial 
against sex discrimination for small firms who contract with the 
state or a private firm to perform those same janitorial 
x49 CFR §265.7(a) (1) (i) 
223 CFR §230.113 
347 CFR §73.2080 
441 CFR §60-1.4 
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services. If there is a clear and substantial public policy 
against sex discrimination for small firms who perform janitorial 
services the policy remains clear and substantial against sex 
discrimination for small firms who do anything else. 
For many years neither congress nor the president were 
prohibited in any fashion from discriminating against their 
employees on the basis of sex. As of 1996 both of these 
employers are required to treat women employees no differently 
than they treat men, including in firing decisions. See 2 U.S.C. 
§1311, 3 U.S.C. §411. When both of these employers who have 
previously been able to do as they wish are now restricted in 
their ability to fire a woman because of her sex it is clear that 
the national public policy is clearly and substantially against 
allowing an employer, of any size, to fire a woman because of her 
sex. 
CONCLUSION 
Burton turned on the Supreme Court's application of the 
principals of Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) and 
Retherford, supra, to the UADA's age discrimination provisions. 
Plaintiff asks this court to perform that same analysis for Title 
VII's sex discrimination provisions. Plaintiff also asks the 
court to analyze the other federal statutes cited above and the 
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proclamations of Utah's governors5 in this same light. When that 
is done it is evident that Utah does in fact have a clear and 
substantial public policy prohibiting defendant from terminating 
plaintiff because of her sex. 
DATED this ^ day of Arj^ Yll 2000. 
ROBERT H. WILDE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5UT Exec Order March 17, 1993 - Gov. Leavitt; UT Exec Order 
June 30, 1989 - Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec Order July 25, 1986 -
Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec Order May 28, 1985 - Gov. Bangerter; UT 
Exec Order January 12, 1982 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec Order July 
17, 1980 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec Order May 4, 1979 - Gov. 
Matheson; UT Exec Order October 1, 1977 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec 
Order December 6, 1973 - Gov. Rampton; UT Exec Order October 1, 
1965 - Gov. Rampton. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Rule 59 Motion was mailed to the following via first class mail, 
postage prepaid thereon, this $T day of April, 2000. 
E. Paul Wood 
Littlefield & Peterson 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
[MMi \ljfiw 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYERS, ANGELA 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CREATIVE CORNER INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
Case No. 990911231 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley 
Date: 08/18/2000 
This matter came before the Court upon Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59. 
Having received and considered memoranda in support and opposition to the Motion, the Court 
hereby DENIES the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff, Angela Bryers, was an at-will employee of the Defendant, Creative Corner Inc. 
2. On October 15, 1999, the Plaintiff alleges she was terminated because she was pregnant. 
3. At the time Plaintiff was terminated, the Defendant employed four employees. 
4. On November 5, 1999, the Plaintiff sued her former employer Creative Corner, and its 
President Lyn Pelton, claiming "wrongful termination in violation of public policy" as set forth 
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. This was the 
Plaintiffs sole cause of action. 
5. On December 9, 1999, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Plaintiffs 
cause of action was preempted by the exclusive remedy provision found in the Utah 
Discrimination Act (herein UADA)(Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to 8)(1988 as amended 1989). 
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States. Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). Second, that 
even if the claim was not preempted, there was not a viable cause of action because the 
Defendant is are not an "employer" as defined under the UADA. (U.C.A. 34A-5-102(8)(a)(iv)). 
Finally, the Defendants argued that the holding in Burton v. Exam Cntr. Indus, 2000 UT 18 
(Utah 2000), which affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant, in a suit where the 
plaintiff alleged that his firing by a small employer violated public policy against age 
discrimination, and gave him rise to a claim for tortious wrongful termination, is dispositive of 
this case. 
6. In response, the Plaintiff argued that her termination violated clear public policy against sex 
discrimination and that wrongful termination of an employee in violation of public policy is a 
tort. The Plaintiff also filed a Supplemental Memorandum providing the court with a list of 156 
federal codes, 5 Utah statutes, and 10 Executive Orders. Although the Plaintiff provided no legal 
analysis of how these statutes and regulations support her claim, she asked the court to consider 
these provisions in finding a public policy exception for her claim. 
8. On Febiuary 14, 1999, this court heard Oral Arguments on the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and took the matter under advisement. 
9. On March 30, 1999 this court signed an Order granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
This court dismissed the Plaintiffs complaint because it was not convinced that the Plaintiff had 
identified a clear and substantial public policy against wrongful termination of employment on 
account of sex by a small employer. 
10. A week later the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59. 
RULING 
a. Rule 59 
This trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one of 
the circumstances specified in subdivision (a) of Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Moon Lake Elec. Assn.' v. Ultra Systems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P2d 125 (Ut. App. 1988). 
Here the Plaintiff seeks relief under URCP 59 (a)(7), alleging that the trial court committed an 
"error of law" by not considering the federal codes, case statutes and executive orders the 
Plaintiff provided in her Supplemental Memorandum to find a "public policy exception" for the 
Plaintiffs claim. 
In her Memorandum Opposing the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff cited 
Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A. 2d 608 (1996). In that case the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
had to decide whether a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of a female 
employee based on sex discrimination could be made against an employer with less than 15 
employees. Maryland's Anti-Discrimination Act also exempts employers with less than 15 
employees. However, that court sustained the plaintiffs right to sue her employer on the basis of 
that "section 14 is one of at least thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional 
amendment in Maryland that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances." 
Molesworth at 632. 
In an attempt to mirror Molesworth, the Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Memorandum 
with an attachment listing 156 federal codes, 5 Utah statutes and 22 Utah regulations which 
prohibit sex discrimination under various circumstances. The Plaintiff stated that the list was 
provided "as additional sources of the public policy against sex discrimination, in addition to the 
UADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act..." Supplemental Memorandum Authority p.2. 
However, the Plaintiff provided no copies of these to the Court, nor any legal analysis which 
explains how the latter provisions provide a clear and substantial public policy against sex 
discrimination in the state of Utah. 
In her Rule 59 Motion the Plaintiff provided additional statutes and executive orders it 
would like this court to "analyze" as well. Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion p.6. However, these latter 
statutes and executive orders are outside the pleadings, could not have been considered by this 
court in its ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and cannot be considered now to find 
an error of law in the previous proceeding. Therefore this Court will not consider the additional 
statutes and executive orders in this decision. 
For the first time, in her Rule 59 Motion, the Plaintiff also argues that the Burton 
decision does not apply to Title VII actions. However, on page one of her Supplemental 
Memorandum the Plaintiff stated: "Burton addresses virtually all of the issues addressed in this 
matter. The distinguishing factor is that Burton is a case based on age-discrimination, while this 
action is based on sex discrimination." This Court may not consider a legal theory first 
mentioned in a post-trial motion, as a basis for a finding of an "error of law." Estate of Justhein 
824 P.2d 432, 434. Therefore this Court will not address this allegation either. The only issue 
this court will review is whether the court committed an error of law by not finding a clear and 
substantial policy exception for sex discrimination by small employers based on the list of codes, 
statutes and regulations attached by the Plaintiff in her Supplemental Memorandum. 
b. Rule 12 (b)(6) 
When ruling on a Motion to Dismiss under URCP 12 (b)(6), this Court may only consider 
the allegations made in the Complaint. Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P2d 622, 623 
(Utah 1990). In her complaint the Plaintiff only cites Title VII and the UADA as the basis of her 
claim. Under the Colman decision, this Court did not have the burden of finding, reviewing and 
analyzing the numerous list of codes, statutes and regulations attached to the Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Authority to reach a decision on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Furthermore, while analyzing Title VII and the UADA, this court is guided by the rule 
that in absence of an ambiguity, a statute should be construed according to its plain language. 
Johnson v. State Retirement Office. 755 P.2d 161. This is because the best indication of 
legislative intent is the statute's plain language. Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 679 
P.2d903,906(Utahl984). 
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII considers it an unlawful employment practice for "an employer to fail or refuse 
to hire or discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 U.S.C.S.§ 2000e-2. However, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce, who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty 
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." See 42 U.S.C.S. §200e et. seq. 
The Defendant, Creative Corners does not meet this definition of "employer;" therefore the 
Defendant is exempted from Title VII. 
2. UADA 
The UADA clearly states that "an employer may not refuse to hire, promote, discharge, 
demote or terminate any person ...because of (D) pregnancy; childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions." See U.C.A. 34A-5-106 (l)(a)(I)(D). However the UADA applies only to 
"employer(s)" as defined under the Act. The UADA defines "employer" as: 
(I) the state; 
(ii) any political subdivision; 
(iii) a board, commission ...or agent of the state; 
(iv) a person employing 15 or more employees within the state for each working day in 
each of 20 calendar weeks or more in the current or preceding calendar year." 
See U.C.A. 34A-5-102 (8)(a). 
Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, the Defendant also does not fall under the UADA's definitions of 
"employer." Therefore the Defendant is also not regulated by the UADA. Furthermore, the 
UADA also provides that "the procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimination based on...sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, 
or pregnancy related conditions..." See U.C.A. 34A-5-107(15). By its plain language the UADA 
provides the only remedy available for the Plaintiffs claim. Nevertheless, Utah recognizes a 
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine which does not insulate an employer from liability 
where the employee is fired in a manner or for a reason that contravenes clear and substantial 
public policy. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 165 (Utah 1991). Therefore this 
court will provide a historical review of this public policy exception below. 
c. Public Policy Exception 
Generally actions within the public policy exception involve termination of employment 
for 1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, 2) performing a public obligation, or 3) 
exercising a legal right or privilege. Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1992). In 
trying to explain the "public policy exception" the Utah Supreme Court has tried to identify 
proper sources of "public policy." In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., the court said, "public 
policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied in legislative enactments...Not every 
legislative enactment, of course, embodies public policy; only those which protect the public or 
promote public interest qualify." 771 P2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989). The court in Berube 
explained that the legislature is not the only source of public policy; "judicial decisions can also 
enunciate substantial principles of public policy in areas which the legislature has not treated." 
Id. The court also warned that: 
"actions for wrongful termination based on this exception must involve substantial 
and important public policies. To this end we will construe public policies narrowly 
and will generally utilize those based on prior legislative pronouncements or judicial 
decisions, applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental 
that there can be virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the 
public good." Id 
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently clear and substantial to support a 
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the Utah Supreme Court has 
suggested that trial courts examine the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it 
affects the public as a whole. "The following questions are relevant in determining whether a 
statute embodies a clear and substantial public policy: 
1) whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public, as 
opposed to only the parties only; and 
2) whether the public interest is so strong, and the policy so clear and weighty that we 
should place the policy beyond the reach of contract." 
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 966 (Utah 1992). 
This court finds that question one can be answered in the affirmative under the circumstances of 
this case. Clearly the wrongful termination of pregnant women by any employer is a question of 
overarching importance to the public, and society as a whole. However, at this time, this court 
cannot answer question two in the affirmative for the reasons set forth below. 
In Peterson v. Browning, the Utah Supreme Court held that when an employee is 
discharged in violation of a public policy exception he has a tort action against the employer. 832 
P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). The court admitted that due to the open-ended nature of the "public 
policy exception" the identification of clear and substantial public policies require case-by-case 
development." Id- at 1282. Again the court reiterated that "to provide a basis for an action under 
the public policy exception, a violation of a state or federal law must contravene the clear and 
substantial public policy of the state of Utah." Id- 1283. But this time the court added that 
"[ajlthough many state and federal laws will reflect Utah public policy, and may in fact, provide 
a source of public policy, a plaintiff must establish the connection between the law violated 
and the public policies of Utah." IdL Here the Plaintiff has not met this burden. 
In her complaint the Plaintiff cites Title VII and the UADA as the basis for her claim of 
"wrongful termination against public policy." The Defendants argued in their Motion to Dismiss 
that the UADA preempts the plaintiffs common law cause of action. This was the same 
argument made by the defendants in Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States, Inc., 844 
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). The latter case involved an appeal from a granl of summary judgment 
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint. The plaintiff had sued her employer alleging among other 
things that AT&T fired her in retaliation for complaining of being sexually harassed by her co-
workers, and that such a discharge violated Utah public policy barring reprisals for sexual 
harassment reports. On this issue, the Utah Supreme Court held that the UADA provided the 
exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs claim of discharge in violation of public policy. Retherford 
at 954. 
The Retherford court began its analysis of this issue by looking at the statute itself. 
U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(15) reads, "the procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy- related conditions, age, relation, national origin, or 
handicap." The court concluded that the plain text of the statute preempted common law causes 
of action for retaliation in complaints of employment discrimination. The court said," as a 
matter of statutory construction, we find that the version of the UADA at the time of 
Retherford's firing was the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against an employee who 
complained of sexual harassment." Retherford at 962. 
The Utah Supreme Court then reviewed whether Retherford's tort and contract claims also 
came within the scope of the UADA's preemptive effect. The court admitted that "we have yet to 
propound a generic test for determining when a statutory cause of action functions as the 
exclusive remedy for the wrong...[therefore] we have looked to law outside our jurisdiction [and] 
have adopted a test that inquires whether the statutory scheme supplies an indispensable element 
of the tort claim." Id. at 962-963. The court went on to explain that "the indispensable element 
test relies neither on timing nor conduct to determine preemption. Instead under this test, 
preemption depends on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim, not the 
nature of the defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that injury." 
Id at 965-966. 
Applying this test, the court again looked to the language of the UADA to determine the 
type of injuries the UADA is designed to address. From the plain language of the UADA the 
Retherford court concluded that "the legislature intended the UADA to address all manner of 
employment discrimination against any member of the specified protected groups." IcL at 
966. The court also stated that in order for Retherford to prove the tort of wrongful termination 
in violation of public policy, Retherford would need to show that AT&T discharged her in a 
manner or for reason that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy of the state of Utah, a 
public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or statutes." Id at 966. (citing Peterson 832 P.2d at 
1281; Berube 771 P.2d at 1051). The court concluded: 
"the only possible source in Utah's statues or constitution for a clear and substantial 
public policy allegedly violated by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's prohibition 
of retaliation for good faith complaints of employment discrimination...in absence of 
this public policy declaration, Retherford would be unable even to allege an action for 
this tort...it is plain that the harm the UADA addresses is an indispensable element in 
Retherford's tort cause of action; therefore the UADA must preempt this claim." Id. 
Here, as in Retherford's case, one of the harms the UADA addresses, pregnancy, is also 
an indispensable element in the Plaintiffs cause of action. This court following the Retherford 
holding ruled that the UADA is also the exclusive remedy for the Plaintiffs cause of action. In 
her Memorandum in Opposition, the Plaintiff argued that the Retherford holding does not apply 
to her case because in Retherford the plaintiff had alternative relief under a collective bargaining 
agreement and was also allowed to proceed with her claims for breach of implied contract, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent employment; while here the Plaintiff 
would not have any alternative relief. However the holding in Retherford does not state that to 
preempt a claim a statute must offer alternative relief; in fact the dismissal of Retherford's claim 
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy was affirmed as discussed above. 
Finally there is the case of Burton v. Exam Cntr. Indus., 2000 UT 18 (Utah 2000). In 
Burton the plaintiff appealed from the grant of summary judgment to defendant employers in a 
suit alleging a common law claim for tortious wrongful termination on the ground that firing the 
plaintiff due to his age violated public policy. The plaintiff in Burton argued that because the 
UADA covers only employers with 15 or more employees, he had no administrative remedy 
through the UADA; therefore that the Utah Supreme Court should recognize a tort cause of action 
for wrongful termination against public policy for small employers. B»urton also relied on 
Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996). But the Utah Supreme Court 
declined this argument. It held: 
"we can find no constitutional provision or other statute which declares a clear and 
substantial public policy against age discrimination in employment practices...in 
Molesworth the Maryland court found 'at least 34 statutes..etc' [here] there is no such 
constitutional or statutory declaration of public policy in Utah against discrimination 
on account of age in the termination of employment of employees by small 
employers...We have found no case from other jurisdictions recognizing a public 
policy against age discrimination by small employers in a statute such as our 
UADA which expressly exempts small employers." Burton at 13-14. 
The Burton holding cited some of the reasons why small employers should be exempt. 
For example, "if a small employer were subjected to a tort action in the courts, he would have to 
hire his own attorney, ...and damages could be awarded against him. The action could be 
presumably brought within four years, not limited by the 180-day limitation." Burton at 17. The 
court continued, 
"As stated by the Jennings court 'it would be unreasonable to expect small employers 
who are expressly exempted from the FEHA (California's Anti-Discrimination Act) 
ban on age discrimination to nonetheless realize they that they must comply with the 
law from which they are exempted ...we do not ascribe such a purpose to the 
legislature.'" IcL 
Here the Plaintiff has provided an extensive list of codes, statutes and regulations in an 
effort to establish that under Utah law there is a clear and substantial public policy against sex 
discrimination. However the Utah statutes cited by the Plaintiff apply only to entities or 
professions regulated by the state, not to small private employers. In Molesworthu the court also 
recognized that "absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of public policy, there ordinarily is no 
violation of public policy by an employer's discharging an at-will employee." Molesworth v. 
Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 630 (Md. App. 1996) (citing Watson v. Peoples Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 
478 (1991). However the plaintiff in Molesworth argued that her termination violated the public 
policy announced in §14 of the Fair Employment Act, Maryland Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995 
Supp) Art. 49B which states: 
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland, in the exercise 
of its police power for the protection of the public safety...to assure all persons 
equal opportunity in receiving employment...regardless of race, color, religion... 
sex, age...and to that end to prohibit discrimination in employment by any person, 
group, labor organization, organization, or ANY employer or his agents." Id. at 628. 
The defendant, argued that §14 did not apply to employers with less than 15 employees. However 
the Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed. The court explained, 
" by its own language [§14] proscribes discrimination in employment by 'any 
small employer.' If the term 'employer' in §14 were meant to refer only to employers 
as defined in § 15(b), the term 'any' would be unnecessary...the language of the statute 
indicates that the legislature intended to prohibit sex discrimination by 'any employer.'" 
IcL at 632. 
Although the codes, statues and regulations provided by the Plaintiff prohibit 
discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances, none indicate that the Utah legislature 
intended to prohibit sex discrimination by "any employer." Without a statute with the express 
language of Maryland's §14, it is difficult for this court to simply conclude that together these 
provisions provide strong evidence of a legislative intent to create a clear and substantial public 
policy against sex discrimination by any employer in Utah. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has failed 
to "establish a connection between the law violated and the public policies of Utah." Peterson at 
1283. In addition, the Retherford holding clearly established that the UADA provides the 
exclusive remedy for a claim for "wrongful termination against public policy." Finally, in Burton 
the Utah Supreme Court clearly declined to create a cause of action for small employers who 
discriminate against employees based upon age, a specified group protected under the UADA. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems odd, repugnant and disheartening to have concluded that the State of Utah is a 
place where a pregnant woman can be terminated from employment by a small employer because 
of her pregnancy, and that she is precluded from maintaining a wrongful termination cause of 
action under a public policy exception. The policy considerations which support the exemption of 
small employers from the reach of the Title VII and the UADA seem to pale in comparison to the 
harm caused by maintaining discriminatory employment practices which wrongfully deny 
economic opportunities, and reduce the quality of life for all of us. However, this court has its 
limitations; it must follow the plain text of the statutes of this state, and the controlling precedent 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. Based on the case law and analysis provided above, this 
court concludes that it did not commit an error of law by granting the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. Therefore the Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59 is DENIED. This 
Memorandum Decision shall constitute the final order of this court in resolving the matters 
referenced herein. 
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